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Leth-Petersen for detailed comments to several of my papers. Finally, I wish to thank John
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As part of my Ph.D. studies I studied 10 months at Northwestern University. This was a
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nancial support from the Tuborg Foundation, the Denmark-America Foundation, the Rudolph
Als Foundation, and the Sasakawa Foundation, which made my stay at Northwestern possible.
Finally, I wish to thank my family and my girl friend Louise Rathsach Skouby for support
during my three years of study.
Daniel le Maire
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22 Introduction and Summary
My thesis consists of ve papers which are not all closely related. However, interpreted broadly
all deal with the dispersion of earnings. In the rst two papers the relationship between earnings
and participation in the labor market and occupational choice is analyzed. In the third paper,
the e¤ects of the decentralization of wage bargaining on the wage distribution is examined,
whereas the nal two papers deal with assortative matching, which also has an e¤ect on the
earnings distribution.
The rst paper (coauthored by Christian Scheuer) was originally conducted for the Danish
Welfare Commission, and it seeks to examine the e¤ects of nancial incentives for persons re-
ceiving social assistance benets. First, we use the within-individual variation in the recipients
spouse incomes to examine the employment e¤ects of nancial incentives. From this variation
we nd no employment e¤ects. This result is consistent with consumption smoothing, but it
could also be due to the workers receiving social assistance benets being marginalized. Among
other things, the wage distribution and the strong state dependence in their labor market status
suggest that this group is marginalized. Second, we compute the net potential gain of working
over receiving social assistance. Using this measure we nd participation elasticities of 0.28-
0.44 for men and in the range of 0.62-0.68 for women. However, it is likely that unobserved
heterogeneity implies that these estimated elasticities are upward biased.
In the second paper (coauthored by Bertel Schjerning) we examine the importance of mon-
etary incentives for the choice of becoming self-employed. First, we nd that self-employed
taxable income bunch at kink points in the tax system because self-employed can retain earn-
ings and thereby transfer income across tax-years. Second, we nd that both expected income
level and income variance are important determinants in choice of occupation. Comparing men
and women, we nd that men put more emphasis on expected earnings level, while women
appears more risk averse which contribute to explaining why fewer women are self-employed.
Finally, our results suggest that non-western immigrants are marginalized into self-employment.
The third paper (coauthored by Christian M. Dahl and Jakob Roland Munch) studies how
decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to rm level inuences wage levels and wage dis-
persion. Existing studies rely on cross-section data and it is possible that the endogeneity of the
wage bargaining arrangements, for example due to sorting, is not appropriately controlled for.
We have the advantage of using a panel data set which covers part of the period of decentraliza-
tion which facilitates identication of the e¤ects of decentralization from changes that we claim
are exogenous. Intuitively, when wages are negotiated at the local level we would expect a larger
wage dispersion because rm- and individual-specic characteristics are more likely to enter the
wage contracts. Consistent with this prediction we nd that wages are more dispersed under
rm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems. Furthermore, if local
bargaining is known to imply more dispersed wages, we would expect that high ability workers
3sort into decentralized bargaining segments. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between
local bargaining and unobserved ability and that appropriately controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity should imply smaller estimated e¤ects of di¤erent bargaining arrangements. This
is also conrmed by our empirical results as the di¤erences across wage-setting systems are
reduced substantially when controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
While the rst three papers are empirical, the fourth paper (coauthored with Christian
Scheuer) is both theoretical and empirical. Intuitively, one should think that high productive
workers would choose to work in high productive rms, or interpreting it more general, that
high wage workers would tend to work in high-wage rms. This is termed positive assortative
matching. However, the existing empirical evidence suggests the opposite, that is negative
assortative matching. In order to analyze this counter-intuitive result, we need a (search) model
with i) worker ows between state of unemployment and di¤erent jobs, ii) positive assortative
matching, and iii) a resulting log wage equation, which is additive-separable in worker and
rm productivity. A central problem is that for assortative matching to arise, the canonical
search model needs log-supermodularity of the production function, which implies that the
wage equation is not additive separable. Our solution is to let workers determine how many
jobs they apply to since then we can use a supermodular production function which delivers
the wage equation needed. Besides continuous heterogeneity on both the worker and rm sides
we add a match productivity e¤ect. We show that when such match e¤ect is present we obtain
an estimated negative correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects even though there is
positive assortative matching (positive correlation) in the theoretical model. Furthermore, we
nd from empirical estimates on Danish matched employer-employee data that a match e¤ect
in the wages accounts for 15 per cent of the variation in the log wages. Finally, we nd evidence
of positive assortative matching in the Danish labor market.
The fth and nal paper builds on the previous paper by suggesting another way of achieving
assortative matching in a search model when the production function is only supermodular.
Specically, we do not need workers to choose an optimal sample of rms to apply to. Instead,
I show in a search model of the marriage market that we just need that both men and women
to consider more than one candidate at a time.
43 Summary in Danish
Denne afhandling består af fem papirer. I det første papir (skrevet med Christian Scheuer)
ønsker vi at undersøge e¤ekten af økonomiske incitamenter på personer, der modtager kon-
tanthjælp. Først undersøger vi, om der er e¤ekter på beskæftigelsen, når partnerens indkomst
varrierer over tid. Vi nder ingen deltagelsese¤ekter, men det kan skyldes, at individerne
udglatter forbrug over tid, og muligvis også at kontanthjælpsmodtagere er marginaliseret og
dermed ikke let kan nde et job. Lønfordelingen for den gruppe, vi betragter, hvor en stor
del modtager løn lige over minimumslønnen, og den høje grad af persistens i modtagelsen af
kontanthjælp, tyder netop på, at kontanthjælpsmodtagere er marginaliserede. For hver person
udregner vi desuden den potentielle forskel i indkomst, når personen arbejder i forhold til, når
personen modtager kontanthjælp. Ved at benytte denne forventede indkomstændring nder
vi, at deltagelseselaticiteten er 0,28-0,44 for mænd og 0,62-0,68 for kvinder. Imidlertid argu-
menterer vi for, at det er sandsynligt, at uobserverbar heterogenitet betyder, at disse estimater
er overvurderede.
I det andet papir (skrevet med Bertel Schjerning) undersøger vi, hvor stor en betydning
økonomiske incitamenter har for valget om at blive selvstændig. Først og fremmest nder
vi, at selvstændiges skattepligtige indkomst tenderer til at ligge lige under indkomstgrænsen
for mellemskat og topskat, idet selvstændige kan overføre overskudet i virksomheden til et
efterfølgende skatteår. For det andet nder vi, at både det forventede indkomstniveau og
indkomstvariationen er vigtige parametre for valget om at blive selvstændig. Sammenligner vi
mænd og kvinder, nder vi, at mænd lægger større vægt på indkomstniveauet, mens kvinder er
mere risikoaverse og dermed foretrækker mindre indkomst variation, hvilket kan være med til at
forklare, hvorfor færre kvinder bliver selvstændige. Tilslut viser vores resultater, at ikke-vestlige
indvandrere maginaliseres til at blive selvstændige.
Det tredje papir (skrevet med Christian M. Dahl og Jakob Roland Munch) undersøger,
hvorledes decentraliseringen af løndannelsen fra brancheniveau til virksomhedsniveau har påvir-
ket lønniveauet og lønspredningen. Eksisterende studier benytter udelukkende data for et
enkelt år, og det er dermed muligt at endogeneiteten i overenskomstområdet ikke afhjælpes. Vi
benytter derimod et panel datasæt, der dækker en del af decentraliseringsperioden, hvormed
vi kan benytte de eksogene skift i lønsystemet, som decentraliseringen har medført. Intu-
itivt må en mere decentral løndannelse betyde større lønspredning, da individuelle såvel som
virksomhedsspecikke karakteristika har større mulighed for at inuere lønnen. Vi nder i
overenstemmelse med denne forventning, at lønningerne har større spredning under decentral
løndannelse. Hvis arbejderne ved dette, må vi forvente, at de mest produktive vælger at arbejde
der, hvor der er størst lønspredning. Dermed er det forventelig, at der er en positiv korrelation
mellem decentral forhandling og uobserverbar heterogenitet, og at e¤ekterne af løndannelsen
bliver mindre, når vi kontrollerer for den uobserverbare heterogenitet. Denne forventning bliver
5bekræftet af vores resultater, hvor e¤ekten af løndannelsen bliver væsentlig mindre, når vi kon-
trollerer for uobserverbar heterogenitet.
Det fjerde papir (skrevet med Christian Scheuer) præsenterer en ny søgeteorimodel, hvor
heterogenene arbejdere og virksomheder matcher med hinanden. Vi tillader, at arbejderne
bestemmer, hvor mange jobs de ønsker at søge, hvilket medfører, at mere produktive arbe-
jdere og mere produktive virksomheder har større sandsynlighed for at nde et match sammen
(også kaldet positiv assortativ matching), på trods af at produktionsfunktionen kun er super-
modulær. Foruden kontinuert heterogenitet på både arbejder- og virksomhedsside tilføjer vi et
match produktivitetsled. Vi viser, at hvis der ndes en sådan match e¤ekt, kan vi estimere
en negativ korrelation mellem arbejder- og virksomhedse¤ekterne, selv om der i virkeligheden
er positiv assortativ matching (positiv korrelation) i den teoretiske model. Desuden nder
vi på dansk mikro data, at match e¤ekten udgør 15 procent af variationen i logaritmen til
timelønnen. Tilslut nder vi også empirisk, at der er positiv assortativ matching på det danske
arbejdsmarked.
Det femte og sidste papir bygger på det foregående papir, idet det foreslår en anden måde
at opnå assortativ matching på, selv om produktionsfunktionen kun er supermodulær. I stedet
for at lade arbejderen selv vælge det optimale antal job tilbud, han vil søge, viser vi i en
søgemodel for ægteskabsmarkedet, at man bare behøver, at mænd og kvinder overvejer mere
end en potentiel partner ad gangen.
Determinants of Labor Force Participation for
Recipients of Social Assistance: A Panel Data Analysis
for Denmark
Daniel le Maire
University of Copenhagen and CAM
Christian Scheuer
Copenhagen Business School and CEBR
December 15, 2008
Abstract
In this paper we seek to examine the e¤ects of economic incentives for recipients
of social assistance. The workers receiving social assistance benets are found to be
marginalized and we nd strong state dependence in their labor market status. We nd no
employment e¤ects from the within-individual variation in the recipientsspouse incomes,
and in contrast to Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2002) we argue that for the
case of Denmark the spouse income is endogenous, so that we cannot use the between
variation of spouse income to obtain meaningful estimates. Therefore, we also compute
the net potential gain of working over receiving social assistance. Using this measure we
nd participation elasticities of 0.28-0.44 for men and in the range of 0.62-0.68 for women.
Transforming the elasticities according to denition in the CGE-model DREAM, that is
the percentage change in the number of recipients from a percentage change in the income,
these amount to 0.09-0.17 and 0.13-0.20 for respectively men and women. However, we
argue that it is likely that unobserved heterogeneity implies that both sets of estimated
elasticities are upward biased.
Keywords: Labor force particpation, incentives, nonemployment, state dependence,
heterogeneity.
JEL Classication: C23, C25, J21, J24.
We gratefully acknowledge the comments we have received from Karsten Albæk, Martin Browning, Mette
Ejrnæs, Jan Vognsen Hansen, Martin Ulrik Jensen, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Hans Christian Kongsted, Claus
Thustrup Kreiner, Tove Birgitte Pedersen, Søren Leth-Petersen, Bertel Schjerning, Esben Anton Schultz, Anders
Sørensen and seminar participants in the DGPE 2005 workshop. Finally, we thank Mikael Kirk for research
assistance. All remaining errors are ours.
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71 Introduction
In this paper we consider intertemporal labor supply and examine the e¤ects of economic
incentives on the labor market participation for recipients of social assistance.
The labor supply decision is usually decomposed into the intensive margin, that is the
choice of hours, and the extensive margin, that is the participation decision. Even though it
is generally believed (see e.g. Heckman (1993)) that the largest e¤ects are to be found on
the extensive margin, most empirical studies have focused on the intensive margin. Empirical
studies for Denmark have typically found numerical small elasticities from wages on the amount
of labor supplied; see e.g. Frederiksen et al. (2001). In fact, the studies that have found largest
elasticities have used a Tobit framework and, hence, it seems as if the small elasticities at the
intensive margin have been polluted by the jointly modeling of the participation decision.
In Denmark several types of benets exist. Each of them is more or less directed to a distinct
group of people. With respect to participation, recipients of sickness benets and disablement
benets are for obvious reasons less interesting. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the
recipients of social assistance that is persons that are not eligible to unemployment benets
either because they are not members of an unemployment insurance fund or since they have
not been in work recently.
We have access to a rich panel data set, and we present results from employing di¤erent panel
data estimators. The rst set of estimations follow Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou
(2003) closely in the sense that we estimate the e¤ect on the participation decision using spouse
disposable income separated into permanent and temporary income.
Focusing solely on married women Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) argue
that spouse income is exogenous due to di¤erences in the participation pattern between men
and women. Hyslop (1999) nds elasticities of respectively permanent and transitory spouse
income of -0.2 and -0.04 for the US, while Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) for Germany nd
only very small e¤ects from both permanent and transitory spouse income on the participation
decision. However, in the case of Denmark the di¤erence in participation between men and
women is less pronounced (see e.g. Dex et al. (1995) for a cross-national comparison) and
we should expect a similar picture to emerge for men and women among recipients of social
assistance. Consequently, we also perform the estimations for men.
Instead of solely restricting our attention to the e¤ect of spouse income on participation, we
also estimate a set of models where we analyze the e¤ect of the workers own disposable income
gap from working on the participation decision To compute these income gaps we make panel
data selectivity predictions of the own wage income for each person. From this we can calculate
the disposable income from working full-time and compare this to the disposable income when
receiving social assistance.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical labor market
8search model. Section 3 outlines the data used in the analysis, and section 4 the econometric
methodology. In section 5 and 6, we examine the results when using respectively disposable
spouse income and own predicted disposable income gaps. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
An important aspect of intertemporal labor supply is the persistence of labor market status. In
this section we will briey consider a stylized labor market search model, which can generate
such pattern.
We extend a standard partial equilibrium search model with a stigmatizing e¤ect of becom-
ing nonemployed and by assuming an instant utility function, which is non-linear in income.
The rst assumption will similarly to Garibaldi and Wasmer (2004) imply state dependence,
whereas the latter assumption will allow us to focus on the e¤ect of the spouses income, which
we take to be exogenous to the worker in consideration.
Consider an indenitely living worker, who is married and whose spouses labor market
status is exogenous. We assume a joint instant utility function u (), where the workers own
labor income w and her spouse labor income s are perfect substitutes. Being employed or
nonemployed, wage o¤ers are distributed according to F (w) and arrive with the exogenous
Poisson rate . Workers who decline the new wage o¤er become non-employed.
When an employed worker becomes nonemployed the worker experiences a one-time stigma-
tization e¤ect . When ht 1 = f0; 1g denotes the labor market state of the previous period the
value of being nonemployed U (ht 1) is given by
rU (ht 1) = u (s+ b  ht 1) + 
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (0)) dF (x)  U (ht 1)

(1)
where r is the discount rate andW (w) is the value of being employed at wage w. The Bellman
equation for an employed worker is
rW (w) = u (s+ w) + 
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (1)) dF (x) W (w)

(2)
The reservation wage for an nonemployedRU is the wage where the worker is indi¤erent between
being unemployed and working, that is U (0) = W
 
RU

u (s+ b)  u  s+RU =  Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (1)) dF (x)  
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (0)) dF (x) (3)
Similarly, the reservation wage for an employed RW is when U (1) = W
 
RW

u (s+ b  )  u  s+RW  =  Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (1)) dF (x)  
Z 1
 1
max (W (x) ; U (0)) dF (x) (4)
9Equating equations (3) and (4) gives us
u
 
s+RU
  u  s+RW  = u (s+ b)  u (s+ b  )
and performing a rst-order Taylor series approximation in respectively s+RU and s+ b gives
us
u0
 
s+RU
  
RW  RU =  u0 (s+ b)  ,
RW = RU   u
0 (s+ b)
u0 (s+RU )
 (5)
where it is obvious that RW < RU which implies that employed persons have a higher proba-
bility of being employed in the subsequent time period.
Re-arranging equation (4) and integrating by parts gives us
u (s+ b  )  u  s+RW  =   
r + 
Z RU
RW
u0 (s+ x)F (x) dx
and by use of a Taylor series expansion in the point s+RW the reservation wage for a nonem-
ployed is
Rw = b   + 
r + 
Z RU
RW
u0 (s+ x)
u0 (s+RW )
F (x) dx (6)
With a strictly concave utility function the fraction inside the integral is always less than 1,
but will be increasing towards 1 as the spouses income increases and, hence, imply a higher
reservation wage RW . Moreover, since RU > b the di¤erence between the two reservation wages
RU and RW is declining in the spouse income.
In the present model state dependence is a result of the stigmatization e¤ect, but also loss
of skill by becoming non-employed can imply state dependence. Furthermore, in Garibaldi and
Wasmer (2004) state dependence arises when search costs are higher for nonemployed workers
and the value of home market production is stochastic. In addition to this, state dependence
can arise if employers use nonemployment as a signal of low productivity. Finally, Hyslop (1999)
argues that state dependence also can arise if the marginal utility of consumption is greater
when working.
3 Data
We have access to an unbalanced panel data set for 1998-2003.1 The data set is a representative
10 per cent sample of the Danish population. The variables originate from ve databases. The
rst four databases, the Income Registry, the IDA database, the Housing Registry and the
Health Insurance Registry are all maintained by Statistics Denmark. The fth database is the
1In fact, we also have information for 1997, but these are only used to construct the lagged dependent
variable used when estimating dynamic discrete choice models.
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DREAM database of the Danish Ministry of Employment.
Our interest lies in the group of people in contact with the social assistance system. Social
assistance benets are lower than unemployment benets and the recipients are persons that
are not eligible to unemployment benets either since they are not insured in an unemployment
insurance fund or since they had not recently been in work for a su¢ cient long period of time.
Hence, for most workers in the Danish labor market the relevant alternative to not work is
unemployment benets. Therefore, the characteristics of recipients of social assistance di¤er
remarkably from workers in the labor force, and in this paper we only include persons that in
at least one of the years covered, 1998-2003, have primarily been receiving social assistance.
We dene a recipient of social assistance as a person who has received social assistance benets
in the majority of the year, that is, at least 27 weeks in a given calendar year according to the
DREAM Registry, which contains information on all transfers of public benets on a weekly
basis. For these persons we include information for all years available where the individual was
either primarily receiving social assistance or primarily was in the labor force. In other words,
persons who have been employed in all years are not included in our sample.
Since we are going to model the Danish tax system and compute the taxes paid in vari-
ous scenarios, we further exclude self-employed, assisting wives, and people not fully taxable
in Denmark in a given year from the sample. In addition to this, we have chosen not to in-
clude persons observed only once, since they cannot be used in the majority of our estimation
procedures.
In Table 1 and 2 we present some characteristics of our sample divided by gender. Hourly
gross wage and the partners disposable income are in constant (1997) Danish kroner. Each
table consists of six columns. The rst column contains mean values for our full sample, while
the next four columns have information on di¤erent sub-samples according to the individuals
transition pattern between social assistance and work. The sixth and nal column is included
to facilitate the understanding of how the characteristics of our sample di¤er from the labor
force. Here, we show mean values for a 33 per cent sample of all Danes who have been in the
labor force for at least one year in the period of 1998-2003.
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Table 1: Mean values for males
Full
sam-
ple
Social
assis-
tance all
years
Single
transition
from
social
assistance
Single
transition
from work
Multiple
Transi-
tions
Population
Mean
Experience 4.91 3.13 4.88 8.12 6.58 17.27
(5:95) (4:78) (5:89) (6:86) (6:05) (9:87)
Age 35.89 36.65 35.42 35.89 34.16 40.64
(9:73) (10:02) (9:71) (9:37) (9:01) (10:72)
Neuro medicine() 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0:24) (0:27) (0:17) (0:28) (0:17) (0:39)
Psychiatry() 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.03
(1:38) (1:70) (0:90) (1:32) (0:69) (0:64)
General medical treatment() 8.73 10.04 6.76 8.98 7.03 4.91
(17:80) (20:10) (13:13) (18:69) (13:75) (9:86)
Unskilled 0.70 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.29
(0:46) (0:44) (0:47) (0:48) (0:46) (0:45)
Vocational training 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.46
(0:42) (0:39) (0:43) (0:45) (0:44) (0:50)
Short-cycle higher education 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06
(0:15) (0:16) (0:15) (0:13) (0:14) (0:23)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.11
(0:17) (0:17) (0:20) (0:14) (0:14) (0:31)
Long-cycle higher education 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08
(0:15) (0:16) (0:15) (0:13) (0:12) (0:28)
Immigrant 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.14 0.14 0.04
(0:45) (0:48) (0:48) (0:34) (0:35) (0:20)
Second generation immigrant 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0:09) (0:09) (0:08) (0:08) (0:10) (0:06)
Married 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.56
(0:44) (0:45) (0:47) (0:37) (0:37) (0:50)
Copenhagen 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.10
(0:41) (0:42) (0:41) (0:39) (0:39) (0:30)
Large city 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14
(0:39) (0:42) (0:39) (0:37) (0:35) (0:35)
Rural area 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.64
(0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:48)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.21 0.23 0.30
(0:67) (0:74) (0:68) (0:56) (0:57) (0:63)
Children aged 7-17 years 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.42
(0:75) (0:84) (0:76) (0:58) (0:64) (0:76)
Owner 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.68
(0:49) (0:49) (0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:47)
Hourly gross wage 112.11 - 113.35 110.50 112.07 154.09
(47:47) (45:68) (49:95) (47:19) (71:83)
Partners disposable income 97968 96101 100072 98251 99981 133770
(32749) (29083) (35136) (36272) (35258) (60918)
No. Years in sample 4.67 4.29 4.98 4.78 5.33 -
(1:44) (1:63) (1:23) (1:23) (0:87)
No. Years of Social Assistance
1 25.32 7.48 48.52 37.18 35.21
2 18.05 10.55 22.62 26.39 25.09
3 14.69 13.03 14.85 17.16 16.65
4 13.92 16.27 9.54 12.12 14.65
5 12.81 20.05 4.46 7.15 8.40
6 15.21 32.61 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample Size 41,390 19,298 8,341 7,469 6,282 573,498
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
() These variables originate from the Health Insurance Registry and are computed as the yearly
number of treatments with support from the Danish health system within the given area.
Table 1 shows that the full sample of men consists of 41,390 observations. Looking at the
number of years the individuals received social assistance; about 25 per cent received social
assistance in just one year during 1998-2003 while about 15 per cent received social assistance
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in the full period.
From the sample means a few things are worth noticing. Firstly, even though the mean
age is approximately 36 years the mean value of experience (in years) is only approximately 5
years. Secondly, 70 per cent are unskilled compared to 29 per cent in the active population.
The combination of lower experience and lower levels of education suggest a high degree of
persistence in the labor market status, since males receiving social assistance are clearly less
likely to become employed compared to the average male in the active population.
Furthermore, as the average experience indicates our sample is quite di¤erent from the
average population suggesting that the group under consideration has a weak attachment to
the labor market. The most prominent di¤erences are that 28 per cent of the sample of men
are immigrants compared to 4 per cent in the active Danish population. In addition to this,
the average wage is 112 DKK per hour while the mean wage for private employed males was
154 DKK. Finally, only 42 per cent are homeowners (68 per cent is the active population)
We proceed by splitting the full sample into 4 subgroups; those receiving social assistance all
years (19,298 persons), those who have a single transition from social assistance to work (8,341
persons), those having a single transition from work to social assistance (7,469 persons) and
those who have more than one transition between work and social assistance (6,282 persons).
When breaking the sample down by transition patterns we notice that even though the labor
market experience is quite di¤erent between the three groups of people who at some point have
been on the labor market (4.9-8.1 years) the average wage for the people working is much alike
(111-113 DKK) suggesting that the minimum wage restriction is binding for the majority of
persons belonging to the group. Further, immigrants are much overrepresented among those
receiving social assistance in all years and among those having only one single transition from
social assistance (35 per cent compared to 14 per cent). This may explain why a larger fraction
of these groups is married and why the groups on average have more children.
There is also a striking di¤erence between the spouses average disposable income as it is
much higher for the active population. In particular, the partner income is lowest for those
who are receiving social assistance in all years.
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Table 2: Mean values for females
Full
sam-
ple
Social
assis-
tance all
years
Single
transition
from
social
assistance
Single
transition
from work
Multiple
Transi-
tions
Population
Mean
Experience 2.93 1.82 3.34 6.28 5.05 15.13
(4:60) (3:68) (4:57) (5:80) (5:39) (8:73)
Age 34.36 34.62 33.90 34.48 33.58 41.26
(9:42) (9:69) (9:02) (9:12) (8:75) (10:39)
Neuro medicine() 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0:37) (0:39) (0:32) (0:33) (0:40) (0:26)
Psychiatry() 0.22 0.26 0.13 0.29 0.09 0.07
(1:86) (2:04) (1:24) (2:28) (0:96) (1:21)
General medical treatment() 17.65 19.49 13.66 17.32 15.11 9.38
(31:19) (34:27) (16:08) (37:43) (26:12) (11:37)
Unskilled 0.78 0.83 0.72 0.68 0.71 0.29
(0:42) (0:38) (0:45) (0:47) (0:45) (0:45)
Vocational training 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.39
(0:37) (0:32) (0:41) (0:44) (0:42) (0:49)
Short-cycle higher education 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05
(0:13) (0:13) (0:15) (0:10) (0:08) (0:22)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.20
(0:17) (0:17) (0:18) (0:18) (0:16) (0:40)
Long-cycle higher education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06
(0:10) (0:10) (0:10) (0:11) (0:14) (0:24)
Immigrant 0.32 0.40 0.30 0.11 0.12 0.03
(0:47) (0:49) (0:46) (0:32) (0:33) (0:18)
Second generation immigrant 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0:08) (0:08) (0:10) (0:10) (0:05) (0:05)
Married 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.19 0.18 0.62
(0:47) (0:48) (0:47) (0:39) (0:39) (0:49)
Copenhagen 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.10
(0:38) (0:39) (0:36) (0:38) (0:38) (0:31)
Large city 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14
(0:39) (0:41) (0:37) (0:33) (0:33) (0:35)
Rural area 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.63
(0:50) (0:50) (0:50) (0:49) (0:50) (0:48)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.63 0.72 0.53 0.44 0.49 0.30
(0:86) (0:93) (0:74) (0:69) (0:74) (0:61)
Children aged 7-17 years 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.51 0.61 0.50
(1:02) (1:09) (0:94) (0:83) (0:87) (0:80)
Owner 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.71
(0:45) (0:42) (0:47) (0:48) (0:48) (0:45)
Hourly gross wage 100.99 - 100.59 100.60 102.53 122.83
(41:81) (36:82) (44:72) (49:80) (47:46)
Partners disposable income 108228 99405 123651 116514 121150 173982
(43080) (38738) (44089) (49192) (45992) (121702)
No. Years in sample 4.62 4.45 4.87 4.57 5.19 -
(1:46) (1:60) (1:25) (1:27) (0:91)
No. Years of Social Assistance
1 19.91 6.44 42.41 37.41 34.08
2 14.78 9.19 22.57 25.14 20.17
3 14.19 11.37 18.69 16.13 20.11
4 14.49 15.88 10.79 14.28 14.30
5 14.57 19.73 5.54 7.04 11.33
6 22.06 37.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample Size 40,170 23,698 8,450 4,686 3,336 532,727
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
() These variables originate from the Health Insurance Registry and are computed as the yearly
number of treatments with support from the Danish health system within the given area.
The corresponding mean values for women are shown in Table 2. The pattern of Table 2 does to
a large extent replicate the pattern in Table 1. Therefore, the most important information we
retrieve is that also female recipients of social assistance seem to have a weak attachment to the
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labor market. The mean age is 34 years and the mean experience is only 2.9 years, 32 per cent
are immigrants and 78 per cent unskilled. Again breaking down on di¤erent transition patterns
we see that di¤erences in experience are not reected in the wage rate of those employed from the
di¤erent groups, again suggesting the minimum wage restriction to be binding. Furthermore,
the partner income is now somewhat lower for the group receiving social assistance all years.
This may suggest that to some extent persons cohabiting are likely to have a similar attitude
towards participating in the labor market, and that this e¤ect might dominate the positive
income e¤ect exerted by partner earnings as modeled section 2.
4 The Econometric Framework
The estimations dealt with in this paper are reduced-form participation equations. There are
di¤erent possible sources of the persistence in the individual labor market participation. Here,
we study the importance of unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in generating this
persistence. We do not consider serial correlation in the time-varying error component, which
similar to state dependence implies that transitory changes in the explanatory variable may
have persistent e¤ects on the dependent variable. However, in a similar analysis for Germany
Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) nd that serial correlation in the time-varying error component
does not seem to matter. Hence, we disregarded such error components.
We estimate a number of binary response models. In the following we only shortly consider
the econometric specications, and refer to references mentioned below as well as textbooks
such as Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2002) for a more detailed treatment.
The rst estimation considered is the pooled probit model
Pr (yit = 1jXit) = 1 (Xit + "it  0) =  (Xit) (7)
where yit is the binary variable for the participation decision of individual i at time t, Xit
contains the explanatory variables, and the error term "it is assumed to be independent of the
explanatory variables and distributed iN (0; 1).
The pooled probit estimator does not exploit the fact that we observe the persons again
and again, and since it is very likely that the errors are correlated because the same persons
are observed several times, we also estimate a random e¤ects probit
Pr (yit = 1jXi; i) = 1 (Xit + i + "it  0) =  (Xit + i) (8)
where the compound error-term i + "it is assumed to be independent of the explanatory
variables and both terms are assumed to be normally distributed.
Absent state dependence transitory changes in X can only cause transitory changes in the
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dependent variable y. Allowing for state dependence is equivalent to allowing transitory changes
in X to have permanent e¤ect on y through the e¤ects of the lagged dependent variable. In
the absence of serial correlation this is the only way in which transitory changes in X can have
persistent e¤ects on y. Failing to allow for state dependence will bias the parameter estimates
in presence of (true) state dependence. In addition, it is of interest whether employment is truly
state-dependent, since this implies that becoming a recipient of social assistance deteriorates
an individuals future labor market prospects. In order to address this issue, we estimate a
dynamic random e¤ects probit
Pr (yit = 1jXi; i; yit 1) = 1 (yit 1 +Xit + i + "it  0) =  (yit 1 +Xit + i) (9)
Estimating a dynamic probit raises the question of how to treat the initial observations of
the dependent variable yi0. Heckman (1981) suggests approximating the conditional density
of the initial dependent variable by estimating a probit using observations from the rst year
only and simultaneously specifying the unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the explana-
tory variables. We use the simpler estimation procedure for the dynamic correlated random
e¤ects probit outlined in Wooldridge (2005) where the approximation of the density of the
initial dependent variable is left out. Instead the unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to be
arbitrarily correlated with the initial dependent variable by inclusion of the initial observation
yi0. Furthermore, we model the unobservable individual component with the means of the
time-varying explanatory variables as in Mundlak (1978) in order to be able to better interpret
the e¤ects of the time-varying variables. This implies that we assume that
i = yi0+ Xi+ i
where   N  0; 2.
We apply these estimators in two scenarios: First, we estimate the e¤ect of changes in
partner income and then we estimate the e¤ect from changes in the workers own potential
disposable income gap from working. Besides these income variables Xit includes a quadratic
term in age and experience, dummy indicators for level of education, living area, ethnic ori-
gin, variables for the number of children, variables for medical treatments as well as variables
capturing the regional demand and supply conditions.
Hyslop argues that the spouses income may have three di¤erent e¤ects on the labor market
participation, a) a direct e¤ect as in the theoretical search model in section 2, b) an expectation
e¤ect as future spouse income increases or decreases may be anticipated, and c) a taste e¤ect
from the spouses having the same taste for work by assortative matching in the marriage
market. In the presence of state dependence, the expectations of future outcomes of explanatory
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variables may a¤ect the current labor market status. This we avoid by assuming that the partner
income follows a stationary process. As in Hyslop (1999) stationarity is achieved by dividing
spouse income into a permanent and a transitory component. The permanent income is just the
average of the spouses income in the period under consideration, while the transitory income
is the yearly deviation from this mean. The taste for work e¤ect can be expected to be in the
individual unobservable component and to be correlated with the permanent spouse income,
which makes the latter endogenous.
For transitory income on the other hand it is probably reasonable to assume no correlation
with taste for work. If this assumption holds there will only be a direct income e¤ect from
transitory income. However, in a life-cycle model transitory income shocks should not have an
e¤ect on labor supply, since agents can smooth out consumption. Only when there exist credit
market constraints transitory spouse income shocks will play a role for the labor supply.
We can take account of possible correlation between i and the time-varying explanatory
variables by estimating correlated random e¤ects and xed e¤ects estimators. Here we ap-
ply two xed e¤ects estimators which both use the logit specication and, hence, instead of
assuming that the error-term "it is normally distributed we assume that it is logistically distrib-
uted. We need to observe a person in two periods when estimating the conditional maximum
likelihood xed e¤ects logit. The idea is that only a person that changes state, that is for a
two-period setting yi1 + yi2 = 1, contributes to the likelihood function. Therefore neither per-
sons employed in all years or persons receiving social assistance in all years a¤ect the likelihood
function in the xed e¤ects logit. For yi1 + yi2 = 1 we have
Pr (yi1 = 1jXi; i; yi1 + yi2 = 1) = exp ((Xi2  Xi1) )
1 + exp ((Xi2  Xi1) ) (10)
As with the random e¤ects probit model, naturally, we want to allow for state dependence.
Chamberlain (1993) has shown that if individuals are only observed in three periods, the para-
meters of the dynamic xed e¤ects logit model are not identied. Subject to some regularity
conditions Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) have shown that the parameters are identied when
we have four or more consecutive observations per individual. The basic idea follows that of the
conditional likelihood approach. Consider the following events A = fyi0; yi1 = 0; yi2 = 1; yi3g
and B = fyi0; yi1 = 1; yi2 = 0; yi3g where yi0 and yi3 are either 0 or 1. In this case we have
Pr (AjXi; i) = p0 (Xi; i)yi0 (1  p0 (Xi; i))1 yi0  1
1 + exp (Xi1 + yi0 + i)
 exp (Xi2 + i)
1 + exp (Xi2 + i)
 exp (yi3Xi3 + yi3 + yi3i)
1 + exp (Xi3 +  + i)
(11)
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while
Pr (BjXi; i) = p0 (Xi; i)yi0 (1  p0 (Xi; i))1 yi0  exp (Xi1 + yi0 + i)
1 + exp (Xi1 + yi0 + i)
 1
1 + exp (Xi2 +  + i)
 exp (yi3Xi3 + yi3i)
1 + exp (Xi3 + i)
(12)
Noticing that if Xi2 = Xi3 we can get rid of the is so that we end up with
Pr (AjXi; i; A [B;Xi2 = Xi3) = Pr (AjXi; i; Xi2 = Xi3)
Pr (AjXi; i; Xi2 = Xi3) + Pr (BjXi; i; Xi2 = Xi3)
=
1
1 + exp ((Xi1  Xi2)  +  (yi0   yi3)) (13)
Identication naturally extends to the case with more than 4 observations for each individ-
ual, see Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000). Identication in this case comes from all individuals
changing state between two of the middle periods (that is any period but the rst and last).
Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) propose to estimate  and  by maximizing
nX
i=1
X
1t<sT 1
24 1 fyit + yis = 1gK Xit+1 Xis+1hn 
ln

exp((Xit Xis)b+g(yit 1 yis+1)+g(yit+1 yis 1)1fs t>1g)yit
1+exp((Xit Xis)b+g(yit 1 yis+1)+g(yit+1 yis 1)1fs t>1g)
 35 (14)
over some compact set and where K () denotes a kernel density function which assigns a large
probability for values where Xit+1 and Xis+1 are close. The advantage of this estimator is that
it is completely agnostic about the nature of individual heterogeneity.
In the second part of the paper we examine the e¤ect of the workers own disposable income
gain between receiving social assistance benets and becoming employed. Since we do not
observe the wage rate of recipients of social assistance we need to make a selectivity-corrected
wage. We do this by estimating the Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) sample selection model,
where both the equation of interest and the selection equation include random e¤ects and error
terms that are allowed to be correlated. We have
lnwit = Xit1 + i + it
yit = 1 (yit 1 +Xit2 + i + "it  0) =  (yit 1 +Xit2 + i)
where lnwit is the log of the wage rate, i  iN
 
0; 2

, it  iN
 
0; 2

, i  iN (0; 2), and
"it  iN (0; 2"). Denote the composite error it = i + it. Then, the conditional mean of the
log of the wage rate is given by
E [lnwitjXi; yi0; yi] = Xit +  1it +  2i (15)
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where the two last terms are the selection bias we correct for, and where  1 = "/2" and
 2 = T
 
   "2

2"
  
2 + T
2


are constants to be estimated.
Similar to Vella and Verbeek (1998) we use the labor market state in the previous year as
exclusion restriction and exploit that the earnings equation is static while the participation
equation is dynamic. This aligns with the theoretical search model in section 2. For example,
consider a negative health shock in the current period. The health shock implies a lower wage
and through the reservation wage a lower probability of participating in the current period and,
thereby, also in the subsequent period. Our identifying assumption is that in the subsequent
period the past periods health shock does not a¤ect the wage, since it is static. Using the
lagged dependent variable as exclusion restriction is not necessary innocuous. For example, if
state dependence arises because employers use unemployment as a signal of low productivity,
it is obviously not reasonable to assume that the wage is not a¤ected by the previous labor
market state.
We compute the workers own disposable income gap on a yearly basis by computing the
disposable income from working full time and subtracting the potential disposable income from
receiving only social assistance.
In order to compute the disposable income when working we begin by estimating the Vella-
Verbeek sample selection model. The resulting wage prediction is used to compute the annual
full-time wage income. Next, we use a detailed modeling of the Danish tax system, which takes
the joint taxation of the spouses into account, in order to calculate the tax payments and nally
we compute the disposable income.
For each person we also make a detailed computation of the social assistance benets they
would be entitled to on a yearly basis. Again, we subtract the appropriate tax payments and
calculate the resulting disposable income.
Furthermore, in both scenarios we take full account of housing benets for renters received
from the government, which depend both on the tenants family income and on the rent.2
With this information we compute the gap between the disposable income when working
full-time and the disposable income of receiving social assistance. We do not take account of
transportation costs and child care costs when we compute the income gaps.
5 Does Partner Income Create Work (dis-)Incentives?
In this section we investigate the importance of the spouses disposable income for the partici-
pation decision by including permanent and transitory spouse income among the explanatory
2The dataset contains information for the yearly rent in 1999. Unfortunately, for only approximately 40 per
cent of dwellings for rent we observe the yearly rent. Following Munch and Svarer (2002) we use Heckmans
(1979) two-step procedure to predict the yearly rent. As exclusion restriction we use the number of apartments
in the building, which has positive e¤ect on the probability of observing a rent.
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variables.
Table 3 gives the results for the estimations on the sample of male workers who at some
point during the sample window primarily received social assistance. As expected, we nd a
signicant hump-shaped e¤ect from higher experience. More experience raises the probability
of participation, but the e¤ect declines with total years of experience. Controlling for this
e¤ect, age actually works in the opposite direction, so that older people ceteris paribus have
lower participation probabilities. Having people with a vocational education as our reference
category, we see that more education increases the probability of working.
We nd that everything else being equal, immigrants have a higher probability of working.
We think this is an e¤ect of immigrants within the social assistance system being a more
heterogenous group than the rest of the recipients. Newly arrived immigrants do not have
access to unemployment benets and this group is likely to contain both low and high productive
individuals.
We have included the local gender specic unemployment rate and the number of regional
vacancies normalized by the labor force to capture demand and supply e¤ects in the regional
labor market. Both variables are signicant with expected signs, that is a positive e¤ect of
more vacancies and a negative e¤ect of a higher unemployment rate.
Having children - and especially young children - lowers the probability of being employed.
Finally, we have included three variables for the health status of the worker. These variables
are dened as the yearly number of treatments with nancial support from the Danish public
health system within the given area. We nd that the more neuro medicine treatments, or the
more consultations with psychiatrists or doctors the lower the probability of being employed.
The rst two specications the pooled probit model and random e¤ects probit model deliver
similar results. Although the pooled probit model correctly predicts 71 per cent of the outcomes,
the confusion matrices in Table 10 appendix A reveal that the pooled probit model only does
a good job in tting the y = 0 outcome, while the dynamic correlated random e¤ects model
in the third column performs much better in tting also the y = 1 outcome. In the dynamic
correlated random e¤ects specication we approximate the unobserved individual part by the
means of age, region dummies, children and health variables besides the random normal term.
Besides the improved overall t the picture does not change much. However, the coe¢ cient
to age becomes positive when the individual mean of age is part of the unobservable part.
Similarly, the children variables become insignicant. The set of parameter estimates obtained
from the xed e¤ects logit are similar to the various probit estimates, while we only can use
the estimation results from the dynamic xed e¤ects to verify the presence of (true) state
dependence.
The nal column in Table 3 shows that using an alternative cut-o¤ level of 42 weeks for the
denition of being a recipient of social assistance compared to the 27 weeks used in all other
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estimations does not matter for the results.
Table 3: Participation probability, partner income, males
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit
Fixed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
xed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit, 42
weeks
Spousetemporary income -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.032 -0.017 -0.013
(0:007) (0:009) (0:008) (0:016) (0:052) (0:009)
Spouses permanent income 0.030 0.044 0.027 - - 0.024
(0:004) (0:007) (0:005) - - (0:006)
Age -0.071 -0.108 0.084 - - 0.071
(0:011) (0:019) (0:021) - - (0:025)
Age squared/100 0.041 0.068 0.006 - - 0.000
(0:014) (0:025) (0:017) - - (0:000)
Experience 0.202 0.313 0.118 0.785 0.018 0.101
(0:006) (0:012) (0:009) (0:070) (0:117) (0:010)
Experience squared/100 -0.587 -0.952 -0.343 -2.938 - -0.003
(0:025) (0:050) (0:033) (0:247) - (0:000)
Unskilled -0.117 -0.139 -0.091 - - -0.090
(0:027) (0:053) (0:034) - - (0:039)
Short-cycle higher education 0.097 0.261 0.148 - - 0.116
(0:068) (0:132) (0:085) - - (0:094)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.161 0.208 0.174 - - 0.169
(0:059) (0:119) (0:076) - - (0:082)
Long-cycle higher education 0.182 0.302 0.115 - - 0.185
(0:069) (0:138) (0:089) - - (0:093)
Immigrant 0.336 0.406 0.235 - - 0.151
(0:032) (0:062) (0:041) - - (0:046)
Second generation immigrant -0.039 0.072 0.023 - - 0.088
(0:156) (0:262) (0:182) - - (0:222)
Copenhagen -0.046 -0.012 0.101 0.660 - 0.084
(0:046) (0:085) (0:221) (0:396) - (0:263)
Large city -0.101 -0.186 -0.247 -0.144 - -0.453
(0:046) (0:087) (0:279) (0:502) - (0:317)
Rural area -0.070 -0.125 -0.158 0.141 - -0.131
(0:038) (0:072) (0:234) (0:424) - (0:274)
Children aged 0-6 years -0.128 -0.167 -0.054 -0.207 -0.746 -0.056
(0:014) (0:025) (0:040) (0:072) (0:223) (0:046)
Children aged 7-17 years -0.034 -0.050 0.012 -0.054 - -0.004
(0:013) (0:023) (0:042) (0:078) - (0:048)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.062 -0.077 -0.052 -0.148 - -0.047
(0:008) (0:014) (0:010) (0:040) - (0:011)
Regional vacancies 2.603 2.876 1.908 3.574 - 0.845
(0:788) (1:404) (0:976) (5:154) - (1:129)
Neuro medicine -0.187 -0.246 -0.183 -0.370 - -0.150
(0:060) (0:084) (0:085) (0:191) - (0:081)
Psychiatry -0.036 -0.028 0.001 0.010 - 0.023
(0:011) (0:015) (0:019) (0:035) - (0:021)
General medical treatment -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 - -0.004
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) - (0:002)
y0 (initial participation) - - 0.014 - - -0.041
- - (0:037) - - (0:044)
Lagged participation - - 1.312 - 2.648 1.292
- - (0:034) - (0:215) (0:040)
Observations 15,383 15,383 15,383 6,761 3,652 11,827
Number of persons 5,212 5,212 5,212 1,626 694 4,067
Standard errors in parentheses. All equations besides the dynamic xed e¤ects logit include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
The spouses temporary income is insignicant in all estimations, but the xed e¤ects logit,
where the coe¢ cient is signicantly negative. In the absence of major tax or benet reforms
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the within change in the spouses income the transitory part is limited. If it takes a certain
amount of change in partner income to a¤ect the labor market status, we could fear that we
actually observe too little variation in our data to obtain signicant estimates. In absence of
credit constraints the insignicant parameter estimates suggest that individuals smooth out
consumption.
The permanent income only varies between individuals and, hence, the coe¢ cient cannot be
identied in the xed e¤ects specications. In the rest of the estimations the spouse permanent
income is signicantly positive. Hence, it seems to be the case that the spouses have the same
taste for work by assortative matching in the marriage market. In other words, the positive
sign implies that Hyslops taste e¤ect dominates and, therefore, that the permanent spouse
income is endogenous to the employment decision.
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Table 4: Participation probability, partner income, females
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit
Fixed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
xed
e¤ects
logit
Dynamic
corre-
lated
random
e¤ects
probit, 42
weeks
Spousetemporary income 0.033 0.041 0.036 0.056 -0.003 0.031
(0:005) (0:006) (0:006) (0:012) (0:063) (0:006)
Spouses permanent income 0.060 0.076 0.054 - - 0.053
(0:003) (0:005) (0:003) - - (0:004)
Age -0.012 0.006 0.179 - - 0.177
(0:010) (0:019) (0:021) - - (0:023)
Age squared/100 -0.033 -0.080 -0.060 - - -0.001
(0:014) (0:026) (0:018) - - (0:000)
Experience 0.252 0.389 0.144 0.708 0.095 0.135
(0:007) (0:015) (0:011) (0:079) (0:221) (0:013)
Experience squared/100 -0.940 -1.517 -0.539 -3.570 - -0.005
(0:035) (0:067) (0:050) (0:365) - (0:001)
Unskilled -0.348 -0.610 -0.371 - - -0.345
(0:028) (0:055) (0:037) - - (0:042)
Short-cycle higher education 0.090 0.059 0.063 - - 0.052
(0:081)  (0:168)  (0:106) - - (0:119)
Medium-cycle higher education -0.107 -0.151 -0.084 - - -0.159
(0:066)  (0:131)  (0:086) - - (0:101)
Long-cycle higher education -0.245 -0.401 -0.327 - - -0.370
(0:121) (0:226) (0:152) - - (0:177)
Immigrant 0.208 0.178 0.085 - - 0.027
(0:030) (0:058) (0:039) - - (0:043)
Second generation immigrant 0.316 0.479 0.224 - - 0.617
(0:141) (0:261) (0:180) - - (0:197)
Copenhagen -0.031 -0.043 -0.156 -0.203 - 0.014
(0:044) (0:084) (0:242) (0:439) - (0:282)
Large city -0.075 -0.134 -0.586 -0.731 - -0.708
(0:045) (0:086) (0:273) (0:483) - (0:317)
Rural area 0.050 0.025 -0.098 -0.198 - -0.140
(0:038) (0:072) (0:220) (0:374) - 0:258
Children aged 0-6 years -0.278 -0.369 -0.196 -0.570 0.113 -0.247
(0:015) (0:025) (0:041) (0:082) (0:305) (0:0460)
Children aged 7-17 years -0.059 -0.096 -0.107 -0.339 - -0.127
(0:012) (0:022) (0:042) (0:085) - (0:045)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.037 -0.052 -0.037 -0.096 - -0.044
(0:007) (0:013) (0:009) (0:042) - (0:010)
Regional vacancies 2.468 2.598 2.276 -5.571 - 1.622
(0:741) (1:341) (0:944) (4:882) - (1:073)
Neuro medicine -0.086 -0.108 -0.079 -0.117 - -0.089
(0:033) (0:046) (0:049) (0:095) - (0:048)
Psychiatry -0.056 -0.057 -0.021 -0.043 - -0.015
(0:010) (0:014) (0:016) (0:033) - (0:018)
General medical treatment -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 - -0.003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) - (0:001)  
y0 (initial participation) - - -0.202 - - -0.144
- - (0:039) - - (0:044)
Lagged participation - - 1.537 - 3.752 1.461
- - (0:035) - (0:294) (0:039)
Observations 21,149 21,149 21,149 7,048 3,335 17,284
Number of persons 6,985 6,986 6,986 1,736 638 5,808
Standard deviations are in parentheses. All equations besides the dynamic xed e¤ects logit include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
The results for women are shown in Table 4. There are some noticeable di¤erences in the
parameter estimates compared to men. First, whereas men with higher education have a higher
probability of being employed, the comparable e¤ect for women is insignicant or even negative.
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Second, there is no signicant di¤erence in the employment probability between living in the
capital of Copenhagen and in rural areas. For women we nd signicantly positive e¤ects of
both temporary and permanent income, which again reect the taste e¤ect endogeneity.
Table 5 presents elasticities for the previous estimations. From the dynamic random e¤ects
probit model it can be seen that participation in itself increases the probability of also being in
the labor market next year by about 40 per cent. In a recent paper Ahmad (2007) also estimates
reduced-form participation equations for immigrants receiving social assistance benets and
argues that there is a large degree of state dependence among immigrants in Denmark.
Table 5: Elasticities, partner income
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit,
42
weeks
Males
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.405 0.398
- - (0:020) (0:023)
Spouses temporary income -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0:014) (0:013) (0:016) (0:019)
Spouses permanent income 0.339 0.358 0.303 0.276
(0:052) (0:068) (0:067) (0:081)
Females
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.408 0.379
- - (0:022) (0:024)
Spouses temporary income 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0:042) (0:032) (0:045) (0:051)
Spouses permanent income 0.918 0.791 0.805 0.798
(0:054) (0:067) (0:068) (0:075)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
Unlike both Hyslops (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidous (2003) results for married women we
nd that the permanent part of the spouse income is endogenous for both men and women
and, therefore, that it is not useful for examining the e¤ects of nancial incentives for the
participation decision. The reason seems to be that the di¤erence in the participation rate
between the genders is smaller in Denmark than in Germany and the US. Additionally, the
share of women in part-time work is much higher in Germany. With respect to the transitory
part of the spouses income we similar to Hyslop (1999) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2003) nd
very small and insignicant e¤ects, which suggest that workers are not credit constrained and
can smooth out consumption.
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6 Does Own Income Create Work Incentives?
The results from the previous section show the weakness of using spouses income as predictor
for participation, namely that it may be endogenous. Furthermore, depending on how income
is used in a family, it may be the case that the response is larger for the own disposable income
gain from working. Hence, the results from the previous section do not necessarily imply
that there are low participation elasticities for recipients of social assistance. Instead in this
section we use predicted own disposable income gaps to investigate the importance of nancial
incentives for the participation decision.
Table 6 shows the second step of the Vella-Verbeek sample selection model. It is striking
that most of the variables are insignicant. For example for women there is no signicant wage
di¤erence between being unskilled and having a university degree. This seems to suggest that
for the sample of social assistance recipients the human capital model works poorly. This is
also reected in the low R2 of 7  9 per cent. Using Danish register data it is far from unusual
to obtain an explanatory power of more than 30 per cent. As a matter of fact, by considering
all the persons for whom we observe a wage rate we obtain an R2 of about 20 per cent using
only experience and its square as well as schooling to explain the variation of the log wages.3
In order to understand the results in Table 6 one might again refer to Table 1 and 2 to see that
the level of the mean wage implies, that the minimum wage constraint is binding for a large
part of the recipients of social assistance, perhaps suggesting that these people are unable to
receive a wage matching their marginal productivity measured by the usual Mincer explanatory
variables.
For men the selection into the sub-sample of persons for whom we observe the wage is posi-
tive with respect to the time-invariant unobservables. This is as expected because this suggests,
that people with higher ability earn more and have a higher probability of nding employment.
For women we nd no signicant selection in terms of time-invariant unobservables.
3These results are not shown.
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Table 6: Wage equation, random e¤ects
Male Female
Age 0.017 0.005
(0:003) (0:004)
Age squared/100 -0.022 -0.005
(0:004) (0:005)
Experience 0.010 0.006
(0:003) (0:003)
Experience squared/100 -0.023 -0.012
(0:009) (0:013)
Unskilled -0.021 0.002
(0:009) (0:010)
Short-cycle higher education 0.027 0.024
(0:028) (0:036)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.110 0.114
(0:025) (0:024)
Long-cycle higher education 0.171 0.072
(0:030) (0:042)
Immigrant -0.004 -0.002
(0:012) (0:013)
Second generation immigrant -0.016 0.024
(0:042) (0:044)
Copenhagen 0.023 0.042
(0:014) (0:015)
Large city -0.017 0.003
(0:015) (0:017)
Rural area -0.021 -0.011
(0:011) (0:013)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.012 -0.010
(0:006) (0:006)
Children aged 7-17 years -0.003 -0.006
(0:005) (0:005)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.004 -0.006
(0:002) (0:003)
Regional vacancies -0.558 0.020
(0:245) (0:282)
Neuro medicine 0.026 -0.004
 (0:014) (0:009)
Psychiatry 0.008 -0.002
(0:003) (0:003)
General medical treatment 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000)
Mean (generalized residual) 0.028 0.003
(0:004) (0:005)
Generalized residual -0.035 -0.032
(0:007) (0:007)
Variance of individual specic error 0.213 0.201
Variance of time-varying error 0.224 0.219
R-squared 0.087 0.075
Observations 11,124 7,823
Persons 4,569 3,485
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Both equations include time-dummies.
signicant at 5 per cent; signicant at 1 per cent
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Table 7: Participation probability, own income, males
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Own income gap/10000 0.031 0.044 0.045
(0:003)

(0:005)

(0:004)

Age -0.067 -0.082 0.040
(0:006)

(0:010)

(0:013)

Age squared/100 0.037 0.041 0.007
(0:008)

(0:013)

(0:009)
Experience 0.185 0.263 0.097
(0:004)

(0:007)

(0:005)

Experience squared/100 -0.526 -0.780 -0.285
(0:016)

(0:030)

(0:020)

Unskilled -0.127 -0.178 -0.088
(0:017)

(0:032)

(0:020)

Short-cycle higher education 0.028 0.076 -0.007
(0:048) (0:088) (0:057)
Medium-cycle higher education 0.166 0.222 0.110
(0:043)

(0:080)

(0:051)

Long-cycle higher education 0.258 0.299 0.077
(0:050)

(0:093)

(0:060)
Immigrant 0.285 0.338 0.219
(0:020)

(0:037)

(0:025)

Second generation immigrant -0.009 0.039 0.001
(0:076) (0:135) (0:089)
Copenhagen 0.011 0.037 0.025
(0:027) (0:046) (0:085)
Large city -0.089 -0.118 -0.105
(0:028)

(0:049)

(0:111)
Rural area -0.030 -0.041 0.024
 (0:022)  (0:040)  (0:089)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.003 0.002 0.025
 (0:012)  (0:019)  (0:026)
Children aged 7-17 years 0.076 0.106 0.122
(0:010)

(0:017)

(0:028)

Unemp. on municipality and gender 0.049 0.064 0.042
(0:005)

(0:008)

(0:006)

Regional vacancies 2.127 1.965 1.632
(0:483)

(0:814)

(0:571)

Neuro medicine 0.077 0.084 -0.068
(0:032)

(0:041)

(0:043)
Psychiatry 0.032 0.032 -0.016
(0:006)

(0:008)

(0:010)
General medical treatment 0.006 0.005 -0.002
(0:000)

(0:001)

(0:001)

y0 (initial participation) 0.000 0.000 0.079
(0:000) (0:000) (0:022)

Lagged participation 0.000 0.000 1.325
(0:000) (0:000) (0:021)

Observations - - 41,390
Number of persons - - 10,689
Standard deviations are in parentheses. All equations include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region
dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
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Table 8: Participation probability, own income, females
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Own income gap/10000 0.045 0.059 0.049
(0:002)

(0:003)

(0:003)

Age -0.014 0.001 0.173
(0:007)

(0:013) (0:016)

Age squared/100 -0.030 -0.071 -0.047
(0:009)

(0:017)

(0:012)

Experience 0.216 0.320 0.111
(0:005)

(0:010)

(0:007)

Experience squared/100 -0.772 -1.188 -0.412
(0:023)

(0:047)

(0:031)

Unskilled -0.337 -0.617 -0.345
(0:020)

(0:039)

(0:026)

Short-cycle higher education -0.039 -0.134 -0.070
(0:062) (0:125) (0:081)
Medium-cycle higher education -0.195 -0.247 -0.202
(0:046)

(0:089)

(0:058)

Long-cycle higher education 0.079 -0.133 -0.159
(0:073) (0:144) (0:094)
Immigrant 0.041 0.003 -0.031
(0:021) (0:042) (0:028)
Second generation immigrant 0.033 0.083 -0.007
(0:086) (0:164) (0:108)
Copenhagen -0.091 -0.131 -0.109
(0:029)

(0:054)

(0:115)
Large city -0.090 -0.145 -0.356
(0:031)

(0:059)

(0:144)

Rural area 0.028 0.014 -0.082
(0:026) (0:049) (0:114)
Children aged 0-6 years -0.153 -0.206 -0.128
(0:011)

(0:019)

(0:028)

Children aged 7-17 years 0.019 0.006 -0.032
(0:009)

(0:017) (0:028)
Unemp. on municipality and gender -0.026 -0.039 -0.024
(0:005)

(0:009)

(0:006)

Regional vacancies 1.009 1.120 0.387
(0:540) (0:960) (0:684)
Neuro medicine -0.073 -0.081 -0.065
(0:023)

(0:031)

(0:032)

Psychiatry -0.045 -0.051 -0.037
(0:006)

(0:009)

(0:010)

General medical treatment -0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0:000)

(0:000)

(0:001)
y0 (initial participation) 0.000 0.000 -0.075
(0:000) (0:000) (0:027)

Lagged participation - - 1.503
- - (0:025)
Observations 40,170 40,170 40,170
Number of persons 10,586 10,586 10,586
Standard errors in parentheses. All equations include time-dummies.
The correlated random e¤ects contain the means of age, region
dummies, children and health variables.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
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The results from the participation equation where we include the workers own disposable
income gain from working is presented in Table 7 and 8. Overall, the picture is similar compared
to Table 3 and 4 although there are some changes due to the fact that Table 7 and 8 also include
singles. When we estimate on both couples and singles we nd that only children aged 0-6 years
have a negative inuence on the employment probability and for men we even nd signicant
positive coe¢ cients to the number of children aged 7-17 years.
For women there are two more changes. First, the coe¢ cient to medium-cycle higher edua-
tion becomes signicantly negative, although this does not change the conclusion that there is
an insignicant or negative e¤ect on the participation probability of having a longer education.
Thus, for workers with a weak attachment to the labor market and low experience, vocational
education, which is the reference category, might be the most favourable education. Further-
more, the signaling e¤ect of a social assistance spell to the employer might be more severe for
educations with an overall very low unemployment rate.
Second, immigrants are no longer more likely to become employed than natives. This sug-
gests that single female immigrants do not participate to the same degree as married female
immigrants. However, the reason might be that single mothers to a larger extent are paid addi-
tional benets in an ad-hoc way, which depends on the local government which, therefore, are
impossible to model. This implies that the calculated income gap for single female immigrants
is overvalued, which in turn may imply that they seem to be less likely to participate.
Own disposable income gap is signicantly positive in both estimation frameworks and for
both genders, and thus, having a higher income gap raises the probability of participation.
Table 9: Elasticities, own income gap
Pooled
probit
Random
e¤ects
probit
Dynamic
random
e¤ects
probit
Males
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.422
- - (0:012)
Own income gap 0.276 0.305 0.422
(0:034) (0:037) (0:044)
Change in own income gap, 5,000 DKK 0.018 0.020 0.028
Females
Lagged dependent variable - - 0.414
- - (0:015)
Own income gap 0.655 0.618 0.678
(0:033) (0:037) (0:044)
Change in own income gap, 5,000 DKK 0.052 0.049 0.054
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 signicant at 5 per cent;  signicant at 1 per cent
Table 9 presents the elasticities from changing own disposable income gap on the participa-
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tion probability. The elasticities for men are in the range of 0:28   0:44, while the elasticities
for women are roughly double the size. The estimated elasticities imply that increasing the
disposable income with 5; 000 DKK delivers an increase in the particpation probability of 0:025
for men and 0:05 for women. Another way of measuring the participation elasticities, which
for example is used in the CGE model DREAM, is the percentage change in the number of
recipients of social assistance from a percentage change in the income gap. In Appendix B
we show how to convert the elasticities and for men the elasticity is 0:09   0:17, while we for
women obtain 0:13  0:20.
In the absence of major benet and tax policy changes in the considered period we do not
want to identify the e¤ect of the disposable income gap solely from within-individual variation.
Therefore, we do not include the mean of disposable income in the linear approximation for the
unobservable individual e¤ect. However, this implies that we cannot appropriately control for
unobserved heterogeneity, which may bias the results. If receiving social assistance is voluntary,
but joy of working is positively correlated with productivity, the elasticity will be upward biased.
It is obviously pointless to consider the e¤ects of economic incentives if receiving benets is
completely involuntary. Even though this extreme is not the case, it is likely that some recipients
of social assistance would prefer to be employed, but have a low probability of getting a job due
to very low productivities. In this case our estimated model confuses low incentives with low
participation probability and the estimated elasticity will also tend to be upward biased. In
orther words, the e¤ects from an actual tax or benet reform will be smaller than our income
elasticity estimates.
There exist a few other Danish studies also estimating participation income elasticities.
Graversen (1996) estimates participation elasticities for workers in the labor force from a natural
experiment study of the 1987 tax reform. He nds participation elasticities in the range of
0:2   0:7 for single women and 0:05 for married women. Pedersen and Smith (2002) also
computes disposable income gaps from working, but do as Graversen focus on unemployed
workers in the labor force. They use survey information on the unemployed workers expected
wage and use information on employed workerstransportation costs and child care costs. For
1996 they nd an income elasticity of 0:3 for men and 0:7 for women. Pedersen and Smith do
not solve the potential endogeneity problem of the workers disposable income. The elasticities
are strikingly similar in our study and in Pedersen and Smith, which should imply that the
e¤ect of nancial incentives are similar among the unemployed workers in the labor force and
among recipients of social assistance. However, since the share of very low productivity workers
is larger among the repicipents of social assistance than the recipents of unemployment benets,
the share who is involuntary out of employment is probably largest among the repicipents of
social assistance. Hence, it is probably the case that our estimates for the recipients of social
assistance have the largest bias.
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In contrast to the two mentioned studies, Toomet (2005) focus on social assistance and
exploits the fact that the social assistance benets is increased by 70 per cent when recipients
without children turns 25 years, while the benet level remains constant at the age of 25 years
for recipients with children. Hence, Toomet uses the latter group as control group. From a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation a participation elasticity of income of 0.4 is found for women
while the income e¤ect for men is found to be insignicant.
In a recent survey-based study, Graversen and Tinggaard (2005) examine the e¤ects of the
implementation of the social assistance ceiling in 2004.4 Approximately 1,000 social assistance
recipients were interviewed just before the implementation and again nine months after the
implementation of the social assistance benet ceiling. Although the ceiling has reduced the
amount of social assistance received and, hence, was expected to provide larger incentives,
Graversen and Tinggaard conclude that there seems to be no e¤ect on participation and on
whether the recipient search or not. Moreover, Graversen and Tinggaard only nd very modest
e¤ects on the search intensity.
Finally, in a recent study Graversen (2006) uses the variation in social assistance benets
from the implementation of the social assistance ceiling. A pooled probit model for participation
is estimated for each month for 18 months. Graversen compute the income gap from working
similar to here although he uses a median wage for all persons rather than a predicted wage. This
way Graversen avoids the potential endogeneity of the wages, but the framework only allows
Graversen to determine e¤ects from di¤erences in benets in the short term. No signicant
employment e¤ects are found from this analysis.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the e¤ects of economic incentives on the labor market par-
ticipation for recipients of social assistance. A simple examination of the characteristics of
recipients of social assistance reveals the group has weak attachment to the labor market. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the poor performance of the human capital model and the
large degree of state dependence in the employment status. Hence, to some extent we would
believe that this group of people is involuntary nonemployed and that only small e¤ects from
economic incentives are to be expected. We nd no employment e¤ects of incentives from the
within variation in the spouses income. Recently, Graversen and Tinggard (2005) and Gra-
versen (2006) have evaluated the short-term e¤ect of the social assistance ceiling. They nd no
or very small e¤ects.
However, from estimations where we use predicted disposable income gain from working
4The social assistance ceiling aimed at providing economic incentives for married social assistance recipients,
by setting a reduced maximum of social assistance benets that a household can receive. It came into e¤ect
January 1, 2004.
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we obtain elasticities in the range of 0:28   0:44 for men and in the range of 0:62   0:68 for
women. These elasticities are of similar magnitude as those Pedersen and Smith (2002) nd for
workers in the labor force. However, neither we, nor Pedersen and Smith are able to su¢ ciently
control for unobserved heterogeneity of the disposable income gap. Therefore, we believe that
the estimates are likely to be upward biased. When converting the elasticities to percentage
change in the number of recipients of social assistance from a percentage change in the income
gap as used in the CGE model DREAM the estimated elasticities correspond to 0:09  0:17 for
men and 0:13  0:20 for women.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Goodness of Fit
Table 10: Confusion matrices, spouse income, males
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 9,234 3,248 12,482 0 9,192 1,704 10,896
1 1,250 1,651 2,901 1 1,292 3,195 4,487
Total 10,484 4,899 15,383 Total 10,484 4,899 15,383
Table 11: Confusion matrices, spouse income, females
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 15,593 3,380 18,973 0 15,609 1,942 17,551
1 959 1,217 2,176 1 943 2,655 3,598
Total 16,552 4,597 21,149 Total 16,552 4,597 21,149
Table 12: Confusion matrices, own income gap, males
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 26,877 9,640 36,517 0 25,068 4,276 29,344
1 2,172 2,701 4,873 1 3,981 8,065 12,046
Total 29,049 12,341 41,390 Total 29,049 12,341 41,390
Table 13: Confusion matrices, own income gap, females
Pooled probit Dynamic random e¤ects probit
Actual Actual
Predicted 0 1 Total Predicted 0 1 Total
0 29,905 7,181 37,086 0 29,254 3,821 33,075
1 1,487 1,597 3,084 1 2,138 4,957 7,095
Total 31,392 8,778 40,170 Total 31,392 8,778 40,170
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Appendix B: Elasticities Measured as Population Changes
Elasticities are most often dened as the percentage change in participation probability for a
percentage change in income gap. Hence, we can dene
"p =
@p
@y
y
p
(16)
where y is the disposable income gap and p is the participation probability. Another way of
thinking about participation elasticities is the percentage change in the number of recipients of
social assistance from a percentage change in the income gap. We can express this alternative
elasticity as
"U =  @U
@y
y
U
(17)
where U is the number of persons receiving social assistance. Letting N denote the total
population, which is constant, and noticing that U = N (1  p) we have that
"U =   @p N
@y
y
N (1  p) =
p
(1  p)"p (18)
Since "U is the denition used in two recent tax reform simulations on the CGE model
DREAM (cf. Danish Economic Council (2004) and Danish Welfare Commission (2005)) we
compute these elasticities from our estimations using the predicted participation probability p^,
for each individual in our samples.
From (18), we see that only for a participation rate of exactly 50 per cent, the two elasticities
are equal. For our sample we have participation rates somewhat below 50 percent, since our
samples consist of only people who have been in contact with the social assistance system.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between self-employment choice, expected
earnings, and uncertainty. Several interesting results emerge from our analysis on Dan-
ish longitudinal register data: Firstly, self-employed (taxable) personal income bunch at
kink points in the tax system since self-employed can retain earnings and thereby transfer
income across tax-years. Secondly, expected income level and income variance are impor-
tant determinants in choice of occupation. Thirdly, men put more emphasis on expected
earnings level, while women appears more risk averse, which contribute to explain why
fewer women are self-employed. Finally, our results suggest that non-western immigrants
are marginalized into self-employment.
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1 Introduction
Compared to wage work, self-employment is a fundamentally di¤erent occupation with respect
to the type and source of income. While wage workers receive a wage which is subject to
a relatively small level of uncertainty, self-employed individuals often face considerably more
variation in their income. Moreover, since self-employed typically use own wealth to nance
their business, they bear the risk associated with starting up the rm. Therefore, the ex-
pected income and the uncertainty of this income are likely to be important determinants of
an individuals occupational choice.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the occupational
choice and the distributions of associated monetary gains in di¤erent occupations. Specically,
we analyze how existing earnings di¤erentials and di¤erences in income uncertainty can explain
observed occupational choices. A particular focus is on explaining why fewer women choose to
become self-employed.
If individuals are risk averse, we would expect that the self-employed should be compensated
for facing higher income uncertainty. However, earnings-di¤erentials may arise for other reasons
than risk compensation: Hamilton (2000) argues that cross-sectional earnings di¤erentials may
arise due to i) di¤erent earnings-experience proles, ii) self-selection, and iii) non-pecuniary
benets. Hamilton nds that mean and median incomes are lower in self-employment than
in wage-employment in the US, although those in the higher income brackets earn more in
self-employment than in wage-employment. Hamilton concludes that individuals choose self-
employment primarily because of non-pecuniary benets.
An alternative (or complementary) explanation is that those who choose to become self-
employed may be less risk-averse than the typical wage employed. They may even be risk-
lovers. In a recent paper by Elston, Harrison, and Rutström (2006), experiments are used to
characterize the attitudes to risk among entrepreneurs. Their main nding is that full-time
entrepreneurs are less risk-averse and exhibit a signicant joy of winning compared to non-
entrepreneurs and part-time entrepreneurs.
Yet another explanation relates to the individuals subjective assessment of the probability
of success. While Coelho and de Meza (2006) provide experimental evidence that entrepreneurs
tend to overestimate their chance of success, Elston, Harrison, and Rutström (2006) do not nd
systematic judgmental error of protability. However, it is found that part-time entrepreneurs
are reluctant to enter markets where protability is based on their perception of their relative
skill ability.
Evidence from existing Danish questionnaire surveys shows that men focus more on the
expected income level than women when choosing occupation, whereas women emphasize non-
pecuniary benets (Statistics Denmark, 1999; and Kjeldsen and Nielsen, 2000). Thus, 90 per
cent of the women who had a child in the age of 0-2 years at the time of the business start-up
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state that an important reason for becoming self-employed was to make it easier to combine
family life and work.
With respect to risk aversion, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) analyze 150 psychological
studies of risk-taking behavior, and nd that in 14 out of 16 tasks, women are more risk-averse.
However, according to Croson and Gneezy (2004) the evidence of women being more risk-averse
is less clear in the economics literature which has typically focused on nancial risk.
Several studies have suggested that overcondence is part of human nature, e.g. Svenson
(1980) reports that 90 per cent of Swedish drivers rate themselves above average. Recently and
in relation to occupational choice, Niederle and Vesterlund (2006) nd from the conduction
of experiments that more women than men prefer to work under a non-competitive piece-rate
compensation system rather than under a competitive tournament compensation scheme even
though women are found to be as productive as men. Niederle and Vesterlund (2006) conclude
that the reason for this di¤erence is that men are too overcondent and enjoy competition
more. In other words, too many low productivity men enter the competitive tournament, while
productive women do not enter enough.
To evaluate whether the self-employed actually are compensated for their risk-taking, indi-
vidual level information about the expected income (and the expected distribution of income)
in both self-employment and wage-employment is required. To obtain this information, we
estimate earnings functions for self-employed and wage-employed separately. However, individ-
uals would be expected to select themselves into the type of occupation where they are most
productive. Therefore, we estimate earnings functions for each occupational choice, using the
dynamic panel data sample selection model of Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999). This also allows
us to disentangle the role of unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in the occupational
choices. We nd evidence of state dependence in the occupational choices.
The estimated earnings functions are then in turn used to predict an individuals income
(and the uncertainty of this income) in di¤erent occupations. The random components of the
model are partitioned into transitory and permanent shocks, which in turn are used to create
occupational and education specic measures of income variance (uncertainty) and skewness
(the risk/chance of very low/high incomes).
Rather that rather than characterizing the entrepreneur, we directly evaluate the impact of
earnings on the choice of becoming self-employed, wage-employed or unemployed by examining
the roles of expected earnings, risk aversion and over-condence. This is done for each gender
separately. Our results complement existing evidence from experimental economics, providing
an potential explanations for the substantial gender gap in the probability of choosing to become
self-employed.
We use a large longitudinal data set based on Danish register data from 1980 to 1996, pro-
viding us with detailed individual information about income, wealth, education, labor market
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status (occupation), region of residence, and immigration status. Since the panel covers more
than 15 years, we can track long sequences of individual occupational choices and, thereby,
appropriately investigate the dynamics of the self-employment choice.
Our results point to a large role for monetary aspects when choosing occupation. As ex-
pected, people prefer the sector with the highest expected income and lowest expected variance
and, thus, on average appear risk-averse. We nd that men put more emphasis on the earnings
level, while women appear more risk-averse, which could be one of the crucial reasons why
fewer women are self-employed. We do not nd evidence of overcondence. If anything, women
instead seem to under-estimate their chance of success compared to men.
The explanatory power of the occupational choice model is quite impressive considering
that we only include the predicted income level, variance and skewness. However, we explain
much less of the variation in the realized occupational choices for the group of non-western
immigrants. Immigrants are interesting with respect to occupational choice since they are
more likely to start up their own business than natives. We nd that immigrants put much
less emphasis on the earnings level. These ndings provide additional evidence for immigrants
being marginalized into self-employment as Blume, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2005) suggest.
From their analysis on Danish transition data it is found that most non-western immigrants
entering self-employment come from unemployment and that they do not use self-employment
as a stepping stone for becoming wage-employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the data used in the
analysis. In section 3 we formulate the econometric specication. In section 4, we present the
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data we use in this paper is an unbalanced panel data set for 1980-1996. The data is a
representative 10 per cent sample extract drawn from the Integrated Database for labor market
Research (IDA) and the Danish Income Registry (IKR) both maintained by Statistics Denmark.
IDA and IKR are both longitudinal data based on register data for all individuals in Denmark.
Since data originates from administrative records covering the entire Danish population there
is only natural attrition in the data, i.e. birth, death and migration of individuals. The
occupational status is observed once a year (the last week of November). We divide the labor
market status into three states; self-employed, wage-employed, and unemployed. Since the
panel covers more than 15 years, we have the possibility to track individuals over long time
periods (before, during and after self-employment) and, thereby, appropriately control for the
dynamics of the occupational choice. These high-quality Danish data contains very detailed
individual information concerning, e.g., income, wealth, education, labor market status, region
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME IN 1996
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TABLE 1: INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS IN 1996, SELECTED PERCENTILES
Self-empl. Wage-empl. Self-empl. Wage-empl.
5 0 111,055 -12,529 85,848
10 7,745 135,380 12,687 99,698
25 75,980 167,222 61,119 119,634
40 120,678 190,022 88,076 133,592
50 148,590 205,274 104,021 142,430
60 183,967 221,686 121,745 151,914
75 242,834 253,018 152,229 169,066
90 345,187 325,042 202,619 202,231
95 458,649 387,028 248,060 229,819
Disposable IncomePersonal IncomePercentile
of residence, and immigration status. Moreover, the data also includes the same information
for cohabitants allowing us to aggregate variables to the household level.
In order to avoid distortions in the results due to retirement patterns and educational
attainment we restrict the sample to include persons aged 30-55 years only. This leaves us with
2; 424; 694 observations in total of which 1; 130; 635 are women.
For the analysis of occupational choice we need to decide on an income measure to use.
One obvious candidate is disposable income since this measure is closely related to current
consumption possibilities and, hence, utility.1
Figure 1 shows kernel densities for the disposable income for self-employed and for wage-
employed in 1996. Both distributions are right-skewed with the distribution of incomes from
self-employed being most right skewed. From both Figure 1 and Table 1 it can be seen that
the mean disposable income for self-employed is considerably below the mean income for wage-
employed. However, due to the skewness the 90th percentile earns more in self-employment
1We compute the gross income including wage-income, capital income, labor market contributions (since
1994), taxable and non-taxable benets. In order to obtain the disposable income we subtract the tax payments.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN 1996
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than the equivalent in wage-employment.
Figure 1 and Table 1 conrm the US evidence presented in Hamilton (2000), who also nds
that mean and median incomes are lower in self-employment, but that those in the higher
percentiles earn more in self-employment relative to wage-employment.
In Figure 2 we have depicted the (taxable) personal income for respectively wage-employed
and self-employed together with two dotted vertical lines indicating where the medium and
upper tax brackets set in. In contrast to wage-employed, self-employed tend to bunch just
below where the tax brackets set in. This can be due to self-employed being in charge of their
own working time, but it may also reect that self-employed are building up inventories and
capital stocks or have other means of extracting income from their rm (possibly also in the
grey area between rm economics and personal economics). Finally, an institutional feature
("Virksomhedsordningen") allows self-employed to retain earnings in the rm.
The bunching at the tax brackets suggests that adding retained earnings (less of taxes) to the
disposable income constitutes a better income measure for self-employed and we only use this
income measure in the rest of the paper. As shown in Figure 3 we nd that the unconditional
mean and median incomes are larger in self-employment than in wage-employment in contrast
to the US evidence in Hamilton (2000) and in contrast to when applying the narrow income
measure.
3 Econometric Specication
The organization of this section, can be summarized as follows: First, we consider the estimation
of conditional earnings functions using Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) sample selection model
for panel data. Hereafter, we construct income uncertainty and skewness measures. Finally,
using measures for expected income, uncertainty and skewness, we model the occupational
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FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME PLUS RETAINED EARNINGS
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choice in a conditional logit model.
3.1 Earnings Conditional on Occupational Choice
For each person we separately predict the disposable income including retained earnings from
being self-employed and being wage employed. The chosen income measure is disposable income
including retained earnings. We use unemployment benets for the group of unemployed. For
each occupation we model earnings as a simple log-linear mincer earnings equation
ln ynt = xnt + n + "nt (1)
where n indexes individuals (n = 1; ::; N) and t indexes time (t = 1; ::::; T ); ynt is annual dispos-
able income plus retained earnings,  is a vector of unknown coe¢ cients to be estimated, xnt
is a vector covariates, n represents unobserved heterogeneity and "nt is a normally distributed
disturbance.
Since we observe earnings for the chosen occupational status only, the conditional earnings
functions will in general be estimated on a non-random selected sample. There are several
arguments, why self-selection may be an issue in the present context. In the Roy (1951) model
the individual ex-ante knows her sector-specic productivity, and will select herself into the
sector, where she is most productive. Furthermore, if the incomes in the two sectors are highly
correlated, the most productive persons will select the sector with the largest dispersion of sector
specic abilities, while the least productive will select the sector with the smallest dispersion.
The Danish labor market is characterized by a compressed wage structure as a consequence
of the generous unemployment benet level and a high degree of organization on both employer
and worker sides. As argued by Malchow-Møller, Markusen, and Skaksen (2005) such institu-
tional arrangement may well imply that the most productive are not paid according to their
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marginal product and, therefore, the most able may select themselves into self-employment.
On the other hand, the least productive may not have a su¢ ciently high productivity to earn
the minimum wage in paid employment. Consequently, marginalization may also push the least
productive into self-employment. Blume, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2005) argue that this
indeed is the case for non-western immigrants in the Danish labor market.
Yet another type of selection, ex-post self-selection, arises in leaning models such as Jo-
vanovic (1979) and Jovanovic (1984), where persons have no ex-ante knowledge of their pro-
ductivity, but consecutively observe output realizations. Persons experiencing poor output
realizations will quit and search for a new match.
To control for the selection problem we use the Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) dynamic
panel data application of Heckmans two-step sample selection model. The selection is modelled
as a dynamic random e¤ects probit, which allows us to separate two sources of persistence in
the occupational choice: Persistence as a result of unobserved heterogeneity and (true) state
dependence. Since we do not observe the rst occupational choice, we cannot assume that the
initial observation of the occupational is truly exogenous. We use the Wooldridge (2005) way
of handling the initial conditions problem and, thus, allow the unobserved heterogeneity to be
correlated with the initial dependent variable.
We will now briey explain the model.2 We consider a model consisting of two equations,
where the parameters of equation (1) are of primary interest, while the selection equation below
is a reduced form equation for the occupational choice. The selection part of the model can be
summarized as
dnt = xnt + dnt 1 + n + nt (2)
dnt = 1 (d

nt > 0) (3)
ln ynt = ln y

nt if dnt = 1 (4)
= 0 (unobserved) otherwise
where ynt and d

nt are latent endogenous variables with observed counterparts ynt and dnt.
The equation of interest is assumed to have the usual error component structure, where n 
iN (0; 2) and "nt  iN (0; 2"). For the selection equation we allow for unobserved heterogeneity
through random individual e¤ects, such that the selection equation has the following two-
component error structure n  iN
 
0; 2

and nt  iN
 
0; 2

. We allow for correlation
between the individual e¤ects as well as correlation between the idiosyncratic disturbances,
that is cov(n; n) =  6= 0 and cov("nt; nt) = " 6= 0. Finally, denote nt = n + "nt ,
nt = n + nt , xn = [xn1; :::; xnT ]
0 and let n be a T vector of nt:
2For a detailed treatment of the model see Vella and Verbeek (1999).
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Assume now
njxn  iN
 
0; 2ii
0 + 2I

(5)
E [ntjxn; n] =  1nt +  2n (6)
where n = T 1
PT
t=1 nt and where  1 = "=
2
" and  2 = T
 
   "2=2"

=
 
2 + T
2


are constants to be estimated and i is a column of ones. Note that equation (6) imposes strict
exogeneity of xnt, such that errors are assumed to be independent of future and lagged values
of xnt. To estimate the conditional mean for the dependent variable in the equation of interest,
we condition on the chosen occupation
E [ln yntjxn; dn0; dn] = xnt + E [ntjxn; dn0; dn]
where E [ntjxn; dn0; dn] is the selection bias induced by correlation between the errors in the
two equations.
Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the conditional mean of the error-term from
the selection equation; E [ntjxn; dn0; dn] can be estimated by the following expression
~nt =
1R
f (dnjxn; n) f (n) dn
Z
(n + E [ntjxn; n]) f (dnjxn; n) f (n) dn (7)
This expression can be approximated by quadrature methods or simulation. Once we have
estimated the reduced form parameters for the selection equation, we can easily simulate the
conditional error ~nt.3
After computing ~nt and the individual specic means n = 1Tn
PTn
t ~nt we can estimate the
following equation by the simple linear random e¤ects model
ln ynt = xnt + ~nt1 + n2 + n + "nt
3.2 Uncertainty and Skewness Measures
For each category in our disaggregated education breakdown shown in Table A.1 we estimate
the occupational-specic measures of variance and skewness of the income processes. This is
done separately for men and women.
We divide the uncertainty into a permanent part relating to the variance of the individual
time-constant n and into a transitory uncertainty relating to the time-varying error-term.4
3The procedure is summarized in algorithm 1 in the appendix.
4Recently, Diaz-Serrano, Hartog, and Nielsen (2003) have used a similar approach in the context of educa-
tional choice.
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Among the covariates in xnt we have included 28 educational dummies.5 We dene an =
exp (n) and ent = exp ("nt) and compute the variance R and the skewnessK for each education
type l by
Rl =
1
Nl
PNl
n=1 (anl   al)2 Kl = 1Nl
PNl
n=1 (anl   al)3
R"l =
1
T
1
Nl
PNj
n=1 (enlt   el)2 K"l = 1T 1Nl
PNl
n=1 (enlt   el)3
By averaging the residuals only on education groups, we e¤ectively assume that the income
uncertainty does not depend on for example experience, which is obviously an approximation.
Averaging the incomes on other variables as well is not feasible with the detailed education
break-down used.
For an unemployed there is no or very little uncertainty regarding income. Consequently,
we set the variance and skewness equal to zero.
3.3 A Model of Occupational Choice
The behavioral framework underlying the occupational choice model is simple: We assume that
individuals each period associate each occupation with a continuous random utility function,
Unit , where each occupation is indexed by i 2 [se; we; ue]. Each period individuals choose
between self-employment (se), wage-employment (we) and unemployment (ue) to maximize
the Unit.6 Random utility is assumed to be a linear function of occupational specic earnings,
and the variance and skewness of permanent and transitory income shocks. Hence, the random
utility function can be written as
Unit = xnit + i + nit with n = 1; :::; N and t = 1; ::; T
where i is a choice-specic constant, xnit =
h
Y^nit; R

l ; K

l ; R
"
l ; K
"
l
i
denotes the set of attributes
associated with each occupation,  is a vector of coe¢ cients related to the the choice specic
attributes xint. The error component nit is assumed to be individual-, choice,- and time specic
and distributed according to a Type I extreme value distribution. With this distributional
assumption, we end up with McFaddens well known Conditional Logit model for discrete
choices.
5In the IDA database there are 1,750 di¤erent educations, but in order to secure representativity we operate
with 28 education groups only (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). We have aimed at securing representativity
by not making a too disaggregated educational break-down, but on the other hand aimed at selecting as
homogeneous groups as possible.
6Even though each individual maximizes utility each period by choosing occupations this need not be equiva-
lent to maximization of life-time utility given by a discounted sum of period utility. However, this simplication
is needed to make the model operational.
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4 Results
4.1 Self-selection and Earnings Di¤erentials
In this section, we investigate the extent to which earnings di¤erentials can be explained by
individuals self-selecting themselves into the di¤erent occupations. To account for the poten-
tially important selection problems, we estimate the model sample selection model of Vella
and Verbeek (1998,1999). First, we estimate the selection equation given by equation (2) and
equation (3) by a dynamic random e¤ects probit. Hereafter, we estimate the parameters in the
conditional earnings function in equation (1).
Since the choice of labor market state di¤ers considerably between the genders, the sample
correction and the prediction of incomes are done separately for men and women. Additionally,
the existence of wage di¤erentials between the genders suggests that it would be appropriate
to run the wage equations separately.
The results from the selection equations given in table A.2 suggest that the impact of
the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly signicant, indicating the presence of
substantial state dependence. State dependence can be a result of cost of and uncertainty of
labor market transitions and is likely to be amplied for transitions into self-employment in the
presence of start-up costs. In an intertemporal model of occupational choice Schjerning (2005)
shows that the combination of irreversible start-up costs and income uncertainty introduces
an option value of being self-employed. To avoid potential start-up costs associated with later
re-entry, the self-employed is willing to wait until good times occur rather than temporarily
leaving self-employment. This introduces a value of waiting and consequently we will see later
entry and later exit.
The magnitude of state dependence for the self-employed is substansial: Being self-employed
in the previous period increases the probability of being self-employed in the current period
from 1.2 to 41.5 per cent for females and from 4.0 per cent to 48.7 per cent for men. As a
comparison, the marginal e¤ect from previous wage-employment is 19.9 per cent for females
and 24.0 per cent for men.
The results from the selection equation suggest that, in general, the probability of being
self-employed varies much between the educational categories both with respect to length and
type of education. Although the picture is quite mixed, it seems to be the case that unskilled
and some groups of highest education are the most likely to become self-employed. The latter
is due to the fact that the self-employed include professionals such as practitioner doctors,
dentists, lawyers and accountants.
The estimated earnings equations are given in table A.3. As dependent variable we use the
disposable income including retained earnings. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the
form of random e¤ects, and we control for the usual socio-demographic variables. We nd pos-
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itive coe¢ cients on marriage for men, while they are negative for women. The origin variables
have the expected signs and magnitudes, i.e., non-western immigrants earn considerably less
than western immigrants, second generation immigrants and natives. It is striking that non-
western immigrants are more likely to become self-employed even though they should expect a
much lower income in self-employment compared to wage-employment.
We nd the usual hump-shaped e¤ect of age, which obviously captures labor market experi-
ence. We have included dummies for each education from our detailed educational break-down
shown in the appendix. The general picture is as expected that the longer education, the higher
disposable income. As one would presume, the returns to education di¤er remarkably between
the educations. For example, the returns to humanities are lower compared to social sciences
at each length of education reecting the relatively higher unemployment rate that may lead
to accepting jobs below the educational level.
If education is a signal, so that employers use education to screen potential workers, we
would expect lower returns to education in self-employment. There does not seem to be much
evidence for the signalling hypothesis.
Since we do not wish to rely on the non-linearity of the selection equation to identify the
selection e¤ects in the income equations we need to exclude at least one variable. We use the
lagged dependent variable, household wealth, dummies for children in the household and a
dummy for the spouse being self-employed.
The inclusion of the correction terms account for the selection bias induced by the correlation
between unobservables in the selection model and earnings equations. The coe¢ cients to the
correction terms nt and n are statistically signicant in all four regressions. In the case of
men, the coe¢ cient on both correction terms are negative, implying that the marginalization
on average dominates. Taken literally, we have that those in wage-employment will tend to
earn more in self-employment than those already self-employed.
In contrast to this, the coe¢ cient on the individual specic correction term, n is positive
in the self-employment earnings equation for women implying that those in wage-employment
have a lower self-employment potential than the currently self-employed. Since the income is
measured on a yearly basis a possible explanation for the positive selection into self-employment
relates to di¤erences in the hours of work between wage-employed and self-employed. About
20 per cent of female wage-employed work part-time and if this fraction is larger than the
corresponding for women in self-selection a positive selection into self-employment will, on
average, emerge. In recent work by Carrasco and Ejrnæs (2003) it is in fact argued that
the relative low share of female self-employed in Denmark can be explained by the relative
high level of exibility in the Danish labor market providing the possibility to work part time
in paid employment. Similar arguments apply to women planning to have children, as the
opportunities for paid maternity leave are better in wage-employment. Another explanation
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TABLE 2: CHOICE OF LABOR MARKET STATUS
(CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODEL)
Subsample Mean Earnings
Variance/
Mean
Skewnes/
Mean Sample size R2
All 1.58 (0.007)** -0.15 (0.004)** -0.02 (0.001)** -0.10 -0.010 7,274,082 51.0
Non-western immigrants 1.08 (0.044)** 0.05 (0.025) -0.02 (0.005)** 0.04 -0.016 119,412 23.5
Women 0.40 (0.017)** -0.22 (0.011)** -0.04 (0.001)** -0.56 -0.091 3,391,905 59.7
Non-western immigrants 0.81 (0.095)** -0.34 (0.070)** 0.02 (0.009)* -0.42 0.022 45,564 29.8
Married 1.00 (0.023)** -0.27 (0.014)** -0.03 (0.002)** -0.27 -0.032 2,514,129 61.6
HH. Wealth(t-1)>500.000 0.85 (0.048)** -0.14 (0.022)** -0.01 (0.003)** -0.16 -0.013 493,101 64.5
Father self-employed 1.29 (0.148)** 0.20 (0.030)** -0.06 (0.009)** 0.16 -0.043 64,728 64.2
age<40 0.40 (0.026)** -0.11 (0.013)** -0.05 (0.002)** -0.27 -0.118 1,353,195 60.5
age>45 0.58 (0.030)** -0.37 (0.025)** -0.02 (0.002)** -0.63 -0.038 1,148,580 57.6
Men 2.81 (0.016)** -0.10 (0.005)** 0.00 (0.001) -0.04 -0.001 3,882,177 44.8
Non-western immigrants 1.81 (0.088)** 0.14 (0.027)** -0.03 (0.006)** 0.08 -0.018 73,848 20.3
Married 2.39 (0.020)** -0.15 (0.006)** 0.01 (0.001)** -0.06 0.003 2,761,398 48.2
HH. Wealth(t-1)>500.000 1.42 (0.044)** -0.18 (0.012)** 0.06 (0.002)** -0.13 0.045 474,390 43.5
Father self-employed 3.77 (0.110)** -0.10 (0.023)** -0.02 (0.007)** -0.03 -0.006 91,098 40.5
age<40 3.33 (0.027)** -0.07 (0.007)** -0.02 (0.002)** -0.02 -0.006 1,538,208 50.0
age>45 2.53 (0.027)** -0.10 (0.009)** 0.01 (0.002)** -0.04 0.004 1,348,191 39.6
SkewnessVariance
Distribution of Permanent Chock's MRS
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Other controls: Occupational specific constants
and measures of the temporary components of estimated chocks (skewness and variance)
might be glass-ceiling e¤ects in wage-employment, see e.g. Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman
(2003) for Swedish evidence.
4.2 The Occupational Choice
The occupational choice model is estimated for a several di¤erent subsamples. The results
from these estimations are shown in Table 2. Each row in the Table corresponds to the results
for a di¤erent subsample. The gures in the Table show the e¤ects of the mean, variance
(uncertainty) and skewness (i.e., in this case the chance of very high incomes) of predicted
earnings conditional on the occupational choice. Note that in the estimations, variance and
skewness of both transitory and permanent shocks are included in the model. For expositional
purposes, however, we only report variance and skewness of the permanent income component
in the Table.7
The coe¢ cients to mean earnings gives the marginal utility of expected income, while the
7Since the earnings equations were estimated with age variables and time-dummies there is no aggregate time
variation left in the error-terms, but still individual specic variation occurs. Alvarez, Browning, and Ejrnæs
(2002) nd that Danish income processes are particularly heterogenous. Steep income-experience proles imply
a large variance, but when controlling for the income level, we should due to income smoothing expect that a at
income-tenure prole is preferred. However, a steeper wage-experience prole may indicate greater possibilities
such as promotion for wage-employed and business expansion for self-employed, which may explain the positice
coe¢ cient to the variance of the temporary income shocks. The skewness of the time-varying part does not
seem to play any role.
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(negative of the) coe¢ cient to the variance can be interpreted as the marginal (dis-) utility of
income uncertainty. To give an example, a positive coe¢ cient to expected income is associated
with individuals consistently choosing occupations with higher levels of expected earnings,
while a negative coe¢ cient to variance emerges when individuals choose occupations with little
income uncertainty.
To make results comparable across di¤erent subsamples, we compute the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between the variance and mean earnings and between the skewness and
mean earnings. The MRS can be interpreted as the rate at which you are willing to trade o¤
more uncertainty for higher income.8 These results are shown in the right part of the Table.
Considering the full sample (the rst row in the Table), the results point to a large role
for monetary aspects when choosing occupation. As expected, peoples choice of occupation
is positively a¤ected by expected (mean) earnings and negatively by a higher variance of the
income. Thus, on average, people appear risk averse. These ndings are found to be robust to
various sample decompositions.
Turning to the di¤erences between the genders, we nd that men put more emphasis on
the earnings level, while women appear more risk averse. This is reected in the much lower
value of the MRS estimate for women. This could be one of the main reasons why fewer women
choose to become self-employed.
Women seem to be behaving in a less risk averse manner when household wealth exceeds
DKK 500,000. This is perfectly consistent with standard models of intertemporal behavior that
nd that the degree of e¤ective risk aversion is decreasing in wealth; see, e.g., Deaton (1991),
Carroll (1997), and Schjerning (2005).
The nding that married women appear less risk averse than other women is also fully
consistent with models from the literature on family economics that point to risk sharing as
being a potentially important economic gain from marriage, see e.g. Hess (2004).
A similar variation in mens attitudes towards risk is not found. An interesting nding,
however, is that the MRS between income uncertainty and expected earnings is virtually zero
compared to females. This conrms the evidence from Danish questionnaires, referred to above,
which pointed to men putting much more emphasis on monetary gains (expected income) than
women.
Finally, a positive coe¢ cient to skewness is interpreted as being consistent with evidence of
overcondence. If people systematically prefer occupations with a high degree of skewness (a
chance of very high incomes) it may be due unrealistic, strong beliefs in their own ability.
For the full sample, a negative coe¢ cient to skewness is found. Hence, on average, there
is no evidence of overcondence. The more detailed results with respect to this behavioral
8This normalization is important since estimates from two di¤erent subsamples are not directly comparable
due to di¤erences in the variances of the unobserved factors.
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hypothesis are mixed and inconclusive. If anything, men behave somewhat more overcondently
than females. This result match those found from experimental studies.
It is striking that we in the model for immigrants only can explain 17 per cent compared
to 50 per cent in the other models. Moreover, the coe¢ cient to income is much lower than in
the other conditional logit models. Hence, other important (unobserved) factors, such as lack
of opportunities in the ordinary labor market and non-pecuniary benets may be much more
relevant in explaining their occupational choice. Hence, the low explanatory power, and the
lower coe¢ cient to income points to self-employment being the last resort due to marginalization
in wage-employment. We also nd that non-western immigrants appear less risk averse. This
may be due to marginalization forcing immigrants to accept insecure and low paid occupations,
but it can also be a consequence of cultural di¤erences in the attitudes towards self-employment.
5 Conclusions
This paper uses high quality Danish longitudinal register data, to investigate the relationship
between self-employment choice, expected earnings and income uncertainty. We proceed in
the following steps: Firstly, we estimate of conditional earnings functions using the sample
selection model of Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999). Secondly, using measures for expected
income, uncertainty and skewness, we model the occupational choice in a conditional logit
model.
Comparing earnings distributions based on di¤erent income measures, we nd that i) the
dispersion of incomes is in general much larger for the self-employed and ii) Danish self-employed
earn more than wage-employed when retained earnings are included in the income measure.
Contrary to wage-workers, self-employed (taxable) personal income bunch at kink points in
the tax system since self-employed (unlike wage workers) has the possibility to retain earnings
and thereby transfer income across years. The progressive Danish income tax system provides
strong incentives to make such transfers.
Several experimental studies have found that while men are more competitive, women are
more risk averse. In the context of occupational choice, we nd that men put more emphasis
on the income level, while women seem to be more risk-averse. This result is found to be robust
to various sample decompositions.
Linking the behavioral results from the experimental literature with income distributions in
self-employment and wage-employment may explain why fewer women become self-employed.
We nd that part of the gender gap can be explained by gender di¤erences in the trade-o¤s
between income level and the variance of incomes. However, we nd no e¤ect of skewness of
incomes.
Non-western immigrants are overrepresented in self-employment. The occupational choice
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model performs considerably worse for this group and we nd smaller e¤ects of income level and
variance. Furthermore, the sample selection model shows that non-western are more likely to
become self-employed even though they should expect a much lower income in self-employment
than native Danes. This suggests that non-western immigrants are marginalized into self-
employment
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6 Appendix
Algorithm 1 Estimation of conditional error-term from the selection equation; E [ntjxnt; dn0; dnt]
1. For a given set of parameter values 1 = (; ; ) take a draw from rn from f (nj) =
N (0; ) and calculate the likelihood for individual i conditional on the draw
f (dn; di0jxn;rn) =
TnY
t=1
f (dntjxnt;rn) f (dn0jxnt;rn)
where f (dntjxnt;rn) = ntdnt+(1  nt) (1  dnt) and where nt   (xnt + dnt 1 + rn)
2. Repeat many times and average the results to obtain the Simulated Log Likelihood function
(SLL)
SLL = ln
1
R
RX
r
f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
3. Choose MSL1 so that SLL is maximized
4. Given the MSL estimates from the st stage regression MSL1 , we can easily simulate ^nt:
Take R draws from f
 
njMSL

and calculate the simulated counterpart of ^nt
~nt =
1
1
R
PR
r f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
1
R
RX
r
(rn + E [ntjxn; rn]) f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
where E [ntjxn; rn] =
dntnt
nt
-
(1  dnt)nt
1  nt is the cross-sectional generalized residual for
the probit model and where nt   (xnt + dnt 1 + rn)
To improve coverage of the integrals and reduce simulation noise, we use Halton Draws.9 .
9Halton draws provides a superior coverage as it induces negative correlation across individuals. In the
context of discrete choice models, Bhat (2001) found in a Mixed Logit Model, that 100 Halton draws provided
more precise results than 1000 standard pseudo random draw. Train (2003) provide a comprehensive and
excellent treatment of several variance reduction techniques.
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TABLE A.1: MEAN, VARIANCE AND SKEWNESS
(EDUCATIONAL BREAKDOWN)
se we se we se we se we se we se we
Missing education 3,867 29,167 209,691 163,169 35.633 0.049 2.196 0.224 47.9 11.8 6.1 3.9
Primary School Basic school 80,596 657,151 217,842 133,278 35.476 0.037 2.296 0.099 236.9 36.9 25.8 7.5
Secondary school General 4,509 43,962 267,294 166,541 0.660 0.039 3.216 0.223 25.5 2.1 6.9 3.6
Commercial and technical 1,362 12,906 353,176 218,601 1.062 0.100 6.970 0.806 11.9 20.8 6.9 13.1
Vocational training Shop assistents 24,343 345,545 232,634 151,299 2.342 0.034 0.974 0.122 104.9 9.8 5.3 6.2
Building and construction 18,769 113,541 225,676 170,977 0.571 0.024 0.554 0.072 28.6 5.1 7.5 4.4
Metal 17,887 147,347 240,837 177,130 0.219 0.028 0.784 0.075 11.2 19.9 5.7 4.5
Graphic 2,061 18,304 277,758 202,616 3.609 0.029 2.278 0.161 22.1 4.5 7.2 8.3
Technical 2,606 33,878 158,173 129,978 1.342 0.035 1.147 0.097 18.8 14.5 3.0 2.7
Service and transport 10,725 23,617 124,194 131,480 1.225 0.051 0.478 0.095 42.1 22.1 1.7 1.5
Food 20,383 49,809 314,211 170,244 1.155 0.032 0.764 0.091 83.8 5.1 5.3 4.7
Health care 2,254 67,273 138,455 117,762 0.659 0.026 0.896 0.052 14.2 5.2 3.3 1.2
Post secondary Humanities and social sciences 1,576 18,953 185,609 153,600 0.224 0.039 2.013 0.141 2.1 2.5 3.6 4.5
Technical 3,847 32,146 246,378 181,377 0.202 0.040 0.594 0.112 3.7 15.2 3.0 6.7
Agriculture 917 8,504 306,245 157,736 0.218 0.039 0.697 0.066 3.2 5.1 1.1 1.1
Health care 206 10,378 114,543 129,392 1.163 0.024 0.812 0.051 4.5 2.0 0.3 0.9
Police and defence 327 15,524 234,734 202,600 0.194 0.020 0.621 0.079 3.7 6.2 3.2 3.8
Higher education Humanities 3,033 157,352 174,274 156,319 7.537 0.021 0.893 0.054 48.4 2.6 3.1 1.5
short cycle Social sciences 1,780 22,332 491,580 251,898 0.251 0.073 1.292 0.270 3.2 15.7 2.5 3.8
Technical 3,338 40,915 308,715 246,404 0.483 0.041 1.327 0.126 17.3 8.7 8.4 10.5
Health care 1,962 65,014 168,011 137,621 0.095 0.026 0.659 0.057 2.0 2.7 4.8 4.7
Food, agriculture and transport 730 15,661 276,414 216,992 0.883 0.032 2.391 0.073 19.7 2.4 5.1 1.7
BA 469 5,205 336,057 251,710 0.828 0.087 1.234 0.320 8.4 11.9 1.5 2.4
Higher education Humanities 578 22,592 209,513 190,457 0.162 0.038 0.868 0.068 2.3 26.6 1.7 1.5
MA level Natural sciences 159 9,727 226,141 217,852 0.179 0.023 1.104 0.070 2.8 1.2 4.0 3.8
Social sciences 3,589 25,269 476,302 251,683 0.321 0.047 0.778 0.190 19.3 6.9 3.5 5.4
Technical 1,912 18,252 334,441 255,821 0.553 0.048 2.193 0.161 7.1 17.9 10.3 7.0
Food 1,431 5,250 358,845 228,455 0.122 0.024 0.446 0.073 5.8 2.1 7.6 2.4
Health care 7,069 18,412 441,567 260,069 0.074 0.038 0.199 0.085 2.4 13.1 3.0 1.3
# observations
Variance Skewness
Transitory effect Permanent effect Transitory effect Permanent effect
Mean disposable
income
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TABLE A.2: SELECTION EQUATIONS
(RESULTS FROM A BINARY PROBIT WITH RANDOM EFFECTS)
Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.
Lagged dependent, y(t-1) 2.590 0.007 1.415 0.004 2.651 0.010 1.226 0.005
Initial dependent, y(0) 1.962 0.018 1.918 0.010 1.641 0.023 1.540 0.011
Age 0.705 0.071 -0.157 0.044 0.731 0.096 0.974 0.047
Age squared -0.827 0.082 0.067 0.050 -0.822 0.110 -1.231 0.053
Wealth (in mio dkr, 1996 prices) 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.001
No. of children aged 0-6 0.049 0.006 -0.019 0.004 0.049 0.010 -0.098 0.006
No. of children aged 7-17 0.030 0.004 -0.011 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.001 0.003
Married -0.006 0.009 0.112 0.007 -0.047 0.011 0.064 0.007
Immigrant (western) 0.043 0.030 -0.155 0.023 0.132 0.032 -0.159 0.021
Immigrant (non-western) 0.230 0.028 -0.481 0.020 0.124 0.037 -0.529 0.024
Second generation immigrants 0.092 0.084 -0.111 0.070 0.132 0.109 0.037 0.079
Spouse self-employed 0.453 0.013 0.137 0.005 0.399 0.011 0.152 0.005
Regional Copenhagen 0.009 0.017 -0.131 0.012 0.033 0.022 -0.097 0.013
 dummies Large city 0.012 0.016 -0.096 0.012 0.022 0.020 -0.161 0.012
Rural 0.097 0.013 -0.123 0.009 0.120 0.015 -0.197 0.009
Missing education 0.066 0.029 -0.030 0.023 0.152 0.037 -0.109 0.025
Secondary General 0.061 0.026 0.073 0.020 0.133 0.034 0.093 0.022
school Commercial and technical 0.070 0.043 0.153 0.038 0.002 0.070 0.190 0.042
Vocational Shop assistents -0.038 0.014 0.176 0.012 -0.023 0.013 0.155 0.008
training Building and construction -0.025 0.014 0.067 0.011 0.180 0.084 -0.011 0.067
Metal -0.072 0.014 0.152 0.011 0.403 0.139 0.063 0.103
Graphic -0.025 0.036 0.041 0.028 0.252 0.082 -0.182 0.055
Technical -0.010 0.046 0.087 0.033 0.071 0.029 0.000 0.019
Service and transport 0.188 0.041 -0.145 0.032 0.500 0.025 -0.370 0.020
Food 0.175 0.018 -0.156 0.015 0.110 0.057 0.051 0.037
Health care -0.143 0.086 0.418 0.066 -0.099 0.022 0.351 0.013
Post Humanities and social sciences 0.171 0.069 0.007 0.059 0.176 0.036 0.063 0.023
secondary Technical -0.056 0.026 0.191 0.021 0.057 0.054 0.223 0.035
Agriculture -0.050 0.060 0.126 0.047 -0.172 0.084 0.439 0.054
Health care -0.751 0.361 0.478 0.153 -0.204 0.064 0.443 0.038
Police and defence -0.425 0.053 0.763 0.039 -0.422 0.322 0.532 0.122
Higher Humanities -0.365 0.026 0.587 0.018 -0.221 0.019 0.552 0.012
education Social sciences 0.003 0.035 0.256 0.029 -0.097 0.057 0.418 0.037
short cycle Technical -0.048 0.024 0.302 0.019 0.139 0.118 0.073 0.078
Health care 0.153 0.077 0.285 0.065 -0.177 0.024 0.785 0.016
Food, agriculture and transportation -0.258 0.043 0.478 0.033 -0.095 0.114 0.277 0.073
BA 0.043 0.067 0.170 0.054 -0.238 0.189 0.324 0.094
Higher Humanities -0.358 0.047 0.510 0.032 -0.044 0.055 0.297 0.032
education Natural sciences -0.390 0.069 0.616 0.051 -0.221 0.122 0.352 0.065
MA level Social sciences 0.198 0.029 0.073 0.023 0.195 0.051 0.218 0.034
Technical 0.021 0.033 0.264 0.027 0.112 0.101 0.110 0.072
Food 0.223 0.053 0.034 0.042 0.395 0.094 -0.008 0.062
Health care 0.587 0.031 -0.333 0.027 0.563 0.039 0.048 0.029
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.327 0.153 -0.661 0.098 -4.627 0.208 -2.555 0.104
s µ 0.760 0.009 0.838 0.005 0.626 0.011 0.730 0.005
Number of observations 1288888 1288888 1126960 1126960
Number of individuals 136990 136990 122749 122749
Log-likelihood -116985.808 -287641.544 -59297.355 -243222.453
Males Females
Self-employment Wage-employment Self-employment Wage-employment
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TABLE A.3: EARNINGS EQUATIONS
(CORRECTED FOR SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS AND UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY)
Coefficient Std.Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.Coefficient Std.
Age (divided by 10) 0.707 0.030 0.323 0.004 0.282 0.081 0.069 0.005
Age squared (divided by 1000) -0.834 0.034 -0.350 0.005 -0.410 0.092 -0.111 0.005
Married 0.110 0.006 0.063 0.001 -0.285 0.015 -0.101 0.001
Immigrant (western) -0.278 0.031 -0.081 0.006 -0.264 0.062 -0.046 0.006
Immigrant (non-western) -0.608 0.029 -0.187 0.006 -0.543 0.071 -0.065 0.008
Second generation immigrants 0.008 0.086 -0.027 0.014 -0.098 0.230 0.009 0.018
Regional Copenhagen -0.239 0.015 -0.085 0.002 -0.141 0.034 -0.044 0.002
dummies Large city 0.019 0.016 -0.039 0.002 -0.033 0.036 -0.062 0.002
Rural 0.041 0.012 0.014 0.002 -0.072 0.027 -0.042 0.002
Missing education -0.068 0.031 0.086 0.006 -0.098 0.072 0.063 0.007
SecondaryGeneral 0.079 0.029 0.017 0.005 0.093 0.062 0.009 0.005
school Commercial and technical 0.258 0.047 0.238 0.009 -0.056 0.131 0.114 0.010
VocationalShop assistents 0.196 0.016 0.185 0.003 0.107 0.029 0.093 0.002
training Building and construction 0.025 0.015 0.066 0.003 -0.152 0.194 0.052 0.017
Metal 0.071 0.015 0.087 0.003 0.175 0.288 0.101 0.027
Graphic 0.148 0.041 0.223 0.007 0.276 0.172 0.171 0.017
Technical 0.038 0.051 0.042 0.009 -0.113 0.061 0.036 0.005
Service and transport 0.002 0.036 0.084 0.009 -0.013 0.038 -0.028 0.007
Food 0.319 0.016 0.085 0.004 0.182 0.099 0.051 0.008
Health care 0.144 0.112 0.043 0.012 0.049 0.051 0.039 0.003
Post Humanities and social sciences 0.086 0.072 0.209 0.013 0.219 0.067 0.189 0.006
secondary Technical 0.139 0.030 0.178 0.005 0.098 0.121 0.073 0.009
Agriculture 0.316 0.064 0.218 0.013 0.071 0.171 0.135 0.013
Health care 0.141 0.452 -0.021 0.027 -0.044 0.149 0.113 0.009
Police and defence 0.242 0.076 0.208 0.007 0.215 0.755 0.086 0.022
Higher Humanities 0.133 0.040 0.189 0.004 0.122 0.052 0.224 0.003
education Social sciences 0.660 0.041 0.426 0.006 0.443 0.151 0.276 0.008
short cycleTechnical 0.300 0.029 0.401 0.005 0.324 0.207 0.385 0.020
Health care 0.279 0.097 0.180 0.014 0.468 0.058 0.219 0.004
Food, agriculture and transport 0.181 0.061 0.341 0.008 0.299 0.255 0.191 0.017
BA 0.127 0.068 0.314 0.011 0.484 0.313 0.163 0.015
Higher Humanities 0.233 0.080 0.336 0.007 0.247 0.109 0.445 0.007
education Natural sciences 0.354 0.114 0.387 0.009 -0.066 0.378 0.476 0.015
MA level Social sciences 0.773 0.034 0.486 0.006 0.719 0.109 0.476 0.007
Technical 0.376 0.039 0.477 0.007 0.564 0.198 0.435 0.020
Food 0.634 0.054 0.428 0.013 0.613 0.200 0.420 0.023
Health care 0.959 0.028 0.663 0.008 1.257 0.069 0.627 0.010
s aµ -0.062 0.003 -0.112 0.001 -0.024 0.005 -0.076 0.002
s e? -0.012 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.092 0.008 0.013 0.001
Constant 15.109 0.068 15.783 0.010 15.779 0.180 16.323 0.011
Number of observations
Number of individuals
s a
s e
Fraction of variance due to
individual specific error
R-squared 0.230.12 0.20 0.11
Males Females
Self-employment Wage-employment Self-employment Wage-employment
Summary Statistics
168782 1037089 47496 994058
27544 122754 10456 117511
0.6656 0.2929 0.9831 0.3092
0.4557 0.1737 0.5914 0.1869
0.68 0.74 0.73 0.73
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1 Introduction
Several advanced countries have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage
bargaining in the labor market during the past decades. Comparing the 1970s to the
1990s not a single OECD country moved towards centralization, whereas a considerable
number moved towards greater decentralization according to OECD (2004). This move-
ment has in many countries been accompanied with a steady decline in union densities,
while the extent of bargaining coverage has typically been unchanged. Decentralization
of collective bargaining may have important implications for wage formation and wage
dispersion in particular, but only scarce microeconometric evidence exist to document
such e¤ects.
The principal aim of this paper is to empirically examine the movement of decentral-
ization in wage bargaining in terms of its impact on wage dispersion. From a theoreti-
cal standpoint decentralization may lead to increased wage dispersion because rm- and
individual-specic characteristics are more likely to enter the wage contracts, while under
centralized bargaining egalitarian union preferences are easier to accomplish.1 Obviously,
changes in wage dispersion may have important direct welfare implications through in-
creased income inequality, but there may also be more indirect consequences. First, a
movement away from a standard wage rate applying for all workers means that wages
are more in accordance with individual productivity and local conditions, which tends to
reduce misallocation, ine¢ ciencies and unemployment in the labor market. In contrast
to this view, Moene and Wallerstein (1997) argue that centralized bargaining tends to
bolster expanding progressive industries and hamper declining ones, while local bargain-
ing allows less productive plants to reduce wages and remain in operation. Also when
risk-averse individuals face uncertainty about their position in the income distribution,
unions may improve welfare by compressing the wage structure, see Agell and Lommerud
(1992). In any case, it is clear that the link between bargaining level and wage dispersion
is important for welfare, and a rst step should be to empirically assess the extent to
1See e.g. Farber (1978) and Booth (1984) for theoretical models explicitly handling the role of wage
dispersion in union preferences.
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which decentralization increases wage dispersion.
Another aspect of decentralization is its impact on wage levels. A number of di¤erent
explanations for higher mean wages under rm level bargaining may be put forth. First,
higher wages at the local level may be due to rent sharing, see e.g. Blanchower, Oswald
and Sanfey (1996). Second, rms with local bargaining may encourage workers to work
harder by o¤ering higher wages through e¢ ciency wage considerations, see e.g. Akerlof
and Yellen (1988). Third, it may be argued that decentralization of collective bargaining
makes it less likely that unions internalize externalities of many di¤erent types, see Calm-
fors (1993). For example decentralized wage increases may lead to higher product prices,
thus increasing the cost of inputs for other rms. Such externalities may be taken into
account in more centralized bargaining settings and may induce unions to restrain their
wage demands. However, Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) argue that the relationship between
centralization and wage outcomes is hump shaped. At the national level unions internalize
externalities and moderate their wage demands, but at rm level they also restrain wage
demands because higher wages lead to higher product prices and lower demand for the
goods produced by the rm, thereby reducing employment in the rm. At the industry
level neither of these mechanisms are present to the same extent and so unions negotiate
for higher wages at this level. For open economies Danthine and Hunt (1994) show that
the hump shaped relationship between wages and centralization level attens out as prod-
uct market competition increases and so the room left open for diverging wage policies
narrows. Thus the predictions concerning the impact of decentralization on wage levels
are less clear-cut and is ultimately an empirical question.
We have access to a very rich longitudinal data set for private sector workers in the
Danish labor market. The Danish labor market is interesting to study because four dif-
ferent wage setting systems, representing three di¤erent levels of centralization, coexist,
and so their inuence on wage formation may readily be compared. First, in one segment
of the labor market wages are negotiated at industry level for all workers this is the
so-called standard-rate system. Clearly the scope for wages to reect individual produc-
tivity is limited under this system. Second, a considerable part of the labor market has
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bargaining between unions and employers at the industry level over a contractual wage,
which is accompanied by local bargaining at the rm level over an individual wage sup-
plement (the minimum-pay and minimum-wage systems). In this case wages may better
be in accordance with individual qualications due to the local level bargaining. Third,
a segment of the labor market has no centrally negotiated contractual wage, and wages
are entirely determined at the rm level. Importantly, our data set covers a period where
many labor market segments changed wage setting system towards bargaining at more
decentralized levels. In particular, the importance of the segment with only rm-level
bargaining has increased during our sample window.
The longitudinal dimension of the data is crucial for two main reasons. First, identi-
cation of the e¤ects of decentralization on wage dispersion is greatly facilitated by the
change of wage setting system over time for many workers. The wage setting system
for the individual worker may change because the labor market segment changed its sys-
tem due to the decentralization process or because the worker changed job. Second, in
contrast to all the existing empirical evidence, longitudinal data allows us to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Our econometric approach is quantile regression, since this, in
a very transparent way, illustrates the impact of wage setting systems in di¤erent quantiles
of the wage distribution. However, it is only recently that quantile regression methods
have been developed to better exploit the advantages of longitudinal data, see Koenker
(2004) and Abrevaya and Dahl (2007). We apply the correlated random e¤ects approach
suggested by Abrevaya and Dahl (2007).
We nd that decentralization of wage bargaining increases wage dispersion, i.e., wages
are most dispersed under the most decentralized system rm level bargaining. However,
by using the panel data quantile regression approach we also nd that the di¤erences
in wage dispersion between the wage setting systems are reduced substantially when
unobserved individual heterogeneity is controlled for. With respect to the impact on
mean wages we do not nd important di¤erences across bargaining systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the existing empirical
literature on unions and the dispersion of wages. Section 3 describes the institutional
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framework for wage bargaining in Denmark. This section also summarizes the aggregate
development towards more decentralized wage bargaining in Denmark in the 1990s. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data set, section 5 outlines the empirical framework, and the results
are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Unions and the dispersion of wages
The impact of unions on wage formation and wage dispersion is a subject that has long
attracted the attention of economists. There exists a large literature assessing the wage
di¤erential between union and non-union workers and the impact of unions on wage
inequality (see e.g. Freeman (1980) for an early exposition and Card, Lemieux and Riddell
(2004) for a recent review). This is an interesting issue in Anglo-Saxon countries where
it makes sense to focus on union membership of the individual worker. However, in
most continental European countries the relevant measure is the centralization level of
bargaining, because even in countries with low union densities, bargaining agreements
are typically extended to the majority of the workforce. In this section we briey review
the existing microeconometric evidence of the impact of the bargaining level on wage
formation.
One of the rst studies of the subject is DellAringa and Lucifora (1994), who inves-
tigated the Italian metal-mechanical industry with establishment survey data from 1990.
They found a positive wage di¤erential in rms where unions are recognized for local
bargaining as compared to rms where only the nationally bargaining wages apply. In
addition, they nd that rm-level bargaining raises wages more for white collar workers
than for blue collar workers.
These results are consistent with a more recent paper by Card and de la Rica (2006)
who study the e¤ect of rm level contracting relative to regional or national contracts in
Spain. They use the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) from 1995, which
is a matched worker-rm data set with information on whether the worker belongs to a
multi-employer bargaining regime or a regime with single-employer bargaining (rm-level
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bargaining). They show that there is a positive wage premium of 5-10 per cent associated
with single-employer bargaining. Interestingly, they also nd that the premium is higher
for more highly-paid workers using a weighted least squares approach. They take this as
weak evidence for a more exible wage structure under rm-level bargaining.
Two other recent contributions use the ESES data set for 1995 to examine the e¤ect
on the wage dispersion. DellAringa and Pagani (2007) perform a variance decomposition
of the ESES data for Italy, Belgium and Spain. In Italy and Belgium there is no clear
e¤ect of single employer bargaining on wage dispersion, while for Spain, consistently with
Card and de la Rica (2006), they nd a small positive e¤ect. In addition to the variance
decomposition, DellAringa and Pagani separately for each wage setting system estimate
a quantile regression model in order to compute wage inequality measures conditional
on the di¤erent explanatory variables. Thus, when taking observable heterogeneity into
account, they nd that, if anything, single employer bargaining tends to decrease wage
dispersion in Italy and Belgium, while the opposite is true for Spain.
Plasman et al. (2007) also perform a variance decomposition exercise and nd for
Belgium, Denmark and Spain that decentralized bargaining increases the mean wage.
Furthermore, single-employer bargaining increases the dispersion of wages in Denmark
and Belgium while it decreases the wage dispersion in Spain which is in contrast to the
ndings of Card and de la Rica (2006) and DellAringa and Pagani (2007).
Using a cross section data set for 1991 Hartog, Leuven and Teulings (2002) investi-
gate the impact of bargaining regime on wages in the Netherlands, and they nd that
mean wages under rm-specic and industry-level contracting are very similar. They also
observe workers in rms with no collective bargaining and in rms with mandatory ex-
tensions of an industry agreement, and wage di¤erentials between regimes were found to
be no larger than 4 per cent. Also in terms of wage dispersion modest di¤erences are
found between the four regimes, but rm specic bargaining yields the greatest residual
variation of wages.
Comparing contractual wages and actual wages Cardoso and Portugal (2005) nd
for Portugal a substantial wage cushion with industry averages of 20-50 per cent of the
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contractual wages. From tobit regressions it is found that the e¤ects of worker and
rm characteristics on contractual wage and the wage drift have the same sign, so that
wage drift stretches the wage distribution. A measure for the degree of union bargaining
power is constructed as the concentration of bargaining and Cardoso and Portugal nd
that the higher concentration the higher contractual wage rate and by interacting this
bargaining power measure with worker attributes the lower returns to these attributes.
Interestingly, the higher contractual wage rate is o¤-set by a smaller wage drift.
To sum up, most results indicate that wages are higher when they are negotiated at
the rm level as compared to the industry level. However this result is refuted by the
evidence from the Dutch labor market. With regards to the e¤ects on wage dispersion
the evidence is more mixed although most results suggest that local bargaining leads to
higher wage dispersion than industry level bargaining.
A distinguishing feature is that all the mentioned studies use cross section data, and
a caveat applying here is that there may be unobserved skill di¤erences between workers
covered by centrally and locally negotiated wage contracts. For example it may be argued
that if rms with local bargaining reward observed skills such as education more generous,
they will likely also reward unobserved skills better. Besides this, if local bargaining is
known to imply more dispersed wages, the Roy (1951) model would suggest that high
ability workers sort into decentralized bargaining segments. Hence, we expect a positive
correlation between local bargaining and unobserved ability and that appropriately con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity should imply smaller estimated e¤ects of di¤erent
bargaining arrangements. With access to longitudinal data covering a period of decen-
tralization we are in position to take account of unobserved heterogeneity and we may
more reliably identify the e¤ects of decentralization since it seems reasonable to take the
decentralization process to be exogenous to the individual worker.
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3 The Danish wage setting system
Whereas job protection is low in Denmark and, thus, provides much exibility, the wage
setting has been rather inexible Denmark has been one of the OECD countries with the
most compressed wage structures which in part is due to a combination of three factors.
First, the benet system is generous with a high benet level for low income groups and
a long benet period of up to four years. Second, the Danish labor market is highly
organized on both employer and worker sides: In 2000 74 per cent of the workers were
members of a union and more than 80 per cent were covered by a collective agreement cf.
OECD (2004). Third, wage bargaining has historically been centralized, but, as explained
below, this has changed during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Boeri et al. (2001)
the centralization/coordination index of the bargaining system (which lies between 0 and
1) has for Denmark dropped from 0.64 for the period 1973-1977, to 0.47 for 1983-1987
and 0.34 for 1993-1997.
Wage bargaining at the industry and rm levels depends on the wage setting system
used in the industry collective agreement. In Denmark there are four di¤erent systems:
First, under the standard-rate system (normallønssystemet) actual wages of workers
are set by the industry collective agreement and the wages are not modied at the rm
level. Second, under the minimum-wage system (minimallønssystemet) the wage rates
set at the industry level represent a oor and are intended to be used only for very
inexperienced workers. Hence, for other workers this wage rate is supplemented by a
personal pay supplement. In practice, the personal pay supplements are often negotiated
collectively with the cooperation of the workplace union membersrepresentative. Third,
a somewhat similar minimum-pay system (mindstebetalingssystemet) exists. Rather
than operating with a personal pay supplement on top of the industry-level negotiated
wage rate, the minimum pay system uses a personal wage. The wage rate negotiated at
the industry level can be thought of as a safety net in the form of a minimum hourly
rate that must be paid under all circumstances. Finally, under rm-level bargaining the
collective agreements state that wages are negotiated at the plant or rm level without
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any centrally bargained wage rates ("uden lønsats").
Table 1 shows the development in the use of these four wage setting systems in the
private sector labor market covered by the two bargaining parties at national level; The
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and The Confederation of Danish Employers
(DA). There has been a trend towards more decentralized and exible wage setting, where
the per centage with a standard wage rate was reduced by 50 per cent. Since 1993 the
most decentralized segment (i.e. the rm-level bargaining segment) has grown from a
coverage of 4 per cent to 22 per cent in 2004. For the two remaining decentralized wage
systems, that is the minimum-wage and the minimum-pay systems, we also see consid-
erable variation over time. As an example of an important bargaining segment making
the transition to rm-level bargaining the area covering o¢ ce clerks can be mentioned.
In the empirical analysis below we use data for 1994-1999, so we capture the increased
importance of rm-level bargaining in particular.
Insert Table 1 about here
4 Data and descriptive statistics
We have access to information about individual characteristics for the full population
of workers aged 18-65 years in the Danish labor market for the years 1994-1999.2 These
characteristics are extracted from the Integrated Database of labor Market Research (IDA)
and the Income Registers in Statistics Denmark see Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a
brief description. The hourly wage rate is obviously an important individual level variable
in the analysis, and this wage rate is calculated as the sum of total labor income and
mandatory pension fund payments divided by the total number of hours worked in any
given year. The measure for total labor income as such is highly reliable since it comes
from the tax authorities, and the pension fund payments are also available in the registers.
These payments were introduced in the early 1990s, and have been rising throughout the
2To reduce estimation time we extract a 40 per cent random sample as a starting point. This section
reports summary statistics for this subsample.
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sample period, but not in a uniform manner across collective bargaining segments of the
labor market and they are therefore important to account for.
We use very detailed industry and occupation variables to determine the collective
agreement to which the individual belongs. The industry code follows the NACE industry
classication, and the occupation variable is based on the so-called DISCO code, which is
the Danish version of the ISCO-88 classication. We use the most disaggregated denition
of the industry- and occupation codes, i.e., the six digit NACE code and the four digit
DISCO code. By using these industry and occupation variables to dene bargaining
segments of the labor market we follow the two bargaining parties at national level, LO
and DA, since they use the codes to assess the economic implications of proposals for the
workers and employers they represent. That is, we determine the bargaining segments in
the same way as DA and LO, when the parties evaluate the bargaining outcome. However,
the construction of such bargaining segments is not completely awless. For example, a
rm may wish to stay outside its industrys collective agreement and we will not be able
to see this in the data. Nevertheless we are condent that our allocation of workers into
bargaining segments is fairly accurate since we end up with a distribution of workers
across wage setting systems that resembles Table 1 quite closely (more on this below).
We have identied 31 bargaining segments within the DA/LO segment which correspond
to roughly 50 per cent of workers in the organized part of the private labor market in
Denmark. Coupled with information about the bargaining system each segment operates
under in each year, it was straightforward to partition all workers into the four bargaining
systems under consideration.
A long list of individual socio economic characteristics are used as control variables in
the analysis. We use dummies for gender, the presence of children, marriage, immigrant
status, city size (Large city, and Ruralwith Copenhagenas the omitted category),
education (Unskilled, Short term higher education, Long term higher educationwith
Vocational educationas the omitted category)3 and experience (measured as actual labor
3The classication of education groups rely on a Danish education code that corresponds to the
International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED). Higher educationbasically corresponds to
the two highest categories (5 and 6) in the International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED),
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market experience since 1964). There are also dummies for the size of the workplace
measured in terms of the workforce. Furthermore, di¤erent industries may face di¤erent
degrees of competition from abroad, which may well be reected in both the wage level
and the wage dispersion within a given industry. To avoid that wage setting dummies pick
up di¤erences in business conditions between industries we include industry dummies.
In Table 2 we show some summary statistics for each of the four wage setting systems
in 1997. With respect to the average wage level the unconditional evidence is mixed
since the most decentralized segment, rm-level bargaining, has the highest wage level
while the standard-rate system, which is the least decentralized wage setting system,
has the third highest wage level. To assess the extent of wage dispersion we have also
computed the unconditional 90th/10th, 90th/50th and the 50th/10th per centile ratios
for each of the wage setting systems. The wage dispersion is much higher for the workers
belonging to the minimum-wage system which is particularly true for the lower end of the
wage distribution. Wage dispersion under rm-level bargaining appear to be only slightly
higher than the remaining two wage setting systems the standard-rate system and the
minimum-pay system. It should be noted that, since the standard-rate system typically
applies for unskilled workers while many skilled workers belong to the minimum-wage
system, we should not put too much emphasis on the unconditional evidence in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
With our longitudinal data set identication of the impact of wage setting system on
wages rests on the existence of workers who change wage setting system. This can happen
for two reasons; the bargaining segment may change its system as a part of the decentral-
ization process or the worker may change job. Table 3 tracks the persons in our sample
that change wage setting system in each year. The second column shows the total number
of workers changing wage setting system, and it is seen that there is a transition rate of
i.e., the individual has a tertiary education. Vocational education is dened as the nal stage of
secondary education encompassing programmes that prepare students for direct entry into the labor
market. Thus persons with just high school or equivalent or less than that are classied as Unskilled.
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around 5-10 per cent each year. Column 3-6 decompose the total annual changes further.
First, the entire bargaining segment can change wage setting system due to the decentral-
ization process (column 3), which contributes with the majority of transitions. Second,
a worker can change occupation and/or industry and, thereby, perhaps also bargaining
segment and wage setting system (column 4-6).4
Insert Table 3 about here
Since the wage setting system variable is constructed based on the industry and occu-
pation codes we know that measurement error may arise in particular the occupation
code is known to be unstable within job spells in some years, and this may bias our
estimates. In relation to panel data estimations of a union membership e¤ect on wages
Freeman (1984) argues that measurement error in the union membership variable will
lead to a downward-biased estimate of the e¤ect. However, when entire bargaining seg-
ments change wage setting system as in our data, measurement error is less of a problem
compared to the situation where we only rely on people changing jobs and, thereby, wage
setting system. The data still include job changers though (see columns 4-6 in Table
3), so in the empirical analysis below we restrict the sample further to reduce potential
problems with measurement error. Specically we throw away all workers that change
wage setting system because of a shift in the occupation code (column 5) unless they
also change employer. This reduces the number of wage setting system changes due to
occupation changes by approximately 90 per cent.
The sample version of Table 1 is Table 4. Even though we only distinguish between 31
bargaining segments and, thus, leave out part of the DA/LO segment, the development
in Table 4 resembles that of Table 1 quite closely. As described above, much of the
4It should be noticed that it is only the year when a collective agreement is initiated that the wage
setting system changes. For most bargaining segments this happened every second year in the early 1990s,
i.e., the years 1991 and 1993. However, some collective agreements in 1995 and 1997 had a duration of
three years. The 710 persons whose bargaining segment seems to have changed wage setting system
because of decentralization in 1996 are persons that are in the given segment in 1994 and 1996, but out
of the sample in 1995. This is also the case for the 1,858 persons in 1998 and the 976 persons in 1999.
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decentralization of the bargaining level in Denmark took place before 1993, but this is
not essential to the analysis as long as we still have considerable time variation in the
data.
Insert Table 4 about here
5 Empirical framework
To assess the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion we use quantile regression.
Quantile regression techniques for panel data have only recently been developed, and this
section outlines the approach we follow.
The standard (cross section) quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett (1978)
is given by
yi = xi + ui with Q (yijxi) = xi ; (1)
where i = 1; :::; N is indexing the individuals, yi is the log of the individual hourly wage
rate,  is a k  1 vector and xi is a 1  k vector of explanatory variables. Q (yijxi)
denotes the th conditional quantile of y given x,  2 (0; 1).
In the linear model the solution to endogeneity problems in presence of panel data is
typically the xed-e¤ects estimation. Unfortunately, the usual di¤erencing strategy does
not apply here since the conditional quantiles are not linear operators, that is
Q (yit   yisjxi) 6= Q (yitjxi) Q (yisjxi); (2)
where time periods t 6= s and where xi  (xi1; :::; xiT ).
Abrevaya and Dahl (2007) suggest to estimate a Chamberlainian correlated random
e¤ects quantile regression model to take account of unobserved heterogeneity. Their
estimator is most easily understood if we begin by considering the standard linear panel
data model
yit = xit + ci + uit; (3)
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where t = 1; 2; :::; T , ci is the individual specic term and uit the error term.
As in Chamberlain (1982, 1984) assume that the unobservable term ci is a linear
projection onto the observables plus a disturbance vi, that is
ci =  + xi11 + :::+ xiTT + vi: (4)
Plugging this into equation (3) gives
yit = xit +  + xi11 + :::+ xiTT + vi + uit: (5)
We need to make two assumptions in order to estimate the model in equation (5):
(A1) vi independent of xi
and
(A2) Q (uitjxi; vi) = Q (uitjxit) :
Assumption (A1) is also needed in the traditional random-e¤ects probit model (see for
example Wooldridge (2002)), but is stronger than the conditional mean independence
needed in the linear Chamberlainian random-e¤ects model. By assumption (A2) we as-
sume strict exogeneity, which e¤ectively rules out feedback-e¤ects from current wages, yit;
on future values of xit.
The partial derivative of the conditional quantile with respect to xit is
@Q (yitjxi)
@xit
=  + t +
@Q (uitjxit)
@xit
; (6)
and
@Q (yisjxi)
@xit
= t (7)
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for t 6= s. Following Abrevaya and Dahl we measure the e¤ect of xit as
@Q (yitjxi)
@xit
  @Q (yisjxi)
@xit
=  +
@Q (uitjxit)
@xit
; (8)
which essentially reects the desirable feature of quantile regression that xit is allowed to
have di¤erent e¤ects on yit in di¤erent quantiles. In other words, this is a general result
of quantile regression (cf. Koenker and Bassett (1982)) and does not only pertain to the
Abrevaya and Dahl estimator. For illustrative purposes Abrevaya and Dahl assumes that
uitjxi; ci  N
 
0; (txit)
2. This panel data version of the linear-scale model implies that
equation (8) becomes
@Q (yitjxi)
@xit
  @Q (yisjxi)
@xit
=  + tQ (it) ; (9)
where it is a standard normal random variable. It is apparent that for t > 0 the e¤ect
of xit is larger in the upper part of the yit distribution.
A drawback is that the approach only works for balanced panels. Therefore, we esti-
mate the model on di¤erent (sub-) samples. First, we construct a sample with individuals
we observe twice or more and randomly select two observations for each individual. Sec-
ond, we extract a sample with persons observed at least four times and randomly select
four observations per individual. Third, we use the Mundlak (1978) version of the corre-
lated random-e¤ects model where the unobserved part includes averages rather than the
values of each period. In this case the unobservable term becomes
ci =  + xi+ vi: (10)
This allows us to use all observations, but at the expense of restricting the linear projection
in equation (4).
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6 Results
This section rst presents results for the impact of wage setting systems on mean wages
using a standardMincer wage equation approach. This is followed by results for the impact
on wage dispersion using the panel data quantile regression approach outlined in the
previous section. Finally we present some robustness checks of our preferred specication.
6.1 Wage levels and wage-setting systems
While our focus is on the the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion it is instructive
to rst study how mean wages di¤er across wage setting systems controlling for individual
heterogeneity. Table 5 reports estimation results from a pooled OLS as well as linear
random-e¤ects and xed-e¤ects models. It is rst seen that we obtain the usual signs of
the human capital and socio-demographic variables.
With respect to the wage setting systems the most clean comparison is between the
standard-rate system (where wages are negotiated at sector or industry level) and rm
level bargaining since these systems represent the most centralized and the most de-
centralized systems respectively. As described in section 3 the minimum payment and
minimum wage systems are intermediate cases since they both have elements of a cen-
trally negotiated wage and locally negotiated wages. In the following we use as the base
category the standard-rate system. For the OLS regression we nd that wages are 5.2 per
cent higher under rm level bargaining than under the standard-rate system. However,
this quite substantial wage di¤erential vanishes if unobserved individual heterogeneity is
controlled for through random e¤ects, and if the xed e¤ects estimator is used the e¤ect
even changes sign such that wages are 1.3 per cent lower under rm level bargaining.
This clearly suggests that it is important to control for unobserved heterogenety and that
failure to do so leads to an upward bias in the coe¢ cient, i.e., unobserved ability may be
better rewarded under local bargaining. With respect to the two intermediate systems
there is also a negative e¤ect of minimum pay once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted
for while there is no wage di¤erential between the standard rate system and the minimum
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wage system.
Insert Table 5 about here
To sum up, we nd evidence of lower mean wages under the more decentralized bar-
gaining systems, and this seems to be at odds with what is expected from simple rent-
sharing or e¢ ciency-wage considerations while it is more consistent with the externality
explanation of Calmfors and Dri¢ l (1988) as argued in the introduction. Also, it is impor-
tant to be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity as otherwise the wage di¤erentials
between wage-setting systems are greatly exaggerated. One important aspect which can-
not be studied using the simple mean regressions is the fact that the decentralization
process may have very uneven e¤ects across the wage distribution an issue to which we
now turn.
6.2 Wage dispersion and wage-setting systems
As a rst step we will start out with a simple quantile regression without exploiting the
longitudinal nature of our data. Table 6 displays the results from pooled quantile regres-
sion models for the quantiles 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90. In general the coe¢ cients on
the individual level variables are fairly constant across the di¤erent quantiles, but there
are also some notable exceptions. For example women and immigrants have a higher
wage penalty in the top end of the wage distribution, which suggests the existence of
a glass ceiling for these groups in the labor market (this is consistent with the results
of Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2008)). Also,
unskilled workers have relatively lower wages than workers with vocational education in
the bottom of the wage distribution. Of particular interest is the e¤ect of the wage system
dummies, and it is found that the coe¢ cient on the variables for the three decentralized
systems increase between almost all of the reported quantiles, so that the e¤ects at the
90th quantile are substantially higher compared to the e¤ects at the 10th quantile. For
example the e¤ect of working under rm-level bargaining compared to the standard-rate
system more than triples from the 10th to the 90th quantile (from 3.2 per cent to 10.7
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per cent). Thus these results support the prediction that decentralization leads to in-
creased wage dispersion for example because rm- and individual-specic characteristics
are more likely to enter wage contracts, or because egalitarian union preferences become
more di¢ cult to accomplish. However, we suspect that the coe¢ cients on the wage system
dummies are biased upwards because unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for.
Insert Table 6 about here
Therefore the next step is to apply the panel data quantile regression techniques
outlined in section 5. Table 7 shows results for estimation of the Abrevaya and Dahl
(2007) correlated random-e¤ects quantile regression model for the case where we balance
the panel by randomly selecting only two observations for each individual for the reasons
explained above. It is rst noted that the e¤ects of individual level variables are only
changed slightly. Some variables like age, experience and workplace size appear to have
somewhat stronger e¤ects now, but otherwise the results are robust. However, for the
wage system dummies the picture changes in important ways. For rm level bargaining
we again nd that wage dispersion is higher than under the standard-rate system, but the
coe¢ cients are in accordance with the fact that there is roughly no mean e¤ects, cf. Table
5. That is, we nd negative coe¢ cients in the lower quantiles and positive coe¢ cients in
the higher quantiles such that workers under rm-level bargaining earn 2.6 per cent lower
wages at the 10th quantile and 3.9 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile compared
to workers under the standard-rate system. There appears to be no signicant di¤erences
between the minimum-pay system and the standard-rate system, while the minimum-wage
system increases wages in the upper part of the wage distribution.
Insert Table 7 about here
To study how these results depend on the sampling scheme we also estimate the corre-
lated random-e¤ects quantile regression model where we randomly select four instead of
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two observations for each worker. This e¤ectively corresponds to selecting stable workers
in the sense that they enter the original sample at least four out of the six years in our
sample window. With respect to the rm-level bargaining system the results are quali-
tatively similar but the e¤ects are slightly stronger such that workers now earn 4.6 per
cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 4.3 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile
compared to workers under the standard-rate system, see Table 8. The minimum-pay
system now has a negative e¤ect in the 10th quantile but there are no changes otherwise,
and the e¤ects of the minimum-wage system are also not changed in any important way.
Insert Table 8 about here
To cast further light on the importance of the sampling scheme we also estimate a ver-
sion of the correlated random e¤ects quantile regression model where we approximate the
unobservable part with the individual means of the explanatory variables as in Mundlak
(1978), see equation (10). This has the advantage that we can use all observations in our
original sample and thus circumvent the requirement of a balanced sample, but it comes
at the expense of a more restrictive functional form for the unobservables. The results are
displayed in Table 9, and it is seen that they are very much in accordance with the two
previous sets of results. In fact, the e¤ects in Table 9 typically lie in between the e¤ects
found for the balanced sample with two observations per worker and the balanced sample
with four observation per worker. For example, workers under rm-level bargaining now
earn 3.0 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 3.9 per cent higher wages at the
90th quantile compared to workers under the standard-rate system.
Insert Table 9 about here
To sum up, the three di¤erent versions of the correlated-random e¤ects quantile re-
gression model yield fairly robust results showing that decentralization of wage bargaining
increases wage dispersion. Under the most clear cut comparison, i.e. the e¤ect of working
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under rm-level bargaining (where wages are set entirely at the rm level) compared to
the standard-rate system (where wages are set entirely at the sector level) negative ef-
fects are found in the lower part of the wage distribution and positive e¤ects are found
in the upper part. The two intermediate bargaining systems the minimum-pay and the
minimum-wage systems wages are only slightly more dispersed than under the standard-
rate system.
In the following we will take the Mundlak version of the empirical model as our main
specication as it yields very similar results to the more exible models while still being
based on the full sample. For illustrative purposes we have used this model to compute
the coe¢ cients for every two per centiles and plot them with 5 per cent condence bands
see Figure 1. This shows very clearly that wage dispersion is higher under rm level
bargaining.
Insert Figure 1 about here
6.3 Robustness
A major advantage of our analysis vis-à-vis the existing literature is that we exploit time
variation in the wage system of the individual worker, but this also raises the question
about whether wage system changes are exogenous. We argue that if the wage system
change because of the decentralization process, i.e. a whole bargaining segment changes
wage system, then this can safely be taken to be exogenous to the worker. The wage
system may also change because workers change jobs from one bargaining segment of the
labor market to another, and in this case endogeneity may be an issue as e.g. high paid
workers in the standard-rate system may be inclined to change to jobs under rm-level
bargaining to receive a higher wage. In traditional Mincer human capital wage equations
this issue may be approached by also estimating a selection equation for the choice of
wage system (see e.g. Vella and Verbeek (1998) for an application to union wage premia).
However, corresponding techniques are not yet developed for the panel data quantile
regression case, and in any case this approach also requires proper instruments which is
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not immediately available in our data. Therefore, to proceed we have to settle for more
indirect evidence for exogeneity of the wage system variables.
Table 3 showed that most wage system changes are due to the decentralization process,
so a straightforward sensitivity test would be to simply leave out all wage system changes
that can be ascribed to job changes. However, our reference wage system is the standard-
rate system because it represents the most clear-cut example of a wage system with wage
determined solely at the sector level, but no bargaining segments changed to or from
the standard-rate system during our sample window (see Tables 1 and 4), so we have to
rely on job movers. In the following we study whether these job changes are plagued by
endogeneity.
The rst step is to provide some further descriptive statistics for the wage system
changes. There are 53,012 wage system changes in the data, and two thirds of these
are due to the decentralization process and the rest is job mobility. Among job changes
involving the standard rate system the most frequent type is between the standard rate
system and the minimum pay system more than one third of all job changes are in this
category. In fact only very few workers change job from the standard-rate system to a
job under rm-level bargaining or vice versa, but once we can identify the wage e¤ects of
changing between the standard-rate system and minimum-pay we have also identied the
e¤ects of rm-level bargaining because of su¢ ciently many exogenous decentralization
transitions between minimum-pay and rm-level bargaining.
Since most of the mobility in and out of the standard-rate system is to/from the
minimum-pay system and since identication therefore relies on this transition in partic-
ular we will now study potential endogeneity of this transition only. One way to do this is
to include two additional dummy variables for a changes between the two wage systems,
i.e. the variable Change standard-rate to minimum-payin Table 10 takes the value 1 if
the worker has experienced this transition as the latest transition and 0 otherwise. If mo-
bility is endogenous we would expect that these variables enter the model with signicant
e¤ects. Wages should rise in the top end of the wage distribution if workers change to the
more decentral minimum-pay system and they should fall in the bottom end. Likewise
79
wages should fall in the top end of the wage distribution if workers change to the central-
ized standard-rate system and they should rise in the bottom end. However, we nd no
evidence for such e¤ects all coe¢ cients on the change variables are insignicant. At the
same time the direct e¤ects of the wage system dummies are not dramatically changed.
Insert Table 10 about here
The next question is whether we would get similar results to the main results of Table
9 if in addition to the exogenous decentralizationtransitions we rely only on job movers
between the standard-rate system and the minimum-wage system, i.e. if we remove all
observations involving other types of job mobility. A Comparison between the results of
Table 9 and 11 shows only small changes in the coe¢ cients on the wage system variables,
so mobility between standard-rate and minimum-wage systems is su¢ cient to get the main
results and these job changes appear not to be driven by wage concerns. We take this as
evidence for our main results not being seriously plagued by endogenity bias through job
mobility.
Insert Table 11 about here
7 Conclusion
Many European labor markets have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage
bargaining during recent decades. Such changes may have important welfare implications
both in terms of e¢ ciency and equity. When wages are negotiated locally at the rm level
as opposed to more centralized bargaining, wages are more likely to reect individual
productivity and rm specic conditions. This should lead to increased wage dispersion.
We use a unique register-based panel data set covering a period of decentralization in
the Danish labor market, and to the best of our knowledge we are the rst to study these
questions using longitudinal data. This is a crucial element because the time variation
allows us to identify the e¤ects of decentralization as many workers have seen their wage
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setting system change as a result of the decentralization process. In contrast, the existing
literature has relied on cross section data. Also, in contrast to previous studies, the lon-
gitudinal dimension allows us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This is
important because by doing so the wage structure di¤erences across wage-setting systems
are substantially narrowed down.
We nd empirical evidence in support of the predictions from theory, i.e., wage disper-
sion is higher under the more decentralized wage setting systems. In our main specication
workers under rm-level bargaining, where wages are set entirely at the rm level, earn
3.0 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 3.9 per cent higher wages at the 90th
quantile compared to workers under the standard-rate system, where wages are entirely
set at the sector level.
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Table 1: Private sector wage setting systems 1989-2004
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 2000 2004
Standard-rate 34 19 16 16 16 15 16
Minimum-wage 32 37 13 12 21 23 27
Minimum-pay 30 40 67 61 46 42 35
Firm level 4 4 4 11 17 20 22
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Danish EmployersFederation (DA).
Table 2: Wage dispersion in 1997 by type of wage setting system
No. of obs Mean 90th/10th 50th/10th 90th/50th
Standard-rate 21,354 150.75 1.89 1.37 1.39
Minimum wage 37,665 139.04 2.87 1.89 1.52
Minimum payment 85,976 153.39 1.89 1.33 1.42
Firm level bargaining 30,840 155.89 2.06 1.39 1.48
Table 3: Transitions between wage setting systems 1995-1999
No. of All Decentra- Change in Change in Change in
obs. changes lization occ. and occupation industry
industry
1994 165,190 . . . . .
1995 166,365 16,988 14,333 1,191 934 530
1996 169,023 4,975 710 2,123 1,367 775
1997 175,835 22,539 17,095 3,206 1,307 931
1998 180,297 7,816 1,858 3,741 1,285 932
1999 183,885 7,985 976 4,248 1,842 919
Total no. of obs. 1,040,595 60,303 34,972 14,509 6,735 4,087
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Table 4: Private sector wage setting systems 1994-1999, data
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Standard-rate 12.6 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.3
Minimum wage 13.5 13.8 13.7 21.4 21.2 21.6
Minimum pay 73.3 62.2 62.2 48.9 49.2 48.6
Firm level bargaining 0.6 12.4 12.2 17.5 17.5 17.4
Total no. of obs. 165,190 166,365 169,023 175,835 180,297 183,885
Figure 1: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression
Firm-level bargaining Minimum pay Minimum wage
86
Table 5: Linear panel data models
OLS Random e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
Age 0.048 0.053 0.111
(0:000) (0:000) (0:001)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Woman -0.154 -0.127
(0:001) (0:001)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.043 0.010 0.000
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Non-western immigrant -0.020 -0.002
(0:002) (0:003)
Large city -0.069 -0.058 -0.020
(0:001) (0:001) (0:003)
Rural -0.076 -0.066 -0.050
(0:001) (0:001) (0:002)
Experience 0.017 0.015 0.025
(0:000) (0:000) (0:001)
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.112 -0.276
(0:001) (0:001)
Short term higher education 0.057 -0.008
(0:001) (0:002)
Long term education 0.180 0.115
(0:002) (0:003)
Workplace size, 10-50 workers 0.040 0.033 0.027
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Workplace size, 100-200 workers 0.074 0.067 0.052
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.109 0.095 0.071
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Firm-level bargaining 0.051 -0.002 -0.012
(0:001) (0:002) (0:003)
Minimum pay -0.001 -0.014 -0.021
(0:001) (0:001) (0:002)
Minimum wage 0.040 0.002 0.004
(0:001) (0:002) (0:003)
Observations 1,016,389 1,016,389 1,016,389
R-squared 0.42 0.33
Number of pnr 320,561 320,561 320,561
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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Table 6: Pooled quantile regression
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Age 0.067 0.048 0.030 0.027 0.028 0.046
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:00) (0:000)
Woman -0.122 -0.144 -0.164 -0.179 -0.196 -0.158
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.062 0.045 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.041
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Non-western immigrant -0.002 -0.022 -0.034 -0.047 -0.063 -0.030
(0:006) (0:005) (0:004) (0:005) (0:006) (0:004)
Large city -0.063 -0.074 -0.075 -0.076 -0.065 -0.070
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Rural -0.069 -0.082 -0.084 -0.082 -0.077 -0.076
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience 0.026 0.020 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.018
(0:001) (0:000) (0:000) (0:001) (0:001) (0:000)
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (:0000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.116 -0.109 -0.078 -0.067 -0.062 -0.111
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Short term higher education 0.073 0.069 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.058
(0:005) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Long term higher education 0.111 0.148 0.181 0.199 0.220 0.167
(0:008) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:008) (0:005)
Workplace size, 10-50 workers 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.039
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Workplace size, 100-200 workers 0.067 0.065 0.059 0.062 0.060 0.071
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.104 0.104 0.098 0.096 0.083 0.106
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Firm-level bargaining 0.032 0.042 0.055 0.084 0.107 0.050
(0:005) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Minimum pay -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.010 0.028 -0.002
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Minimum wage 0.018 0.020 0.042 0.074 0.105 0.043
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. The bootstrap was done using a sample
size of 10,000 persons and 1,000 iterations. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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Table 7: Abrevaya-Dahl quantile regression, 2 observations
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Age 0.089 0.096 0.059 0.052 0.048 0.082
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Woman -0.116 -0.133 -0.161 -0.181 -0.199 -0.153
(0:002) (0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:001)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.063 0.053 0.032 0.026 0.028 0.042
(0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:001)
Non-western immigrant 0.008 -0.007 -0.023 -0.037 -0.050 -0.016
(0:005) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Large city -0.062 -0.072 -0.074 -0.072 -0.063 -0.068
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Rural -0.068 -0.081 -0.080 -0.076 -0.071 -0.073
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Experience 0.079 0.041 0.020 0.011 0.008 0.029
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.119 -0.128 -0.092 -0.073 -0.064 -0.122
(0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:001)
Short term higher education 0.063 0.063 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.052
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:005) (0:003)
Long term higher education 0.129 0.166 0.182 0.205 0.226 0.175
(0:006) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:007) (0:004)
Workplace size, 0-50 workers 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.024 0.030 0.030
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Workplace size, 100-200 workers 0.050 0.055 0.049 0.048 0.062 0.056
(0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.077 0.075 0.071 0.071 0.081 0.078
(0:005) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Firm-level bargaining -0.026 -0.020 -0.002 0.017 0.039 0.007
(0:009) (0:007) (0:006) (0:007) (0:010) (0:005)
Minimum pay -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 0.013 0.000
(0:008) (0:007) (0:006) (0:006) (0:009) (0:005)
Minimum wage -0.007 0.020 0.022 0.016 0.031 0.022
(0:009) (0:008) (0:006) (0:007) (0:010) (0:006)
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. The bootstrap was done using a sample
size of 10,000 persons and 1,000 iterations. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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Table 8: Abrevaya-Dahl quantile regression, 4 observations
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Age 0.108 0.075 0.051 0.045 0.046 0.078
(0:008) (0:005) (0:004) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Woman -0.131 -0.153 -0.174 -0.189 -0.204 -0.169
(0:004) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.043 0.027 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.031
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Non-western immigrant -0.001 -0.024 -0.032 -0.040 -0.057 -0.032
(0:008) (0:006) (0:006) (0:007) (0:007) (0:006)
Large city -0.065 -0.072 -0.071 -0.070 -0.057 -0.066
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:005) (0:003)
Rural -0.074 -0.082 -0.083 -0.080 -0.073 -0.076
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:004) (0:002)
Experience 0.055 0.020 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.017
(0:008) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Experience squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.095 -0.078 -0.059 -0.054 -0.051 -0.088
(0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:004) (0:001)
Short term higher education 0.065 0.065 0.060 0.061 0.053 0.055
(0:005) (0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:006) (0:004)
Long term higher education 0.106 0.147 0.186 0.205 0.230 0.178
(0:011) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:013) (0:007)
Workplace size, 0-50 workers 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.025
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Workplace size, 100-200 workers 0.047 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.040 0.046
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:005) (0:003)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.047 0.062
(0:005) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:006) (0:003)
Firm-level bargaining -0.046 -0.026 -0.004 0.011 0.043 0.002
(0:010) (0:008) (0:008) (0:009) (0:013) (0:007)
Minimum pay -0.024 -0.021 -0.014 -0.005 0.024 -0.006
(0:009) (0:008) (0:008) (0:009) (0:013) (0:007)
Minimum wage -0.020 0.015 0.012 0.016 0.040 0.015
(0:012) (0:009) (0:008) (0:010) (0:014) (0:008)
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. The bootstrap was done using a sample
size of 10,000 persons and 1,000 iterations. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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Table 9: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Age 0.112 0.098 0.060 0.056 0.057 0.086
(0:005) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Woman -0.125 -0.146 -0.167 -0.183 -0.200 -0.161
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:004) (0:002)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.061 0.044 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.040
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Non-western immigrant -0.002 -0.020 -0.031 -0.043 -0.060 -0.029
(0:007) (0:005) (0:004) (0:005) (0:006) (0:004)
Large city -0.063 -0.072 -0.073 -0.074 -0.063 -0.068
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Rural -0.068 -0.080 -0.081 -0.080 -0.073 -0.074
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience 0.054 0.027 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.023
(0:004) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.114 -0.108 -0.075 -0.065 -0.060 -0.109
(0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:001)
Short term higher education 0.065 0.064 0.059 0.058 0.055 0.053
(0:006) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006) (0:004)
Long term higher education 0.109 0.143 0.173 0.188 0.212 0.163
(0:008) (0:006) (0:005) (0:006) (0:009) (0:005)
Workplace size, 0-50 workers 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Workplace size, 100-200 workers 0.045 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.046
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.064 0.061 0.062 0.060 0.055 0.065
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:005) (0:003)
Firm-level bargaining -0.030 -0.022 0.000 0.015 0.039 0.004
(0:009) (0:008) (0:006) (0:007) (0:010) (0:006)
Minimum pay -0.018 -0.018 -0.010 0.000 0.017 -0.007
(0:008) (0:007) (0:006) (0:007) (0:009) (0:005)
Minimum wage -0.017 0.008 0.016 0.018 0.047 0.017
(0:009) (0:008) (0:006) (0:008) (0:010) (0:006)
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. The bootstrap was done using a sample
size of 10,000 persons and 1,000 iterations. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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Table 10: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression with change dummies
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Age 0.112 0.098 0.060 0.056 0.057 0.085
(0:005) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Woman -0.126 -0.146 -0.167 -0.184 -0.200 -0.161
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:004) (0:002)
Children 0-6 years 0.061 0.044 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.040
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Non-western immigrant -0.003 -0.021 -0.031 -0.044 -0.060 -0.029
(0:007) (0:005) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006) (0:004)
Large city -0.063 -0.072 -0.073 -0.074 -0.063 -0.068
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Rural -0.067 -0.080 -0.081 -0.080 -0.073 -0.074
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience 0.054 0.027 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.023
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.114 -0.108 -0.075 -0.065 -0.060 -0.109
(0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:001)
Short term higher education 0.065 0.064 0.059 0.058 0.055 0.053
(0:005) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006) (0:004)
Long term higher education 0.109 0.143 0.174 0.188 0.212 0.163
(0:008) (0:006) (0:005) (0:006) (0:009) (0:005)
Workplace size, 0-50 workers 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.023
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Workplace size, 50-200 workers 0.045 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.046
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.064 0.061 0.062 0.060 0.055 0.064
(0:005) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Firm-level bargaining -0.048 -0.023 0.000 0.005 0.024 -0.002
(0:012) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009) (0:012) (0:008)
Minimum pay -0.036 -0.018 -0.011 -0.011 0.002 -0.013
(0:011) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009) (0:012) (0:008)
Minimum wage -0.035 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.033 0.010
(0:011) (0:011) (0:009) (0:009) (0:013) (0:008)
Change standard rate to minimum pay 0.014 -0.003 -0.006 0.011 0.017 0.010
(0:010) (0:009) (0:008) (0:008) (0:010) (0:007)
Change minimum pay to standard rate -0.022 -0.004 -0.009 -0.016 -0.022 -0.005
(0:012) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009) (0:014) (0:009)
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. The bootstrap was done using a sample
size of 10,000 persons and 1,000 iterations. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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Table 11: Abrevaya-Dahl Mundlak quantile regression, sample with exogenous
changes
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Age 0.113 0.085 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.082
(0:006) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Woman -0.124 -0.148 -0.169 -0.186 -0.202 -0.163
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Children 0-6 years 0.059 0.037 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.037
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Non-western immigrant -0.008 -0.026 -0.036 -0.049 -0.057 -0.033
(0:007) (0:006) (0:006) (0:007) (0:008) (0:006)
Large city -0.065 -0.076 -0.075 -0.074 -0.063 -0.071
(0:005) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Rural -0.070 -0.085 -0.084 -0.081 -0.073 -0.076
(0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Experience 0.046 0.021 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.017
(0:005) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Experience squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Unskilled -0.115 -0.101 -0.071 -0.062 -0.054 -0.104
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Short term higher education 0.063 0.062 0.059 0.060 0.057 0.053
(0:006) (0:005) (0:004) (0:005) (0:007) (0:004)
Long term higher education 0.110 0.139 0.169 0.185 0.205 0.159
(0:010) (0:008) (0:006) (0:007) (0:010) (0:007)
Workplace size, 0-50 workers 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.023
(0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Workplace size, 100-200 workers 0.051 0.040 0.044 0.047 0.048 0.048
(0:006) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.066 0.057 0.066 0.060 0.051 0.062
(0:006) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006) (0:004)
Firm-level bargaining -0.039 -0.009 0.007 0.024 0.039 0.013
(0:011) (0:008) (0:008) (0:009) (0:013) (0:007)
Minimum pay -0.032 -0.014 -0.010 00 0.012 -0.005
(0:011) (0:008) (0:007) (0:009) (0:013) (0:006)
Minimum wage -0.034 0.023 0.019 0.025 0.050 0.025
(0:012) (0:009) (0:008) (0:011) (0:015) (0:008)
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. The bootstrap was done using a sample
size of 10,000 persons and 1,000 iterations. * Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
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we can simulate the theoretical model and estimate the two-way xed-e¤ects model as
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). By adding a match-e¤ect we obtain an estimated
negative correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects even though there is assortative
matching (positive correlation) in the theoretical model.
Keywords: Assortative matching, labor market search, linked employer-employee data,
person and rm e¤ects.
JEL Classication: C23, C78, J31, J62, J64.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a labor market search model with two new features. First, the model
has three types of continuous heterogeneity, which are worker productivity, rm productivity,
and a random match e¤ect. Each of these three productivity terms enters the production
function. Second, assortative matching arises even though we only use a strictly supermodular
production function.
We solve our search model and simulate data from the model. Using the two-way-xed
e¤ect estimator invented by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth, AKM) on this
simulated data, we show that the presence of a match e¤ect can imply an estimated negative
correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects even if there is true positive assortative matching
in the model economy. Therefore, this paper aims at explaining the puzzling negative correlation
between worker and rm e¤ects found empirically.1
Existing models of assignment along the lines of Beckers (1973) marriage model imply
positive assortative matching. In fact, the ranking is such that a more productive worker
always will have a better job than a less productive one. This result holds in a frictionless
economy as long as the production function is strictly supermodular implying that the workers
human capital and rms capital are complements in production. However, Shimer and Smith
(2000) show that for assortative matching to arise in a search model setting it is no longer
su¢ cient that the production function is strictly supermodular. Instead, Shimer and Smith
nd that a su¢ cient condition is that the production function is strictly log supermodular.
As noted by Atakan (2006) the problem is that the higher gains to more search for more
productive workers are o¤set by higher costs of rejecting an o¤er. Using this, Atakan shows
that if unmatched agents have constant ow costs independent of their type and if the discount
rate is zero, the production function only needs to be strictly supermodular in order to imply
assortative matching.
We obtain assortative matching with the strictly supermodular Cobb-Douglas production
function by letting workers choose how many job o¤ers they wish to sample as in the seminal
contribution by Stigler (1961). Assortative matching arises since more productive workers
sample more jobs and, hence, they will, on average, end up in better jobs. In order to isolate
the e¤ect of the workersjob sampling we - similarly to Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) - assume
that each rm that receives more than one application randomly chooses one of its applicants
above a reservation threshold.
Previous studies on assortative models have examined the sets of matches that are acceptable
1See Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) and Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann and Perez-Durate (2004) for
results for both the US and France, Gruetter and Lalive (2004) for results for Austria, Piekkola (2005) for
Finland, Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) for results for Germany, and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003)
for results for Norway.
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by both workers and rms. Most of the studies (e.g. Atakan (2006), Becker (1973), Burdett
and Coles (1999), Chade (2001) and Smith (2006)) have found perfect segregation, which
implies that the labor market is segmented into multiple non-overlapping markets. Such an
approach to study assortative matching is not useful with on-the-job search where the same
search technology is available as unemployed and employed, since workers accept any o¤er
greater or equal to the benet level and subsequently climb the wage ladder by searching
on-the-job. Instead of the matching sets approach, we compare the worker distribution over
di¤erent rm and match productivities conditional on worker type. The latter approach is
also used in Lentz (2008), where assortative matching also arises with a strictly supermodular
production function since workers are allowed to choose their own search intensity.
When heterogeneous workers and rms match, it seems obvious that both worker and rm
productivity should a¤ect the wage paid. However, there are no a priori reasons to believe that
these two e¤ects should capture all variation in wages. It is very likely that complementarities
between specic workers and rms could exist, or that human capital is accumulated according
to the quality of the match between the worker and the rm involved. Both suggest a role for
a heterogeneous match specic component. Moreover, several contributions have argued that
the quality of the match between workers and rms in itself inuences the earnings variation.
A prominent example is the search model in Jovanovic (1979), where the ow production is
a match quality plus a stochastic term. However, in principle there need not to be a match
productivity in order to have a match component of the wage. The match e¤ect could be due to
di¤erences in bargaining strength, for instance, as a consequence of the labor market tightness
at the time of contract negotiation.
In the proposed model framework we let the match e¤ect be a random productivity compo-
nent, which enters the production function together with the worker and rm productivity. To
our knowledge the model we propose is the rst to o¤er a theoretical framework encompassing
the idea of heterogeneity in both rm, worker and match e¤ects.
A useful feature of our theoretical model is that it also implies a log linear wage equation
with additively separable worker, rm and match heterogeneity. This is only possible because
we can relax the requirement for assortative matching to be strictly supermodularity of the
production function. The log linear wage equation with additively separable e¤ects enables us
to link the theoretical model directly to the AKM model as also done by Abowd, Kramarz,
Lengermann and Perez-Duarte (2004). However, since the log linear wage equation is built into
an equilibrium search model with assortative matching it gives us the opportunity to simulate
our theoretical model and perform the AKM estimation on this data. When we simulate
our model without the match e¤ect and perform the AKM estimation and apply the bias
correction in Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) the estimated correlation equals the
true correlation. In contrast, simulating our model with the match e¤ect and again estimating
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the AKM model and bias-correcting we obtain the very interesting result, that even though
data is generated from a model with positive assortative matching the estimated correlation is
negative.
The intuition behind our results is as follows. The rm e¤ects are identied by workers
making job-to-job transitions, and those with relative low realizations of the match e¤ect will
ceteris paribus be more likely to change jobs. However, since the econometrician does not
estimate the match e¤ect, the rm e¤ect will be under-valued, which in turn will imply an
over-valued worker e¤ect, and the spurious negative correlation is established.
These results are in line with Woodcock (2007) who suggests an estimation procedure for an
empirical model with person, rm and match e¤ects. Using this estimation procedure he nds
that the estimated negative correlation of the AKM model on US-data, in fact, is positive when
taking the match heterogeneity into account. We apply his estimator both to our simulated and
empirical data. From the simulations we learn, that the model performs very well in attributing
the di¤erent parts of variation in the dependent variable to the rm, person and match e¤ects,
but also this estimator consequently underestimates the true correlation between workers and
rms.
We apply both set of estimators to a panel of Danish employer-employee data. We estimate
that the match e¤ect indeed has empirical relevance since it accounts for 15 per cent of the
variation in log wages. Furthermore, we estimate (what consequently is a downward biased)
a correlation of worker and rm e¤ects of 12 per cent, which suggests that the Danish labor
market is characterized by positive assortative matching.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our search model where more
productive workers sort themselves into more productive matches. In section 3 we briey
consider the AKMmodel and the recent alternative estimation procedure outlined in Woodcock
(2007). In section 4, we simulate our theoretical model and estimate both the AKM and
Woodcock models on this model-generated data, whereas we in section 5 perform estimations
on Danish register data. In section 6, we conclude.
2 Theoretical Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of rms and a continuum of workers that participate
in the labor market. Both the measure of workers and rms are xed and normalized to 1.
All agents are rational, forward-looking, risk-neutral and innitely lived. Workers have the
opportunity of searching both while they are unemployed and employed.
Heterogeneity exists on both sides of the market as well as in the match between a worker
and a rm. Workers di¤er in respect to their productivity such that more productive workers
in all types of jobs are more productive. Denote the worker productivity by pw, the rm
97
productivity by pf and the match e¤ect by pm. Both the worker and the rm know their
own productivity term as well as the decomposition in a given match and, hence, we rule out
uncertainty and learning about any of the productivity terms.
We assume that we have a Cobb-Douglas production function f (pw; pf ; pm) = p1w p
2
f p
3
m .
The worker searches for the highest possible combination of rm and match productivity. There-
fore, it is useful for us to work with the joint rm and match productivity pfm = p
2
2+3
f p
3
2+3
m ,
allowing us to express the production function as f (pw; pf ; pm) = f (pw; pfm) = p1w p
2+3
fm . The
Cobb-Douglas function has two important properties. First, it is strictly supermodular, that is,
@2f(pw;pfm)
@pw@pfm
> 0 for 1 > 0 and 2+3 > 0. Second, it is multiplicatively separable. We need not
to assume the Cobb-Douglas form, and all implications of the model are true for all functions
admitting strictly supermodularity and multiplicative separability. We use the assumption of
multiplicative separability to ease the derivation of the workers reservation productivity below,
but note also that this assumption rules out comparative advantages, since the ratio of output
of two rms is independent of the workers productivity, cf. Sattinger (1975).
The distribution of worker productivity pw is given by the cumulative distribution function
H (pw) =
R pw
p
¯ w
h (p0w) dp
0
w. The distribution of the rm and match productivity pfm is given by
  (pfm) =
R pfm
p
¯ fm

 
p0fm

dp0fm.
The search environment is closest to Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) although we allow for
on-the-job search, but do not consider the rms investment decision. The model is set in
discrete time and the timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: One period sequence of events
The job searcher, whether unemployed or employed, is given the opportunity to apply for
n di¤erent jobs in each time period. Searching is costly and the more jobs applied to, the
larger costs. We assume that this ow cost function is strictly convex in the number of jobs
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applied to, c0 (n) > 0 and c00 (n) > 0 and that c (0) = c0 (0) = 0. The more jobs applied to, the
more likely the worker is to draw a high joint rm and match productivity. In order for the
worker to realize the joint rm and match productivity, the worker needs to apply for a job
in the particular rm. Hence, the worker applies to all jobs sampled, although he/ she is only
willing to match with the job which turns out to be most productive (if above a reservation
productivity level).
Depending on the number of job applications and rms, it is likely that a rm gets more
than one application in each discrete time interval. Each rm is only capable of hiring one
worker and among the applicants, one application is chosen randomly. One could think of the
rmsrandom choice of worker as a framework, where the rm is only able to use sequential
search in continuous time, and where it is random, whose application is the rst to arrive.2
The implication of this search environment is that the expected number of job applications
received is the same for all rms and that the acceptance rate workers face is independent of the
workers productivity. If both the worker and rm choose each other a match will be formed
from the beginning of next period. Finally, in the end of each period a fraction  of existing
and newly formed matches are exogenously destructed.
There is no traditional job arrival rate in this search context, but by abusing the traditional
notation the workers chance of getting his/ her chosen rm is denoted . That is
 = (1  ) #rms
# job applications
where the term (1  ) takes account of that  of the new matches are destroyed before they
come to existence.
2.1 The Worker Side
As unemployed, the worker receives benets which depend on her own productivity bp1w . This
takes account of the fact that benets typically are dependent on previous income as employed.
Furthermore, the exact specication used here will simplify the analysis.3 With the usual
notation we denote the value of unemployment U () and the value of employment W (; ).
Letting r denote the discount factor the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker is
(1 + r)U (pw) = bp
1
w   c (n) + 
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
max

W
 
pw; p
0
fm

; U (pw)
	
dQ
 
p0fmjn

+ (1  )U (pw) (1)
2Restricting the rms to consider one worker at a time, makes the model tractable. If also allowing rms
to sample workers it is no longer necessarily the case that all workers will prefer the highest joint rm and
match productivity. Rather, less productive workers may have a higher chance of becoming employed in less
productive rms and, thereby, prefer to join these. Hence, allowing for endogenous sampling on both sides of
the market complicates the math, but will only tend to increase the degree of assortative matching.
3A similar assumption is used in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
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where pfm and pfm denote respectively the upper and lower points of the joint rm and match
productivity distribution pfm, and Q (pfmjn) =   (pfm)n denote the distribution conditional on
the number of sampled jobs n. Letting prfm be the workers reservation productivity and using
integration by parts we can express this Bellman equation as
rU (pw) = bp
1
w   c (n) + 
Z pfm
prfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm (2)
As employed the worker earns the wage w (pw; pfm), and as wage setting rule we employ the
simplest: linear output sharing or piece-rate contract as in for example Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2007): w (pw; pfm) = p1w p
2+3
fm where  is the workers share of the ow
production. With probability  the job is destructed and the worker returns to unemployment.
The Bellman equation for an employed worker is
(r + )W (pw; pfm) = p
1
w p
2+3
fm   c (n) + 
Z pfm
pfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm + U (pw) (3)
Both workers and rms have minimum values of productivities that they are willing to match
with. On the worker side this reservation value is the rm and match productivity for which
the worker is indi¤erent between being employed compared to staying unemployed. This can
be derived as
p1w
 
prfm
2+3   c (n) +  Z pfm
prfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm
= bp1w   c (n) + 
Z pfm
prfm
W 0pfm
 
pw; p
0
fm
  
1     p0fmn dp0fm
,
prfm =

b

 1
2+3
(4)
Thus, the rm reservation productivity prfm is identical for all workers. This would not have
been the case if all workers received the same amount of unemployment benets. In that case
more productive workers would have a lower joint rm and match reservation productivity than
less productive workers, since more productive workers have higher opportunity costs of staying
unemployed and, therefore, would be more eager to get a job.4 With identical prfm across worker
type, the reservation wage is increasing in the worker productivity pw.
Di¤erentiating the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker (2) and substituting out
W 0pf (pw; pf ) from (3) gives us the rst-order condition for the sample size n for an unemployed
worker
4A similar result appears in the general model of Burdett and Coles (1999).
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c0 (n) = 
Z pfm
( b )
1
2+3
 (2 + 3) p
1
w

p0fm
2+3 1 h  p0fmn ln p0fmi
r +  + 

1   

p0fm
n dp0fm (5)
Since [   (pfm)n ln (  (pfm))]  0 for all pfm, the right hand side is increasing in pw for
1; (2 + 3) > 0. Since c00 (n) > 0 and the r.h.s. is decreasing in n for   (pfm) 2]0; 1[,
more productive workers sample more jobs, that is n0pw (pw; pfm) > 0. The restriction that
1; (2 + 3) > 0 corresponds to the production function having a positive cross derivative,
f 00pw;pfm (pw; pfm) > 0, which again exactly is the requirement of complementarity (or supermod-
ularity) in the production function for Beckers (1973) model implying assortative matching.
n only take on integer values and the nmaximizing (5) is most likely not an integer. However,
since the l.h.s. is increasing in n, while r.h.s. is decreasing in n, the optimal integer value of n
is one of the two integers adjacent to n unless the optimal value of (5) itself is an integer.
Employed workers maximize the right hand side of equation (3) with respect to n
c0 (n) = 
Z pfm
pfm
 (2 + 3) p
1
w

p0fm
2+3 1 h  p0fmn ln p0fmi
r +  + 

1   

p0fm
n dp0fm (6)
For a given joint match and rm productivity, more productive workers sample more jobs than
less productive workers as long as 1; (2 + 3) > 0 corresponding to the production function
being strictly supermodular.
We can summarize the ndings above in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the production function f (pw; pfm) admits supermodularity such that
1; (2 + 3) > 0, more productive workers sample more jobs conditional on their current joint
rm and match productivity n0pw (pw; pfm) > 0.
Proof. See the text above.
Since workers are employed at pfm 

b

 1
2+3 they have smaller expected gains of search-
ing than unemployed workers with the same productivity and consequently they search less.
Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that more productive employed workers search more
than less productive employed workers since, on average, they will be employed in more pro-
ductive matches already in the rst match after being unemployed.
2.2 The Firm-Side
Unemployed workers choose the rm with the highest productivity among the sampled pro-
ductivities given pfm  prfm, while employed workers only accept to join a rm of productivity
pfm if their current productivity is lower and if pfm is the highest productivity sampled. The
rm picks the worker at random given that the workers productivity together with the drawn
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match e¤ect is above a reservation threshold. We will express the reservation threshold in terms
of the match e¤ect, but make it depend on the worker productivity, that is prm (pw). The rms
reservation productivity is decreasing in pw, such that the highest reservation match e¤ect is
at the lower support of the worker distribution. To make the model tractable we assume that
workers are accepted at any rm. More formally,
Assumption 1 prm

p
¯ w

p
¯
m for all pf 2
h
p
¯ f
; pf
i
, where p
¯
m is the lowest possible
match e¤ect.
Rather than matching with a worker of a given pw, a rm may actually prefer to match
with workers of lower productivity since workers with higher productivity sample more jobs
and, hence, are more likely to draw a better rm and leave. In other words the expected value
of a match may not be an increasing function of worker productivity. Nevertheless, since a rm
selects its workers randomly it will be willing to hire a high productivity worker, since this is
better than not hiring anyone.
2.3 Steady State
Since rms choose workers randomly, we can express the inow to and outow from unemploy-
ment as in usual search models. In steady-state the inow and outow must balance
 (1  u) = u (7)
The mass G (pw; pfm) is the share of the employed workers with a worker productivity less
or equal to pw working at a joint rm and match productivity less or equal to pfm. The ow into
G (pw; pfm) must equal the outow in steady-state. The outow, on the l.h.s. below, consists
of two terms, the exogenous destruction which happens at the rate  and the endogenous job
quits. When considering outow from G (pw; pfm) in the form of quits, we - by denition -
only consider workers with productivity pw or less, who leaves a job with productivity equal
or below pfm and gets a job with productivity above pfm. Since workers only change to more
productive matches, inow into G (pw; pfm) only comes from unemployment, where the number
of jobs sampled is n
 
pw;p
r
fm

. The steady-state condition is given by
 (1  u)G (pw; pfm) + (1  u)
Z pw
p
¯ w
Z pfm
p
¯ fm

  (pfm)
n(p0w;p
0
fm)     (pfm)n(p
0
w;p
0
fm)

g
 
p0w; p
0
fm

dp0fmdp
0
w
= u
Z pw
p
¯ w

  (pfm)
n(p0w;p
r
fm)    

p
¯ fm
n(p0w;prfm)
h (p0w) dp
0
w (8)
Rearranging and using the equilibrium equation for unemployment gives us
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Z pw
p
¯ w
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
h
 + 

1    (pfm)n(p
0
w;p
0
fm)
i
g
 
p0w; p
0
fm

dp0fmdp
0
w = 
Z pw
p
¯ w
  (pfm)
n(p0w;p
r
fm) h (p0w) dp
0
w
Di¤erentiating this with respect to pw givesZ pfm
p
¯ fm
h
 + 

1    (pfm)n(pw;p
0
fm)
i
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm =   (pfm)
n(pw;prfm) h (pw) (9)
Evaluating this expression in pfm obviously gives
R pfm
p
¯ fm
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm = h (pw), and when
combining this with equation (9), we obtain
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
~g

pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm =

 + 
  (pfm)
n(pw;prfm) +

 + 
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
  (pfm)
n(pw;p0fm) ~g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm (10)
where
R pfm
p
¯ fm
~g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm 
R pfm
p
¯ fm
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dpfm
R pfm
p
¯ fm
g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
 1
is the cumula-
tive distribution function of rm productivities conditional on worker skill.
We want to examine whether the allocation of workers in the economy reects positive
sorting. While previous studies on assortative models have studied the sets of matches that
are acceptable by both workers and rms, this approach is not useful with on-the-job search.
Instead, we compare the worker distribution over di¤erent rms conditional on worker type
similarly to Lentz (2008). For this purpose we use the following denition:
Denition 1 Consider two workers A and B, where pAw > p
B
w . Assortative matching im-
plies that GB (pfm) 
R pfm
p
¯ fm
~g
 
pBw ; p
0
fm

dp0fm 
R pfm
p
¯ fm
~g
 
pAw; p
0
fm

dp0fm  GA (pfm) for pfm 2i
p
¯ fm
; pfm
h
.
In the present model set-up, it is not immediately clear on the grounds of equation (10)
whether or not the model framework implies assortative matching. Before we more formally
prove this, we can gain some intuition by assuming that the number of jobs sampled is inde-
pendent of the current rm and match productivity, that is n (pw; pfm) = n (pw). With this
assumption it is clear that we have
Z pfm
p
¯ fm
~g (pw; pfmjn (pw) = n (pw; pfm)) dp0fm =
  (pfm)
n(pw)
 + 

1    (pfm)n(pw)
 (11)
which for the number of jobs sampled being constant across worker type, that is n (pw) = 1
gives us the usual distribution of realized matches (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)).
If equation (11) is di¤erentiated with respect to pw, we see that the r.h.s. becomes negative
implying assortative matching. However, assuming that n (pw; pfm) = n (pw) will overvalue
the degree of assortative matching since it does not take into account that workers in better
matches searches less.
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A formal proposition for assortative matching is below. The proof uses a discretized version
of equation (10) and is in Appendix A.5
Proposition 2 When the production function f (pw; pfm) admits supermodularity such that
1; (2 + 3) > 0, and the workers are allowed to sample n = 0; 1; 2 jobs the model features
assortative matching.
Proof. See appendix A.
Furthermore, the steady-state equilibrium is a tuple

prfm; n (pw; pfm) ; n
 
pw; p
r
fm

; G (pw; pfm) ; u
	
satisfying equations (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8), which leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique steady-state.
Proof. See appendix B.
3 Econometric Methodology
3.1 The Two-Way Fixed E¤ects Model
Our theoretical model implies a log-linear wage equation where the log of worker productivity
and the log of rm productivity are additively separable. This property is very convenient,
since it aligns perfectly with the leading empirical model for estimating the degree of assortative
matching in the labor market developed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth
AKM). Before we exploit this direct link between the theoretical and empirical model, we will
give a brief introduction to the AKM model which takes the following form
yit = xit + i +  J(i;t) + "it i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; ::; Ti (12)
where yit is the log of the hourly wage rate for individual i in period t, xit is a 1 k vector of
time-varying explanatory variables that may both relate to the individual and the rm,  is the
parameter vector, i is the unobserved person e¤ect,  J(i;t) is the unobserved rm e¤ect, and
"it is the error term with E
 
"itjxit; i;  J(i;t)

= 0. The function J (i; t) associates an employer,
indexed by J , with an individual i at time t.
Since most empirical applications relate to data with more individuals than rms (N > J),
we begin by making a within-individual transformation that sweeps away i. Expressing the
5This proposition only encompass n = 0; 1; 2 since allowing for higher n makes the math very cumbersome.
By computer simulation it is fairly straight-forward to show that this property of assortative matching holds
as we let the maximum number of jobs sampled increase far above 2. These programs are available from the
authors upon request.
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model in matrix form, using  to denote within transformed variables and letting D be the
matrix of rm dummies gives us the following model to estimate
~Y = ~X + ~D	+ ~" (13)
where 	 is a vector of rm e¤ects for every rm in the sample.6 The parameter estimates can
be found by solving "
^
	^
#
=
"
~X 0 ~X ~X 0 ~D
~D0 ~X ~D0 ~D
# 1 "
~X 0 ~Y
~D0 ~Y
#
(14)
The problem of estimating the resulting model is that the cross-product matrix is potentially
very high-dimensional due to ~D0 ~D containing a dummy for each rm. However, with use of
sparse matrix algebra we can estimate the
h
^; 	^
i
and afterwards recover ^.
One key aspect of this estimator worth noticing is that the rm coe¢ cient is only identied
by workers moving between rms in the sample period. Hence, looking only at a worker
employed in the same rm in all years there is no way for the econometrician to disentangle
the person and rm xed element of log wages.
As in all xed e¤ects models the variances of the xed e¤ects have a positive bias. Fur-
thermore, due to the additive structure the covariance of the estimated worker and rm e¤ects
will be biased, since an over-estimate of the one xed e¤ect will lead to an under-estimate
of the other. Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) develop the formulae to correct for
these biases. We use their method of correcting the estimates under the assumption that the
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the worker and rm e¤ects.7
3.2 Woodcocks Hybrid Mixed E¤ects Estimation
Woodcock (2007) argues that the presence of a match e¤ect will bias the correlation between
worker and rm e¤ects, but his agenda is broader than this, since omitted match e¤ects will
bias all estimates unless the match e¤ect is completely orthogonal. Estimating an AKM model
which also includes a match e¤ect is impossible and, therefore, Woodcock suggest using the
mixed e¤ects model. Instead of estimating all the individual e¤ects, Woodcocks estimation
procedure implies estimating the variances of the worker, rm, match e¤ects and error term and
subsequently predicting all the individual e¤ects. Woodcock needs to assume that the three
6Identication of rm e¤ects is in principle only possible within a group, where a group is dened by the
movement of workers between rms. For a thorough discussion see Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002). For
expositional simplicity we assume that we already have identied the groups, dropped one rm dummy for each
group, and normalized the mean in each group to zero to allow for cross-group comparison. All while redened
~D accordingly.
7This assumption is made since without it we need too invert a N N matrix to solve for the biases, and
this is not feasible with our current computational power. Note also that unlike in the empirical estimation
we have no explanatory variables when we simulate data from our theoretical model. Hence, in that case the
assumption is met by denition.
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random e¤ects are uncorrelated with each other, when estimating the variances. However, there
is no such restriction on the predicted individual e¤ects. Woodcocks model is
yit = xit + i +  j + ij + "it i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; ::; Ti; j = 1; :::; J
where ij is the match e¤ect. It is easy to estimate  even if the worker e¤ect i, the rm e¤ect
 j, and the match e¤ect ij are xed e¤ects, since  is the within-match estimator. However,
separately identifying the worker, rm, and match e¤ects in a xed e¤ects context is impossible
since we from, say,M matches cannot estimateM+N+J e¤ects. However, if we are willing to
assume that the worker, rm and match e¤ects are orthogonal random e¤ects, we can estimate
the model. Obviously, the orthogonality assumption is a strong assumption - especially since
we are mainly interested in the correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects.
Woodcock suggests the following 3-step estimation procedure: First, estimate ^ as the
within-match estimator in the rst stage and compute

yit   xit^

. In the second stage, the
variance of the random e¤ects
 
2; 
2
 ; 
2


and the error variance 2" are estimated by Restricted
Maximum Likelihood (REML) on

yit   xit^

. These REML estimates are computed with the
use of the average information algorithm of Gilmour, Thompson and Cullis (1995), which
exploits the sparsity of the matrix design. In the third and nal stage, Woodcock makes the
Best Linear Unbiased Predictor (BLUP) of the random e¤ects and estimate the correlations
between the various terms.
4 Simulating of the Search Model
Since our theoretical model delivers a log-linear wage equation it seems as a natural starting
point to solve and simulate data from the theoretical model and estimate the AKM model as
well as Woodcocks mixed e¤ect model on this simulated data.
To simulate our model we need a number of functional assumptions. In the following we
assume that worker productivity pw, rm productivity pf and match productivity pm all are
log-normal distributed; pw  LN (w; 2w), pf  LN
 
f ; 
2
f

, pm  LN (m; 2m) and specify
the search cost function as c (n) = c1nc2 .
Before we can simulate data from our model, we need to approximate the function n (pw; pfm).
To do this, we solve equations (5) and (6) for n using quadrature methods to approximate the
integrals. The function n (pw; pfm) is stepwise increasing in pw and decreasing in pfm, as illus-
trated in Figure 2, so we just need to know precisely in what values of (pw; pfm) that n changes.
We use an algorithm that determines the number of points where n changes in the (pw; pfm)
space with a precision such that the maximum deviation in pfm and pw from their true values is
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0:01.8 Next, we use cubic splines to approximate a curve for each change in n in the (pw; pfm)
space. These cubic splines are then use to draw n (pw; pfm) in the actual simulation.
Notice that since the production function is given by f (pw; pfm) = p1w p
2
f p
3
m our as-
sumption of log-normality in all inputs implies that the joint rm and match productiv-
ity pfm = p
2
2+3
f p
3
2+3
m is also log-normally distributed pfm  LN
 
fm; 
2
fm

with fm =
2
2+3
f +
3
2+3
m and fm =
q
( 2
2+3
f )2 + (
3
2+3
m)2. This again implies that when we
want to simulate from a model without a match e¤ect, we can simply let 3  0 which implies
that fm = f and fm = f such that pfm = pf and f (pw; pfm) = f (pw; pf ).
To facilitate comparison between simulations with and without match e¤ect below in the
simulations with match e¤ect we always choose m and m such that we have fm = w and
fm = w, and in the simulations without the match e¤ect we simply choose f = w and
f = w.
We wish to simulate an economy inhabited with rms whose size is log-normal distributed.
Given f and f we dene the minimum and maximum pf as the values corresponding to the
0:05 percentile and the 99:5 percentile. In between the minimum and maximum values, we
let each rm productivity be equally spaced, whereas each rms share of the job o¤ers is the
log-normal density. Hence, the rm productivity is only approximately log-normal, but will
as the number of rms increases, converge to the log-normal distribution. Given our initial
guess of a correlation between worker and the joint rm and match e¤ect, the model runs for
30 periods before the worker allocation is completely stable and, hence, we discard the rst 29
simulated periods.
We also need to choose values for our parameters. The parameters describing ows in labor
market are xed at  = 0:9 and  = 0:1, which implies an equilibrium unemployment of 10 per
cent. We have set the parameters of the log normal distributions such that 3 = 0:25 implying
that the match e¤ect constitutes roughly 25 per cent of the explained variation in log wages.
Obviously, the inuence of the match e¤ect that we nd below will be smaller (larger) if the
match e¤ect constitutes a smaller (larger) share of the wage than the assumed 25 per cent. The
rest of the parameters in the two simulations are given in Table 3.
8First, we set pfm = 0 and determine for which values of pw n changes. Then for p
¯
w, each of these points
in pw, pw, and two additional values evenly distributed among each of these points we determine all values of
pfm where n changes.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Match E¤ect Included:
1 2 3 w = fm w = fm f f m m  c1 c2 r
0.40 0.35 0.25 5.00 0.60 5.00 0.84 5.00 0.84 0.50 5.50 1.20 0.05
Match E¤ect Not Included:
1 2 3 w = fm w = fm f f m m  c1 c2 r
0.40 0.60 0.00 5.00 0.60 5.00 0.60 . . 0.50 5.50 1.20 0.05
To complete the link between the theoretical model and empirical model we add a normal
distributed error term to the log linear wage equation. We set the variance of the error term,
such that it contributes with 5-10 per cent of the total wage variation.
With the assumed parameter values, the maximum number of jobs that any worker samples
is 3. In Figure 2 a surface plot of the n-function is shown. Unemployed workers with produc-
tivity above approximately 225, corresponding to 25 per cent of the workers, sample 3 jobs.
Since almost no unemployed workers sample just one job, almost 75 per cent sample 2 jobs.
The gure also shows that as workers climb the rm and match productivity ladder they reduce
the number of jobs they sample and when they reach su¢ ciently far, they stop searching.
Since the workers in the economy without a match e¤ect and in the economy with a match
e¤ect draw productivities from the same distribution the n-function in the two scenarios is
identical.
Figure 2: The optimal job sample size
pfm pw
n = 0
n = 1
n = 2
n = 3
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In Table 2 we show the results from the AKM estimation on the simulated data. There are
only small di¤erences in the overall labor market between the two scenarios. The di¤erences in
the dispersion of wages arise, since whereas we assume a discrete distribution of rm productiv-
ities which is cut o¤, the match e¤ect is allowed to be continuous. Therefore, the joint rm and
match distribution will have a larger dispersion than the rm productivity in the case without
match e¤ect. Furthermore, in the economy with a match e¤ect workers can get a better job
within a rm by drawing an o¤er from the exact same rm, but with a higher match e¤ect.
This might have a small positive e¤ect on both the mean wage and the dispersion of wages.
Table 2: Monte-carlo estimations
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 6 6
No. of observations 66,760 66,760
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 495 473
Average of wages 124.7 124.4
Variance of wages 47.1 41.2
Ave. no. of obs per rm 135 141
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.086 -0.035 -0.064 0.107 0.140 0.125
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.076 -0.023 -0.052 0.112 0.146 0.131
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.014 0.042 0.029 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.079 0.115 0.095 0.112 0.147 0.131
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.093 0.135 0.112 0.112 0.147 0.131
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.194 0.193 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.442 0.678 0.444 0.543 0.555
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.285 0.000 .
Error term 0.077 0.128 0.078 0.065 0.052
In the right panel of the table we show the results for the case without a match e¤ect. The
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estimated correlation is very close to the true correlation. With the bias correction we obtain
the true correlation.
In the left panel of the table we include the match e¤ect. Here, workers change jobs on the
grounds of the composite rm and match productivity rather than just the rm productivity.
This implies that the true correlation between the worker and rm productivities, on average, is
0:095. However, with the presence of the match e¤ect both the estimated and corrected corre-
lations from the xed e¤ects estimation are severely biased and even negative with mean values
of  0:064 and  0:052 respectively. Therefore, existing studies nding a negative correlation
between worker and rm e¤ects may actually reect a labor market with positive assortative
matching. Moreover, the bias from the match e¤ect seems to be more important than the statis-
tical bias. Woodcocks mixed e¤ects model does considerably better with a positive correlation
of 0:029 although it is also biased downwards.
The assumed wage setting in our theoretical model is the piece-rate contract. Cahuc, Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2006) and Lentz (2008) use an alternative bargaining mechanism, in which
employers are allowed to respond to an outside bid for its workers. Besides the workers own
productivity and her current rms productivity, the workers current wage also depends on the
productivity of the previous rm. Thereby, this wage-setting mechanism would compared to
the piece-rate contract ceteris paribus imply a lower correlation between the worker and rm
productivities. To some extent the match e¤ect plays a similar role here, and it is also apparent
that the correlation between the worker productivity and the rm productivity is lower when
there is a match component in the wages.
Woodcock (2007) argues that a match e¤ect, which is positively correlated with the worker
e¤ect and negatively correlated with the rm e¤ect, will imply that the AKM model overes-
timates the proportion of variation attributable to the worker e¤ect and underestimates the
proportion attributable to the rm e¤ect. Our simulation results show that this is certainly
true; while the true worker e¤ect amounts 44 per cent of the variation, the estimated is 68 per
cent. In this perspective Woodcocks model performs much better since it attributes exactly
44 per cent of variation to the worker e¤ect.
Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) argue that the negative correlation between
worker and rm e¤ects to a large extent is due to limited mobility bias. Perhaps, limited
mobility bias and the bias due to match e¤ects are the same. In other words, will the match
e¤ect bias disappear if we consider rms with more worker mobility? Due to the lognormal rm
size distribution rms with the highest rm productivity advertise the fewest jobs. Thus, if we
only estimate the AKM model using a 6 period sample of rms with more than 100 workers,
we are essentially restricting the range of rm productivities and the estimated correlation will
be biased due to the selection on an endogenous variable. Hence, for the simulated data the
sample selection bias makes such exercise useless.
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Instead of estimating on a sample of large rms, as we will do for the empirical estimation
in the next section, we extend the sample length. Table 3 shows that more estimation periods
imply that the gap between the true and the corrected estimate narrows since as the number
of observations per rm increases, the rm e¤ects become more precisely estimated. With 20
periods the estimated correlation from the AKM estimation turns positive, but even with 50
periods the bias still amounts to approximately 20 per cent. Nevertheless, we can conclude
that the match e¤ect bias is a cause of the limited mobility bias. Furthermore, Table 3 reveals
that the correlation from the mixed e¤ects estimation in all simulations lies in between the true
correlation and the correlation from the AKM estimation.
Table 3: Limited mobility bias
No.of timeperiods No. of obs. Ave. obs. per rm True correlation AKM corrected MIXED
6 66; 760 135 0:095  0:052 0:029
10 111; 281 224 0:096  0:013 0:033
20 222; 523 447 0:095 0:026 0:050
30 333; 746 670 0:095 0:045 0:063
50 555; 296 1115 0:096 0:062 0:075
Note: The complete set of results for the simulations can be found in Table 2 and Tables 8-11 in Appendix C.
5 Empirical Results
We have access to a population register data set from Statistics Denmark and we restrict
attention to all workers aged 25-59 years and employed in the private sector. The data set is an
unbalanced panel data set for 1999-2004 and the variables originate from three databases and
include detailed information on a wide range of variables. Due to the nature of a xed e¤ect
estimator, which precludes the use of time-invariant explanatory variables, we only include
a small number of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages
taken from the IDA database. We use two groups of explanatory variables. Firstly, we include
a second order polynomial in the actual labor market experience and dummies for whether
the individual lives in a rural area or in a large city. These variables are also drawn from the
IDA database. Secondly, rm variables including value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, the ratio of males in the rms workforce and log of number of employees drawn from
the IDA and FIDA databases. Furthermore, we include time dummies in the regression. All
nominal variables are deated with the GDP deator.
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Since rm e¤ects are only identied by movers we have chosen to restrict our estimation to
rms with more than 50 worker observations in the 6-year sample window. The resulting data
set has 4 million observations on 925; 000 persons employed in approximately 15; 000 rms.
Table 4: AKM parameter estimates
AKM Estimator MIXED Estimator
Experience 0.0187 0.0200
(80:20) (237:22)
(Experience)2 -0.0062 -0.0041
 (233:40)  (190:91)
Large cities() -0.0022 -0.0273
 (3:66)  (52:22)
Rural area() 0.0027 -0.0269
(7:65)  (83:70)
Value added per employee (mill. DKK) 0.0085 0.0189
(33:55) (85:74)
Capital stock per employee (thousands DKK) 0.0049 0.0000
(1:89) (6:42)
Male ratio -0.0175 0.1379
 (7:74) (116:44)
ln(employees) 0.0194 0.0127
(54:02) (90:53)
R2 0.8939 0.8874
No. of observations 4,003,929
No. of persons 925,011
No. of rms 15,455
No. of worker-rm spells 1,350,944
No. of groups 95
Note: () The omitted category is the greater Copenhagen area. t-values are in parenthesis.
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates. All coe¢ cients are signicant besides the coe¢ -
cient for the capital stock per employee 9, and all have the expected signs. As our main focus is
assortative matching we proceed to look at the estimated correlation between worker and rm
xed e¤ects.
9In Appendix D it is shown that the coe¢ cient to capital stock per employee is signicantly positive when
restricting the sample to rms with more than 300 observations, where the rm e¤ect is better identied.
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Table 5: AKM Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >50)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:351 1:000  0:049 0:044 0:010 0:281 0:886 0:294 0:905 0:326
Xw^w 0:068  0:049 1:000  0:018  0:042 0:003  0:256  0:004  0:051 0:000
Xf ^f 0:037 0:044  0:018 1:000 0:009  0:165  0:018 0:235  0:022 0:000
T^dum 0:017 0:010  0:042 0:009 1:000  0:001  0:032 0:003  0:042 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:009
(0:008)
0:281 0:003  0:165  0:001 1:000 0:036
(0:064)
0:920 0:037 0:000
^i 0:107
(0:102)
0:886  0:256  0:018  0:032 0:036
(0:064)
1:000 0:028 0:978 0:000
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:094 0:294  0:004 0:235 0:003 0:920 0:028 1:000 0:028
(0:056)
0:000
Xw^w + ^i 0:316 0:905  0:051  0:022  0:042 0:037 0:978 0:028
(0:056)
1:000 0:000
"^it 0:114 0:326 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
Note: Lower case parenthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experience,
(experience)2, large cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
The resulting correlation matrix from the AKM model is shown in the Table 5. The es-
timated correlation between the unobserved worker and rm e¤ects is 0:036, while the bias
corrected correlation, shown in parenthesis, is 0:064. Taking account of both observed and un-
observed e¤ects, we estimate the correlation between the overall worker e¤ect and the overall
rm e¤ect to be 0:028, while the corrected is 0:056.10 With the two-way xed e¤ects model we
explain 89 per cent of the variation of the log wages, and approximately 3=4 of this variation
is due to observed and unobserved worker characteristics.
The positive correlation is in contrast to existing international studies which have almost all
found negative correlations. Hence, the evidence from the AKM estimation implies that there
is positive assortative matching in the Danish labor market. It turns out that the positive
correlation is not robust to inclusion of persons aged 18-24 years. In this case the estimated
correlation is  0:0047 while the corrected correlation is 0:0155. This result suggests that the
process of sorting takes time.
In addition to the statistical bias, both Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann and Perez-Duarte
(2004) and Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2007) argue that there might also exist a
10To compute the corrected correlation we simply subtract the bias in the cov

^i;  ^J(i;t)

from
cov

Xw^w + ^i; Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t)

, and subtract the biases in var

^i

and var

 ^J(i;t)

from respectively
var

Xw^w + ^i

and var

Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t)

.
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negative bias due to poorly identied rm e¤ects, when there is limited mobility. We can
quantify this bias by only estimating the AKM model on larger rms.11 As Andrews, Gill,
Schank and Upward we also nd that this bias is more important than the statistical bias,
and as shown in Appendix D the corrected correlation between the unobserved e¤ects becomes
0:092 and 0:111 when we estimate on samples, where the minimum number of observations per
rm are respectively 100 and 300. The correlation between the overall worker and rm e¤ects
are respectively 0:085 and 0:113.
Table 6: MIXED Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >50)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i ^ij Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:351 1:000 0:145 0:155 0:027 0:477 0:837 0:706 0:492 0:851 0:398
Xw^w 0:055 0:145 1:000 0:066  0:039  0:009  0:019  0:011 0:008 0:228 0:001
Xf ^f 0:037 0:155 0:066 1:000  0:011 0:069 0:025 0:001 0:320 0:041  0:007
T^dum 0:012 0:027  0:039  0:011 1:000 0:003  0:002 0:001 0:000  0:012 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:137 0:477  0:009 0:069 0:003 1:000 0:119 0:038 0:967 0:114 0:004
^i 0:217 0:837  0:019 0:025  0:002 0:119 1:000 0:690 0:119 0:969 0:114
^ij 0:072 0:706  0:011 0:001 0:001 0:038 0:690 1:000 0:036 0:670 0:216
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:144 0:492 0:008 0:320 0:000 0:967 0:119 0:036 1:000 0:118 0:002
Xw^w + ^i 0:223 0:851 0:228 0:041  0:012 0:114 0:969 0:670 0:118 1:000 0:111
"^it 0:099 0:398 0:001  0:007 0:000 0:004 0:114 0:216 0:002 0:111 1:000
Note: Lower case parenthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experience, (experience)2, large
cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix when estimating using Woodcocks hybrid mixed
e¤ects model. We obtain a correlation of 0:119 on the sample where the minimum number
of observations per rm is 50. In Table 7 we compute the mean inuence of each term on
the variance of the log of the wage rate. While the AKM estimation suggests that roughly 80
per cent of the variance in the wages can be attributed to the individual heterogeneity, the
mixed e¤ects estimation only suggests about 50 per cent are due to worker heterogeneity. This
repeats the nding from the simulated data and is due to the high positive correlation of 0:69
between the match e¤ect and the worker e¤ect. From the mixed e¤ects estimation we nd that
the match e¤ect explains 14:5 per cent of the variation in the log wages, which is of the same
magnitude as Woodcock nds using US data.
11Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward examine this by estimating on a sample of plants with 30 or more
workers moving during the sample period.
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Table 7: Mean Influence On var(Y )
AKM Estimator MIXED Estimator
Xw^w (0.0097) 0.0226
Xf ^f 0.0049 0.0161
T^dum 0.0008 0.0009
 ^J(i;t) 0.0745 0.1854
^i 0.8235 0.5173
^ij . 0.1450
"^it 0.1061 0.1126
The correlation from Woodcocks mixed e¤ects estimation is higher than the estimated
correlation from the AKM model. Still our simulation results from section 4 combined with
the sizeable match e¤ect found using the Woodcock estimator show that the true correlation
in the Danish labor market will be above the estimated 11.9 per cent.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that thepresence of a match e¤ect in the wages will imply that the
estimated correlation in an AKM estimation will be negatively biased. In order to analyze this
we develop a theoretical search model with continuous heterogeneity on both worker and rm
sides. Like the empirical model, the theoretical model implies a log-linear wage equation which
is additively separable in the worker e¤ects and the rm e¤ects. Besides this, the theoretical
model also provides the opportunity of having an additively separable match e¤ect. Importantly
for our agenda, the model implies assortative matching even though we only use a strictly
supermodular production function. We achieve this by letting the workers choose how many
jobs they want to sample. Compared to Shimer and Smith (2000) we can as Lentz (2008) relax
the assumption of log supermodularity and re-instate Beckers frictionless result.
Our model shares similarities with Lentz (2008), but has the desirable feature that more
productive workers, on average, leave unemployment or any given employment level to nd
better matches than their less productive colleagues. However, compared to Lentzmodel this
is at the expense of no di¤erences in unemployment durations. A model that could combine
the di¤erences in expected unemployment duration and that more productive workers leave
unemployment to nd more productive matches than less productive workers would be most
appealing. It seems to be the case that such a model can be achieved by allowing not only
workers to choose the sample, but also rms to choose the optimal sample of job candidates.
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Thus, for future research on assortative matching the discrete time sampling approach seems
to be more relevant than its continuous approximation.
In the case of Denmark the correlation between the worker and rm e¤ects is estimated to
be 0:12. We argue that it is most likely still a downward biased estimate, since from simulations
of the search model we show that we can obtain the standard negative correlation estimate from
an economy where there is indeed positive assortative matching.
In conclusion, although researches have found negative correlations from estimating the
AKM model for a series of countries, labor markets might after all be characterized by positive
assortative matching.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The number of jobs sampled is necessarily discrete and recognizing this, it is useful
for us to work with segments of pfm for which a given worker with productivity pw does not
change her number of jobs sampled n (pw; pfm). Dening g^
 
pw; p
j
fm
  R pjfm
pj 1fm
~g
 
pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
and p0fm  prfm we can express equation (10) evaluated in pifm as
iX
j=1
g^

pw; p
j
fm

=

 + 
 
 
pifm
n(pw;p0fm) + 
 + 
iX
j=1
 
 
pifm
n(pw;pj 1fm ) g^ pw; pjfm (15)
Rearranging to solve for g^
 
pw; p
i
f

we get
g^
 
pw; p
i
fm

=

+ 

pifm
n(pw;p0fm)
1  + 

pifm
n(pw;pi 1fm )   fi > 1g
i 1X
j=1
1  + 

pifm
n(pw;pj 1fm )
1  + 

pifm
n(pw;pi 1fm ) g^

pw; p
j
fm

(16)
Next, for some workers of productivity pXw we have that
G^X
 
pIfm

=
IX
i=1

+ 

pIfm
n(pXw ;p0;Xfm )
1  + 

pIfm
n(pXw ;pI 1;Xfm )   fI > 1g
IX
i=2
i 1X
j=1
0BB@1  + 

pi;Xfm
n(pXw ;pj 1;Xfm )
1  + 

pi;Xfm
n(pXw ;pi 1;Xfm )  g^

pXw ; p
j;X
fm
1CCA
(17)
Consider two workers A and B, where pAw > p
B
w , so that we by proposition 1 have that
n
 
pAw; pfm
  n  pBw ; pfm. Furthermore, assume that n = 0; 1; 2. Using Denition 1, we
wish to compare the allocation of the two worker types to show that GB
 
pIfm
  GA  pIfm.
The proof is in two parts. In part A we show that for the particular example depicted in Figure
3 GB
 
pIfm
  GA  pIfm for any pIfm 2 [0; 1]. In part B of the proof, we show that all other
possible scenarios are special cases of the example in part A.
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Part A: The discreteness of the number of jobs sampled implies that n in the interval
[0; 2] is a decreasing step-wise function of pfm with ve segments. As illustrated in Figure 3,
the considered example implies that pAw and p
B
w are su¢ ciently close so that workers A and
B are sampling the same number of jobs for some ranges of pfm. Next, we will use that if
n
 
pAw; pfm

= n
 
pBw ; pfm

it must be the case that person B will decrease her n at some rm
productivity pfm lower than the rm productivity where A will decrease her n.
By the use of equation (16) and (17) we have that G^B
 
pIfm
   G^A  pIfm  0 no matter
which segment pIfm is situated on in Figure 3. The solutions for each segment are:
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm j0pIfm<p1;Bfm = 0 (18)

G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm jp1;BfmpIfm<p1;Afm =

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2
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2    
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2
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2
1CA 1   
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
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
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 > 0 (19)
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1CA 1   
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1  + 

pIfm
 > 0 (20)
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where the only term not immediately seen to be positive is0B@1   

pIfm
2
1   

pIfm
   1  + 

p2;Bfm
2
1  + 

p2;Bfm

1CA
But since
@ 1 x
2
1 x
@x
= 1 > 0 this term as well is clearly positive. Hence, we conclude that
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^A  pIfm 8pIfm 2 [0; 1]
.
Part B: Since we know that
pAw > p
B
w ; n
0
pw (pw; pfm) > 0 =) n
 
pAw; pfm
  n  pBw ; pfm (23)
it is straightforward to show that every possible scenario satisfying (23) can be included either
directly as part of the main case above or be re-stated as combinations of a number of sub-cases,
all part of the main case above.
To illustrate consider the two examples in Figure 4.
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Case I) just parallels the last four segments of the main case from part A since from (18)
G^B
 
pIfm

= G^A
 
pIfm

for 0  pIfm < p1fm. In case II) one can include a worker C with
pAw > p
C
w > p
B
w (as illustrated with the middle line). By the proof in part A we know that
G^B
 
pIfm
  G^C  pIfm and G^C  pIfm  G^A  pIfm, whereby we also have that G^B  pIfm 
G^A
 
pIfm

. By the same line of argument, all cases in the n 2 [0; 1; 2] space can be showed to
have assortative matching by using only part A of this proof.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Existence of a unique reservation productivity prw and a unique unemployment rate u
follows trivially from equations (4) and (7). The l.h.s. of equations (5) and (6) is increasing
in n, while the r.h.s. is decreasing in n, which implies that there is a unique solution for each
of the equations. If this value is not an integer, it is possible that the two integers adjacent to
the solution of rst-order condition imply the same value of the value function. In this case,
we assume that the worker chooses the lowest n. Under this assumption there exist a unique
n (pw; b) and n (pw; pfm) for any pw 2
h
p
¯ w
; pw
i
and any pfm 2
h
p
¯ f
; pfm
i
. Di¤erentiating (10)
with respect to pfm gives
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g^ (pw; pfm) =
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n(pw;b) 1 +
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p
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0
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,
g^ (pw; pfm) =

+n (pw; b)   (pfm)
n(pw;b) 1
1  +  (pfm)n(pw;pfm)
+

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R pfm
p
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
pw; p
0
fm

  (pfm)
n(pw;p0fm) 1 g^

pw; p
0
fm

dp0fm
1  +  (pfm)n(pw;pfm)
which is an inhomogenous Volterra equation of second kind with an everywhere continuous and
uniformly bounded integral kernel. Given uniqueness of n (pw; b) and n (pw; pfm) we also have
a unique solution for g^ (pw; pfm) for any pw 2
h
p
¯ w
; pw
i
and any pfm 2
h
p
¯ fm
; pfm
i
.
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Appendix C: Tables from Simulation
Table 8: Monte-carlo estimations with 10 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 10 10
No. of observations 111,281 111,281
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 496 477
Average of wages 124.7 124.4
Variance of wages 47.2 41.3
Ave. no. of obs per rm 224 233
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.035 0.004 -0.018 0.114 0.145 0.130
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) -0.031 0.010 -0.013 0.116 0.147 0.132
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.019 0.049 0.033 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.082 0.110 0.096 0.116 0.146 0.132
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.097 0.128 0.113 0.116 0.146 0.132
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.189 0.191 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.443 0.642 0.448 0.543 0.551
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.284 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.169 0.078 0.065 0.057
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Table 9: Monte-carlo estimations with 20 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 20 20
No. of observations 222,523 222,523
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 498 481
Average of wages 124.7 124.4
Variance of wages 47.2 41.4
Ave. no. of obs per rm 447 462
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.007 0.038 0.024 0.118 0.143 0.131
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.009 0.040 0.026 0.118 0.144 0.131
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.035 0.061 0.050 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.080 0.109 0.095 0.118 0.144 0.131
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.099 0.124 0.113 0.118 0.144 0.131
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.181 0.187 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.442 0.592 0.453 0.544 0.547
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.282 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.227 0.078 0.065 0.061
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Table 10: Monte-carlo estimations with 30 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 30 30
No. of observations 333,746 333,746
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 498 484
Average of wages 124.8 124.4
Variance of wages 47.3 41.4
Ave. no. of obs per rm 670 689
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.032 0.060 0.043 0.120 0.143 0.131
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.034 0.062 0.045 0.120 0.143 0.132
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.052 0.076 0.063 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.084 0.108 0.095 0.119 0.143 0.132
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.101 0.124 0.112 0.119 0.143 0.132
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.177 0.185 0.391 0.391
Person e¤ect 0.443 0.564 0.458 0.544 0.546
Match e¤ect 0.271 . 0.279 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.259 0.078 0.065 0.063
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Table 11: Monte-carlo estimations with 50 periods
Match e¤ect included Match e¤ect not
included
No. of replications 100 100
No. time periods 50 50
No. of observations 556,296 556,296
No. of persons 12,500 12,500
No. of rms 499 487
Average of wages 124.8 124.5
Variance of wages 47.3 41.3
Ave. no. of obs per rm 1115 1142
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
AKM, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.051 0.070 0.061 0.124 0.140 0.132
AKM, Corrected cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.052 0.070 0.062 0.124 0.140 0.132
MIXED, Estimated cor(^i;  ^J(i;t)) 0.066 0.084 0.075 . . .
True cor(1  ln(pw); 2  ln(pf )) 0.086 0.104 0.096 0.124 0.141 0.132
True cor(1  ln(pw); (2 + 3)  ln(pfm)) 0.102 0.123 0.113 0.124 0.141 0.132
Mean inuence on var(Y ):
True AKM Mixed True AKM
Firm e¤ect 0.208 0.173 0.183 0.392 0.392
Person e¤ect 0.442 0.534 0.462 0.543 0.545
Match e¤ect 0.272 . 0.276 0.000 .
Error term 0.078 0.294 0.078 0.065 0.063
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Appendix D: Tables from Empirical Estimation
Table 12: AKM parameter estimates
(obs per rm >100) (obs per rm >300)
Experience 0.0168 0.0137
(67:34) (47:76)
(Experience)2 -0.0061 -0.0060
 (219:63)  (191:50)
Large cities() -0.0018 -0.0022
 (2:92)  (3:18)
Rural area() 0.0024 0.0014
(6:41) (3:25)
Value added per employee (mill. DKK) 0.0082 0.0067
(31:23) (19:12)
Capital stock per employee (thousands DKK) 0.0047 0.4968
(1:82) (18:63)
Male ratio -0.0190 -0.0260
 (6:87)  (6:89)
ln(employees) 0.0182 0.0211
(47:64) (45:37)
R2 0.8986 0.9045
No. of observations 3,458,066 2,596,705
No. of persons 820,883 645,302
No. of rms 7,585 2,293
No. of groups 11 1
Note: () The omitted category is the greater Copenhagen area.
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Table 13: AKM Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >100)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:351 1:000  0:067 0:020 0:009 0:286 0:891 0:296 0:916 0:318
Xw^w 0:079  0:067 1:000  0:009  0:048  0:001  0:303  0:004  0:070 0:000
Xf ^f 0:033 0:020  0:009 1:000 0:013  0:210  0:024 0:183  0:027 0:000
T^dum 0:020 0:009  0:048 0:013 1:000 0:001  0:038 0:007  0:052 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:007
(0:007)
0:286  0:001  0:210 0:001 1:000 0:071
(0:092)
0:923 0:075 0:000
^i 0:110
(0:106)
0:891  0:303  0:024  0:038 0:071
(0:092)
1:000 0:063 0:972 0:000
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:083 0:296  0:004 0:183 0:007 0:923 0:063 1:000 0:064
(0:085)
0:000
Xw^w + ^i 0:317 0:916  0:070  0:027  0:052 0:075 0:972 0:064
(0:085)
1:000 0:000
"^it 0:112 0:318 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
Note: Lower case paranthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experi-
ence, (experience)2, large cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
Table 14: AKM Estimator, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrix (obs per firm >300)
Correlations
Standard
deviation
Y Xw^w Xf ^f T^dum  ^J(i;t) ^i Xf ^f+
 ^J(i;t)
Xw^w+
^i
"^it
Y 0:350 1:000  0:081  0:005 0:007 0:282 0:887 0:299 0:926 0:309
Xw^w 0:099  0:081 1:000 0:000  0:051  0:008  0:367  0:009  0:083 0:000
Xf ^f 0:033  0:005 0:000 1:000 0:016  0:356  0:023 0:079  0:025 0:000
T^dum 0:022 0:007  0:051 0:016 1:000 0:004  0:048 0:011  0:067 0:000
 ^J(i;t) 0:006
(0:006)
0:282  0:008  0:356 0:004 1:000 0:099
(0:111)
0:904 0:104 0:000
^i 0:116
(0:112)
0:887  0:367  0:023  0:048 0:099
(0:111)
1:000 0:095 0:957 0:000
Xf ^f +  ^J(i;t) 0:073 0:299  0:009 0:079 0:011 0:904 0:095 1:000 0:099
(0:113)
0:000
Xw^w + ^i 0:318 0:926  0:083  0:025  0:067 0:104 0:957 0:099
(0:113)
1:000 0:000
"^it 0:108 0:309 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 1:000
Note: Lower case paranthesis denotes the correlation corrected for statistical bias. Xw includes experi-
ence, (experience)2, large cities and rural areas. Xf includes value added per employee, capital stock per
employee, male ratio and ln(employees).
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Abstract
This paper presents a search model of marriage with heterogenous agents. All agents
are allowed to sample two potential partners in a one-shot game. In this search envirron-
ment the production function needs only to be supermodular for assortative matching to
arise. Hence, we are able to re-instate Beckers (1973) result in a search context without
relying on agents having either constant costs as in Atakan (2006) or di¤erent search
e¤orts as in Lentz (2008) and le Maire and Scheuer (2008). Furthermore, in contrast to
the latter two models we achieve symmetric assortative matching.
1 Introduction
This paper considers two-sided matching between heterogeneous agents. When two agents
meet and match, they generate an output, which can be shared among the two. Such matching
situation arises in many contexts although the search and matching literature most often has
considered matching between workers and rms in the labor market or matching between men
and women in the marriage market. In this paper we consider matching in the marriage market.
When considering heterogeneous agents we are especially interested in when it is the case
that high productivity agents match with other high productivity agents, which is termed
positive assortative matching. In a seminal contribution Becker (1973) argued that when there is
complementarity in the production function we can expect positive assortative matching. In the
frictionless model considered by Becker, the su¢ cient mathematical property of the production
function is supermodularity, which implies that the cross derivative of the production function
is positive.
Shimer and Smith (2000) show that for assortative matching to arise in a search model
setting it is no longer su¢ cient that the production function is strictly supermodular. Instead,
I thank Karsten Albæk, Dale Mortensen and Louise Rathsach Skouby for very helpful comments. All
mistakes are mine.
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Shimer and Smith nd that a stronger version of complementarity is needed, that is log super-
modularity. As noted by Atakan (2006) the problem is that the higher gains to more search
for more productive workers are o¤set by higher costs of rejecting an o¤er. Using this, Atakan
shows that if unmatched agents have constant ow costs independent of their type and if the
discount rate is zero, the production function only needs to be strictly supermodular in order
to imply assortative matching.
Recently, Lentz (2008) and le Maire and Scheuer (2008) have shown that when workers
can choose their search e¤ort the su¢ cient condition for assortative matching is just strictly
supermodularity of the production function. Lentz casts his model in continuous time and in
his model more productive workershigher search intensity implies that they have a higher job
arrival rate. Hence, after some time productive workers will, on average, have changed jobs
more times and, therefore, be in more productive rms. Thus, more productive workers do not
leave unemployment to a more productive rst job and without on-the-job search there is not
assortative matching with a strictly supermodular production function.
Le Maire and Scheuer set their model in discrete time and allow workers to optimally choose
a sample of either 0; 1; or 2 jobs. When more productive workers sample more jobs, they will
not match more frequently, but instead each time select among a larger sample of rms and,
thereby, on average select a more productive rm. Therefore, in the model of le Maire and
Scheuer assortative matching does not break-down in the absence of on-the-job search.
In this paper we want to abstract from the ingredients that re-instate assortative matching
with a strictly supermodular production function in a search context, that is, constant costs of
search and endogenous search e¤ort together with on-the-job search are assumed away. Instead,
we allow both sides to sample partners simultaneously in a one-shot matching game.
When only workers are able to use sampling and rms just ll their vacancy randomly, it is
optimal for workers to apply to the most productive rm. When both sides use sampling it will,
in general, not be optimal for low productivity agents to select the best alternative. To take
account of this, we use a framework as in Gale and Shapley (1962) and allow agents to apply
for all sampled partners and use a downward-recursively matching strategy, that is, rst try to
match with the best alternative, and if rejected try to match with the second best alternative,
etc.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the theoretical model is outlined, and
in section 3 we conclude.
2 Theoretical Model
Consider a market with N women and N men. All agents are rational, forward-looking, risk-
neutral and innitely lived. Agents look for a partner of the opposite sex to match with. We
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allow agents to sample 1  S  N potential partners in a one-shot matching game. The S
potential partners are randomly selected among all agents on the other side of the market. To
keep things simple we assume that the matching behavior is controlled by a marriage agency.
This agency makes sure that each agent sample exactly S agents from the other side.
When a man and a woman meet, they can generate a non-negative output according to
the production function f (pm; pf ) where pm 2
h
p
¯ m
; pm
i
is the productivity of the man and
pf 2
h
p
¯ f
; pf
i
is the productivity of the woman. Agents on both sides of the market are
heterogenous. The distribution of mens productivity is given by H (pm) while for women it is
given by Q (pf ). We assume that the utility or production is transferable and can be shared
among the two, such that the man gets the share  of the production, while the woman get
the remainder. All possible matches have positive pay-o¤ and, hence, all types of match have
a probability strictly greater than zero.
When f 0pf (pm; pf ) > 0 men prefer to match with the woman of highest pf among their S
potential partners, and similarly when f 0pm (pm; pf ) > 0 women prefer to match with the most
productive man among their S potential partners. Both conditions are satised under the
following assumption
Assumption 1 The production function f (pm; pf ) is non-negative, increasing in its
inputs f 0pm (pm; pf ) > 0, f
0
pf
(pm; pf ) > 0, and is supermodular, that is, if p1m > p
0
m and p
1
f > p
0
f
we have that f
 
p1m; p
1
f

+ f
 
p0m; p
0
f
  f  p1m; p0f+ f  p0m; p1f.
The fact that matching with more productive women yields a higher output, that is f 0pf (pm; pf ) >
0, suggests a possibility of di¤erent matches not carrying the same probability. When a man
receives his S draws from the marriage agency, he sorts the draws according to productivity
and downward-recursively he tries to match with each of the women until he is accepted. For
S = N this is the "deferred-acceptance" procedure of Gale and Shapley (1962) with the addi-
tional assumption that all men rank women in the same way and all women rank men in the
same way. To keep things simple, but still deriving new results, we assume that S = 2 such
that the marriage agency allows each person to consider exactly two potential partners from
the other side. If agents on the one side all randomly sample two partners on the other side,
not all agents on the other side would be sampled twice. To overcome this problem we assume
that there exists a marriage agency, which randomly allocates two potential partners from the
other side of the market to each agent.
Let 1
 
pm; p
1
f

denote the probability that a man with productivity pm will match with
the preferred woman among his two draws, and let 0
 
pm; p
0
f

denote the probability that the
man matches with the other draw. The probability that the best of the two women has a
productivity below p1f is given by Q
 
p1f
2
. Conditional on the best of the draws is p1f , the
probability that the other draw is below some p0f < p
1
f is q
 
p0f

Q
 
p1f

.
If we let the value of being unmatched be denoted by Ui () where i 2 fm; fg. The Bellman
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equation for an unmatched man of productivity pm is
rUm (pm) =
Z pf
p
¯ f
0@ 1

pm; p
1
f

f

pm; p
1
f

+
1 1(pm;p1f)
Q(p1f)
R p1f
p
¯ f
0

pm; p
0
f

f

pm; p
0
f

dQ

p0f
 1A dQ  p1f2 (1)
where r is the discount factor. The corresponding value functions for a woman of productivity
pf are
rUf (pf ) =
Z pm
p
¯ m
8<: 1
 
pf ; p
1
m

(1  ) f  p1m; pf
+
1 1(pf ;p1m)
H(p1m)
R p1m
p
¯ m
0
 
pf ; p
0
m

(1  ) f  p1m; pfQ  dp0m
9=; dH  p1m2 (2)
where j (pf ; p
j
m) for j 2 f0; 1g is the probability that a woman with productivity pf matches
with a man of productivity pjm.
Consider a man with quality p1m sampling two women with productivities p
1
f > p
0
f . Naturally,
he will prefer to match with the woman with the highest quality p1f . If the other woman with
productivity p0f has drawn a less productive man p
0
m < p
1
m, she will wait until it is known
whether the man with productivity p1m actually matches with p
1
f or not. If p
1
m and p
1
f do not
match, then, it must be the case that p1f has a better o¤er p
2
m > p
1
m, and p
2
m and p
1
f will match.
Since the man with productivity p1m cannot match with his preferred draw, he will, instead
match p0f .
We can assign probabilities to such matching process. With probabilityH (p1m) the preferred
woman with productivity p1f accepts p
1
m and the two match. However, with probability 1  
H (p1m) the preferred woman samples a better man and with probability Q
 
p1f

the woman
and the other man match. It can also be the case that the woman of productivity p1f does
not get the preferred man with p2m > p
1
m. For a moment let us stop the matching process
here and calculate the probability that the man of productivity p1m matches with his preferred
woman of productivity p1f . This probability is H (p
1
m) + (1 H (p1m))
 
1 Q  p1f. However,
this calculation is only true conditional on the man with quality p2m matches with his preferred
woman. The probability of that event is H (p2m) + (1 H (p2m))
 
1 Q  p2f given that if the
woman with productivity p2f draws a higher p
3
m > p
2
m he gets his preferred woman of productivity
p3f > p
2
f . Hence, we have that the probability that a man of productivity p
1
m matches with his
best alternative is
1
 
p1m; p
1
f

= E
266666664
H
 
p1m

+
 
1 H  p1m 1 Qp1f

8>>>><>>>>:
H
 
p2m

+
 
1 H  p2m 1 Qp2f
8><>:
H
 
p3m

+ 
1 H  p3m 1 Qp3f
(
and
so on
) 9>=>;
9>>>>=>>>>;

p1m; p
1
f
377777775
= E
24K 1Y
i=1
 
1 Q  pif  1 H  pim+ KX
i=1
H
 
pim
 i 1Y
j=1

1 Q

pjf
  
1 H  pjm
 p1m; p1f
35
= E
24 KX
i=1
H
 
pim
 i 1Y
j=1

1 Q

pjf
  
1 H  pjm
 p1m; p1f
35 (3)
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where K is the maximum number of rounds it takes before all 2N agents are assigned, and
where we can abstract from the rst term
K 1Y
i=1
 
1 Q  pif (1 H (pim)), since it goes to zero
as K becomes large. We will approximate 1
 
p1f ; p
1
m

in equation (3) by abstracting from terms
for K  5. The expressions for i = 1; 2; 3 can be solved exact, while we will approximate the
term for i = 4. All these derivations are relegated to Appendix A.1 Dropping the superscripts
such that pm = p1m and pf = p
1
f we have that
1 (pm; pf ) = H (pm) +
1
2
(1 Q (pf ))

1 H (pm)2

+
1
12
(1 Q (pf ))2

2  3H (pm) +H (pm)3

+
1
288
(1 Q (pf ))3 (1 H (pm))3

37
6
+H (pm)

(4)
The following proposition characterize the basic properties of 1 (pm; pf ).
Proposition 1 (i) The higher quality of the man, the larger is the probability of matching with
the best of the two drawn women, that is @1 (pm; pf )/ @pm > 0. (ii) The better the quality of the
(preferred) drawn woman the smaller the chance is of matching, that is @1 (pm; pf )/ @pf < 0.
(iii) The cross-derivative of 1 (pm; pf ) is positive.
Proof. See Appendix B-D.
Conditional on not matching with the best alternative the probability of matching with the
other alternative is identical to the probability of matching with the best alternative, that is
1 (pm; pf ) = 0 (pm; pf ) and the results in Proposition 1 also hold for 0 (pm; pf ).
The overall share of unmatched agents u is
u = 1 
Z pm
p
¯ m
Z pf
p
¯ f
 
1 (~pm; ~pf ) + (1  1 (~pm; ~pf )) 1
Q (~pf )
Z ~pf
p
¯ f
0
 
~pm; ~p
0
f

dQ
 
~p0f
!
d

Q (~pf )
2

dH (~pm) (5)
Proposition 2 The share of matched men conditional on type is increasing in pm and, simi-
larly, the share of matched women conditional on type is increasing in pf .
Proof. See Appendix E.
We want to consider the allocation of agents for this one-shot game. Let G (pm; pf ) denote
the mass of men with quality pm or less who match with women of quality pf or less. When
S = 2 there are two types of inow to G (pm; pf ); a man with productivity below pm matches
with the preferred partner, who has a productivity below pf or a man with productivity below
pm is not accepted with the preferred partner, but is accepted by the least preferred partner
1It is easy to assess the quality of the approximation since it is independent of the shape ofH (pm) and Q (pf ).
The maximum approximation errror for 1

p1m; p
1
f

is when p1m = p
1
f = 0. In this case the approximation error
is approximately 0:001.
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with a productivity below pf . Hence, we have
(1  u)G (pm; pf ) =Z pm
p
¯ m
 Z pf
p
¯ f
1 (~pm; ~pf ) d

Q (~pf )
2

+
Z pf
p
¯ f
0
 
~pm; ~p
0
f
 Z pf
~p0f
(1  1 (~pm; ~pf )) 1
Q (~pf )
d

Q (~pf )
2

dQ
 
~p0f
!
dH (~pm)
(6)
Di¤erentiating equation (6) with respect to pm and subsequently pf gives us
g^ (pm; pf ) =
2
1  u
 
1 (pm; pf )Q (pf ) + 0 (pm; pf )
Z pf
pf
(1  1 (pm; ~pf )) dQ (~pf )
!
=
2
1  u1 (pm; pf )
 
1 
Z pf
pf
1 (pm; ~pf ) dQ (~pf )
!
(7)
where we use the normalized density g^ (pm; pf )  g (pm; pf )/ (h (pm) q (pf )) in order to be able
to examine the allocation of the game. Due to property (i) the rst part of equation (7) is
increasing in pm whereas the second part is decreasing in pm. This implies that g^ (pm; pf )
conditional on pf has a global maximum in pm.
For examination of the allocation of agents we need the following denition of assortative
matching also used in Lentz (2008) and le Maire and Scheuer (2008).
Denition 1 Consider two women A and B, where pAf > p
B
f . Assortative matching implies
that GB (pm)  1 u1 u(pBf )
R pm
p
¯m
g^
 
~pm; p
B
f

dH (~pm)  1 u1 u(pAf )
R pm
p
¯m
g^
 
~pm; p
A
f

dH (~pm)  GB (pm)
for pm 2
i
p
¯m
; pm
h
.
Proposition 3 The model features assortative matching.
Proof. Di¤erentiating g^ (pm; pf ) gives
@g^ (pm; pf )
@pm
=
2
1  u
8<:
@1(pm;pf )
@pm

1  R pf
pf
1 (pm; ~pf ) dQ (~pf )

 1 (pm; pf )
R pf
pf
@1(pm;~pf )
@pm
dQ (~pf )
9=; (8)
Due to property (i) the rst part of equation (8) is always positive, while the second part is
always negative. It is clear that for pf su¢ ciently close to pf we must have that
@g^(pm;pf)
@pm
> 0 for
all pm < pm, since the negative part approaches 0. Next, consider decreasing pf from pf . The
rst term of the positive part decreases when pf decreases due to property (iii). Furthermore,
the second term of the positive part also decreases as pf decreases. At the same time, decreasing
pf implies that the negative part in absolute terms increases. Hence, decreasing pf decreases
@g^(pm;pf)
@pm
. These results correspond to the cross-derivative being positive, that is
@2g^ (pm; pf )
@pm@pf
=
2
1  u
8<:
@21(pm;pf)
@pm@pf

1  R pf
pf
1 (pm; ~pf ) dQ (~pf )

+
@1(pm;pf)
@pm
1 (pm; pf ) q (pf )
 @1(pm;pf)
@pf
R pf
pf
@1(pm;~pf)
@pm
dQ (~pf ) + 1 (pm; pf )
@1(pm;pf)
@pm
q (pf )
9=;
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which is positive since all terms are positive due to property (i),(ii) and (iii). Hence, if decreasing
pf makes
@g^(pm;pf)
@pm
negative, it will not become positive again. We cannot without further
examination know whether
@g^(pm;pf)
@pm
becomes negative, but we can see that when pm comes
su¢ ciently close to pm and pf is su¢ ciently close to p
¯
f we must have that
@g^(pm;pf)
@pm
< 0, since
the positive part approaches zero. From equation (7) we can see that g^
 
pm; p
A
f

> g^
 
pm; p
B
f

,
since 1 (pm; pf ) = 1, so that increasing pf just increases the second term of equation (7).
By proposition 2 we have that
@(1 u(pf))
@pf
> 0, which implies that
R pm
p
¯ m
g^
 
~pm; p
A
f

d~pm >R pm
p
¯ m
g^
 
~pm; p
B
f

d~pm. We cannot know whether g^

p
¯ m
; pAf

 g^

p
¯ m
; pBf

or g^

p
¯ m
; pAf

< g^

p
¯ m
; pBf

and we need to consider each case separately. Below, the two cases are illustrated.
Case 1: g^

p
¯ m
; pAf

 g^

p
¯ m
; pBf

Case 2: g^

p
¯ m
; pAf

< g^

p
¯ m
; pBf

1. Consider the case where g^

p
¯ m
; pAf

 g^

p
¯ m
; pBf

. Since
@g^(pm;pAf )
@pm
>
@g^(pm;pBf )
@pm
we must
have that g^
 
pm; p
A
f

> g^
 
pm; p
B
f

for all pm 2
i
p
¯ m
; pm
i
. Furthermore,
@g^(pm;pAf )
@pm
>
@g^(pm;pBf )
@pm
implies that the vertical distance between g^
 
pm; p
A
f

and g^
 
pm; p
B
f

will be
increasing in pm. Hence, a larger share of the type A women will be matched to high type
men, such that 1 u
1 u(pAf )
R pm
p
¯ m
g^
 
~pm; p
A
f

dH (~pm) <
1 u
1 u(pBf )
R pm
p
¯ m
g^
 
~pm; p
B
f

dH (~pm), that is
the allocation features assortative matching.
2. Consider the case where g^

p
¯ m
; pAf

< g^

p
¯ m
; pBf

such that in a range
h
p
¯ m
; pm
i
g^
 
pm; p
A
f

<
g^
 
pm; p
B
f

and in a range [pm; pm] g^
 
pm; p
A
f

> g^
 
pm; p
B
f

. Since more type A women are
matched than type B women, we must have thatZ pm
pm

g^
 
~pm; p
A
f
  g^  ~pm; pBf  dH (~pm) > Z pm
p
¯ m

g^
 
~pm; p
B
f
  g^  ~pm; pAf  dH (~pm)
Such allocation features assortative matching, since it implies that 1 u
1 u(pAf )
R pm
p
¯ m
g^
 
~pm; p
A
f

dH (~pm) <
1 u
1 u(pBf )
R pm
p
¯ m
g^
 
~pm; p
B
f

dH (~pm).
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The source of assortative matching in Lentz (2008) and le Maire and Scheuer (2008) is the
endogenous search e¤ort, while here the only source of assortative matching is the possibility
for both sides of the market to consider more than one candidate at a time.
In Lentzmodel assortative matching arises, since more productive workers have a higher
probability of matching since they search more. In the model of le Maire and Scheuer, as-
sortative matching arises since more productive agents have more alternatives to choose from,
also since they search more. In Lentzmodel more productive agents are less likely to be un-
matched, but the agents are not more likely to match with more productive partners, since
assortative matching only arises since good agents, from search when already being matched,
change partner more frequently. In contrast to this, in le Maire and Scheuers model the share
of unmatched agents is independent of the productivity, but high productive workers are more
likely to match with high productive employers. Hence, in the latter model on-the-job search
is not needed for assortative matching to arise.
The present model combines the attractive features from Lentz and le Maire and Scheuer in
that a) the share of unmatched agents is higher for low productive agents and b) more productive
agents are more likely to match with more productive agents on the other side of the market,
so that on-the-job search is not needed. Furthermore, in the present framework assortative
matching also arises, when the production function is only supermodular compared to strictly
supermodular. This implies that unlike in the models by Lentz and le Maire and Scheuer
assortative matching is the result with a production function of the type f (pm; pf ) = pm + pf .
In both the models of Lentz and le Maire and Scheuer, the type of assortative matching is
asymmetric, since when assortative matching arises due to di¤erences in search e¤ort on the
worker side, it can only be proven that more productive workers on average will match with more
productive rms. The opposite that more productive rms on average match with more pro-
ductive workers cannot be proven. Interestingly, the two-sided sampling in this model implies
that the assortative matching is symmetric, which we summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assortative matching is symmetric.
Proof. By symmetry since i (pf ; pm) for i = f0; 1g satises property (i)-(iii).
The symmetry of the equilibrium allocation can also be illustrated by considering a man
with productivity pAm and a woman with productivity p
A
f , where H
 
pAm

= Q
 
pAf

and two
other points of the distribution pBm > p
A
m and p
B
f > p
B
m, where H
 
pBm

= Q
 
pBf

. Then we must
have that the man with productivity pAm has the same probability of matching as the woman
of quality pAf with the preferred partner, that is 1
 
pAm; p
B
f

= 1
 
pAf ; p
B
m

. Furthermore, for
the equilibrium allocation we obtain the symmtric result that g
 
pAm; p
B
f
  
h
 
pAm

q
 
pBm

=
g
 
pBm; p
A
f
  
h
 
pBm

q
 
pAm

.
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Since the sample size S is exogenous to the agents, the allocation is not inuenced by the
shape of the distribution functions for the unmatched agents H (pm) and Q (pf ). Hence, if we
double the productivity of women in the highest decile, the matching will not change. Clearly,
this would not have been the case if we allowed men to choose their sample size. Doubling the
productivity of women in the highest decile would imply higher returns to search and, thereby,
a larger optimal search sample.
Earlier studies of assortative matching relied on examining the sets of matches that are
acceptable by both workers and rms, whereas for S = 2 assortative matching only happens
on average. The frictionless case with perfect segregation along the 45 degree line is obtained
when S = N , but what happens when S increases towards N? To answer this question consider
S = N 1 for N  3. Next, consider the most productive man and the second most productive
man. If the most productive man samples all but the most productive woman, and the second
most productive man samples the N   1 most productive women, the most productive woman
and the second most productive man will match and the second most productive woman and
the most productive man will match. Hence, for S = N   1 we obtain a segregated market.
In conclusion, there is not assortative matching when S = 1, but for S > 1 there will be
assortative matching on average, although as S gets su¢ ciently close to N the allocation will
be segregated.
3 Conclusion
This paper has presented a new way of achieving assortative matching in a search context even
though the production function is only supermodular. Whereas Lentz (2008) and le Maire and
Scheuer (2008) relied on endogenous search e¤ort, we show that this is not needed. We just
need that both sides of the market sample more than one potential partner at a time.
The continuous time approximation has shown itself very useful in the search literature, but
this approximation is less innocent when two-sided heterogeneity is introduced in equilibrium
search models. In fact, it is crucial for the properties of the equilibrium allocation of agents
whether the agents can consider more than one candidate at a time.
In typical real life matching situations agents are able to consider more than one potential
partner. For example, a rm aiming at lling a vacancy often invites a small number of
candidates for job interviews. Empirically, it seems very likely that the degree of assortative
matching in the labor market is enhanced by on-the-search, but it is less compelling that
assortative matching in the labor market arises solely as a result of search by already matched
agents. Also therefore, it seems to be very relevant to develop discrete time search models with
two-sided sampling.
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Appendix A: Detailed derivation of 1
 
p1m; p
1
f

The rst term of equation (3) for i = 1 is obviously simply E

H (p1m)j p1m; p1f

= H (p1m). The
term for i = 2 is
E

H
 
p2m
  
1 Q  p1f  1 H  p1m p1m; p1f  =  1 Q  p1f  1 H  p1mE H  p2m p1m; p1f 
=
1
2
 
1 Q  p1f 1 H  p1m2
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where we have used that E

H (p2m)j p1m; p1f

= (1 +H (p1m))/ 2.
To derive the the third term for i = 3 we use that H (pim)and Q
 
pjf

are uncorrelated
and that on average it is only half of the variation in the previous H (pi 1m ) which a¤ects the
expected value of H (pim). We have
E
24H  p3m 2Y
j=1

1 Q

pjf
  
1 H  pjm
 p1m; p1f
35 =

1 Q

p1f
  
1 H  p1m
E
h
1 Q

p2f
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 p1m; p1fi8<: E
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1 H  p2m p1m; p1fiE hH  p3m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H
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p3m
 p1m; p1f
9=;
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1 H  p1m1  1+Q(p1f)2 
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2
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4   12var

H
 
p2m
 p1m; p1f
=
1
12
 
1 Q  p1f2 2  3H  p1m+H  p1m3
Before, we compute the fourth term we will separately consider the variance of H (p3m) For
this we need to dene v which is standard uniform. By using the formula for the variance of a
product (see Bohrstedt and Goldberger (1969)) we nd
var
 
H
 
p3m

= var
  
1 H  p2m v
=
h
E
 
1 H  p2m2 var (v) + E (v)2 var  1 H  p2m+ var  1 H  p2m var (v)i
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4
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1 H  p2m2
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35
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The fourth term is
E
24H  p4m 3Y
j=1
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1 Q

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 p1m; p1f
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where we have used what Bohrstedt and Goldberger (1969, p. 1441) term the "conventional as-
ymptotic approximation procedure" in order to compute cov

(1 H (p2m)) (1 H (p3m)) ; H (p4m)j p1m; p1f

.
Inserting all this gives us
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Appendix B: Proof of property (i) in proposition 1
Proof. Di¤erentiate 1 (pm; pf ) from equation (3) with respect to pm
@1 (pm; pf )
@pm
= h (pm)  (1 Q (pf ))H (pm)h (pm)
 1
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(1 Q (pf ))2
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2
H (pm)
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  172 (1 Q (pf ))3H (pm)3
9>>>>=>>>>;
Consider the part inside the curly brackets and abstract for a moment from the nal term.
Then, we have a quadratic equation. It is immediately apparent that the coe¢ cient in front of
the quadratic term is positive and, hence, the minimum of the function is where
H (pm) =
  1288 (1 Q (pf ))
h
 257  62Q (pf ) + 31Q (pf )2
i
2
576 (1 Q (pf ))2 [125 + 19Q (pf )]
=
257 + 62Q (pf )  31Q (pf )2
125  106Q (pf )  19Q (pf )2
and it is obvious that H (pmjQ (pf ) = 0) = 257125 and that the minimum H (pm) > 257125 for all
Q (pf ) 2 [0; 1]. Hence, the minimum of the quadratic equation is in H (pm) = 1. Therefore, it
su¢ ces to evaluate @1 (pm; pf )/ @pm in this point and verify that it is positive
@1 (pm; pf jpm = pm )
@pm
= h (pm)
8>>>><>>>>:
1 + 1576 (1 Q (pf ))2 [ 179 + 35Q (pf )]
+ 1288 (1 Q (pf ))
h
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i
+ 1576 (1 Q (pf ))2 [125 + 19Q (pf )]
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= h (pm)
8><>:1 + 1576  1 Q  p1f
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 54 + 108Q (pf )  54Q (pf )2
 514  124Q (pf ) + 62Q (pf )2
 8 + 16Q (pf )  8Q (pf )2
9>=>;
9>=>;
= h (pm)Q (pf )
which obviously is strictly positive for 0 < Q (pf )  1.
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Appendix C: Proof of property (ii) in proposition 1
Proof. Straightforward di¤erentiation of  (pm; pf ) with respect to pf gives
@1 (pm; pf )/ @pf = q (pf )
(
  12

1 H (pm)2

  16 (1 Q (pf ))
h
2  3H (pm) +H (pm)3
i
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1
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where it can be immediately seen that all three terms in the curly brackets are positive, such
that @1 (pm; pf )/ @pf < 0.
Appendix D: Proof of property (iii) in proposition 1
Proof.
@21 (pm; pf )
@pm@pf
= h (pm) q (pf )
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where it is clear that for 0  H (pm) ; Q (pf )  1 the rst two terms and the fourth term
are positive while third term is negative. Next consider only the rst and the third terms.
Together, they will have a minimum for H (pm) = 1, since this assigns the highest weight on
the negative third term. Setting H (pm) = 1 and adding the two terms give 162 (1 Q (pf ))2,
which will never be negative. Hence, we can conclude that @21 (pm; pf )/ @pm@pf > 0 for
0 < H (pm) ; Q (pf )  1.
.1 Appendix E: Proof of increasing share of matched indviduals 2
Proof. The share of matched men conditional on type is given by
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and for women by
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Di¤erentiating each in turn gives us
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